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The following abbreviations have been used for the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent, conflicting interpretations ot Whitehead's 
metaphysics point to a serious problem in his philosophy. The 
problem is that of the pla~e of religious experience in White-
head 'a metaphysics. On the one hand, there is the Christian-
Lowe-Leclero interpretation, according to which knowledge ot God 
for Whitehead is primarily by way of inference from the knowledge 
ot this world. 1 On the other hand, there is the Tillich-Harts• 
horne interpretation, according to which knowledge of God 1s pri-
marily by way of religious intuition and secondarily by way ot 
2 inference. These oontlioting interpretations need to be des-
cribed t'urther in order to isolate the problem ot this study. 
1 William A. Christian, An Interpretation ot W~iye­
head 1 s Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale-University Press;-19 9 
p. 386; Viator Lowe, "The Approach to Metaphysics," !h! Relevance 
ot Whitehead, ed. Leclerc (New York: Macmillan Co., 1961} 
PP• 193-216; Ivor Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 19$8) pp. 
2 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951) pp. 9, 43; Charles Hartshorne, 
"Wh1 tehead' s Idea of God," The Philoaophx of Alfred North ~iye• 
head, ed. P.A. Sch1lpp (New York: Tudor PUbliahing ao. I '19 1 
1 
2 
Christian recognises 1n 11the last Part ot Process and 
Reality, in the final chapters ot Adventures S/l, Ideas, and else-
where that he ,L\ilhitehea.9] speaks ot a 'Harmony ot Harmonies' 
which is both the basis or morality and the objeot or religious 
experience."3 Just as this religious experience is relevant to 
man's seeking or the practical good in morality and religion, so 
also it is relevant to man's seeking or the speculative good in 
metaphysioa. Christian suggests that Whitehead's speculative 
philosophy is not pure speculative philoaop~y proceeding only 
from a speculative interest. A religious interest has a basic 
influence on Whitehead's attempt to do speculative philosophy.4 
This interest presupposes the existence ot the proper object ot 
man's worship. For the religious interest leads to asking the 
basic religious question in a form such as this: "What ia it 
that rightly claims worship? ,.5 
Although the religious experience presupposes the exist-
ence or the proper objeot of man's worship, Christian argues that 
p. 538; Hartshorne, 11 Ideal K.."lowledge Defines Reality: What Was 
True 'Idealism'"• Journal ot Philosophy XLIII, no. 21 (Oot. 10, 
1946) p. 4. ~ 
.3 William A. Christian, "some Uses of Reason, 11 The 
Relevance ~ Whitehead, ed. Leclerc, p. 85; Whitehead, Adventures 
S!l, Ideas (New York: Macmillan Oo., 1961) p. 367. (Hereafter re-
ferred to as!,!.) 
4 Obristian, loo. cit. 
5 Christian, ..!Qig., p. 86. 
.3 
knowledge of God's existence 1s a oonolusion of Whitehead's meta• 
physics and not a fundamental point of departure. Christian in-
terprets Whitehead's statement that God is the ultimate irration• 
ality in Soienoe and .!Ul!. Modern World to mean that "we have no 
pure and self-evident principles trom which the existence of 
God • • • could be deduced. Our belief in the existence of God 
is irrational only in the weak sense that it is logically based 
on the reality of the given temporal world, accepted as a fact.6 
Even though Christian holds that the categories of explanation, 
suoh as the ontological principle are logically ineffective with-
out Whitehead's notion of God, Christian argues that the concept 
ot God is a derivative notion in Whitehead's metaphysios.7 Con-
sequently, it is Christian's view that religious experience is 
not relevant to the truth of Whitehead's categories of explana-
tion such as the ontological pr1no1ple. 
Whitehead's ontological principle is his version of the 
principle of suff1o1ent reason. Lowe's interpretation of this 
principle agrees with Christian•s interpretation: 
6 William A. Christian, AB InterRret!tion ,2!: White-
head 'a Metaphxaica, p. 386; ot. Whitehead, Solenoe and tge Modern 
World (New York: Macmillan Co., 1926) p. 2~7. (Hereafter 
referred to as~.) 
7 Christian, "Some Uses of Reason," .2.R• cit., p. 85; 
ct. Ohristian, "The Concept of God as a Derivative NOtion," 
Process and Divinity, eds. Reese and Freeman (Lasalle: Open 
Court, i9'b'Q:) pp. 181-203. 
4 
"'l'bat the universe, or being, is intelligible, is often said 
to be an indispensable and undeniable premise ot metaphysics. 
But Whitehead has shown how the matter can and should be 
conceived: · 
'That we fail to find in experience any elements 
intrinsically incapable of exhibition as examples ot 
general theory, is the hope of rationalism. This hope 
is not a metaphysical premise. It is the faith which 
forms the m.otive for the pursuit of all soienoes alike, 
including metaphysioa. 
In so tar as metaphysics enables us to apprehen9 
the rationality of things, the ola.im is justified.'" 
Leclerc's comment en this text is similar to Lowe's. 
fhe belief and hope that the world is intelligible is not a meta-
physical premise which discloses anything about the metaphysical 
truths of the universe. Rather this hope is an ideal which is 
seeking satiafaction, since it is intrinsically inherent 1n ra-
tionalism as suoh. This ideal is inherent in any attempt to find 
rational explanation. Consequently, a rational attempt to deny 
this ideal of seeking rational explanation is selt-contradiotory.9 
On the one hand, then, the Ohristian-Lowe-Leclerc 1n-
terpreta t1on is that Whitehead establiahes his point of departure 
in metaph7sios, his idaal that the world is intelligible and his 
oategorie9 of explanation such as the ontologioal principle, 
without any appeal to religious experience. But on the other hand, 
8 Viotor Lowe, "The Approaoh to Metaphysics," !h! Rele-
vance g! Whitehead, ed. Leclerc, P• 210; ct. Whitehead, Prooeaa 
~ Reality (New York: Macmillan Oo., 1930) p. 67. (Hereafter 
referred to as PR.) 
-
9 Ivor Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, p. 37. 
the Tillich-Hartshorne interpretation is that Whitehead's tunda-
mental point or departure in metaphysics is his appeal to reli• 
gious experience. 
Tillich holds that the fundamental commitment which 
directs Whitehead's philosophical approach is a type of mystical 
or religious experience, namely, the awareness or value-producing 
processes. This perception and conception of reality is based on 
an iminediate experience or something ultimate in value and being 
16 
ot which man can become aware intuitively. Although Tillich 
does not specify the texts ot Whitehead in which this intuitive 
awareness 11 described, he is probably referring to the Modes g.£ 
Thought description ot the sense of Deity. For Shahan interprets 
this book as having "numerous references • 
• • to an ultimate 
unity in the universe which can be experienced objectively and 
which is the tinal basis ot 'importance• and •aigniticance.• • 
• • 
The totality is desoribed as objectively experienced in a direct 
fashion. nll 
Hartshorne 1s interpretation agrees with Tillioh's inter-
pretation. Hartshorne argues that the sense or Deity is related 
to the very possibility ot man's knowledge ot objeotive truth, 
10 Paul Tillich, Systematic !heology, Vol. I (Ohioago: 
University of Chicago Preas, 19Sl) pp. 9, 43. 
11 Ewing P. Shahan, Whitehead's Theor~ of Experience (New York: Columbia University, l9SO) pp. 127-l a:-
6 
including metaphysical truth.12 In Whitehead's type ot metaphys-
ics, trillich points out, "God !!. .lh!. Ereaupposition .2! the ques-
tion or ~. or as Augustine argues more apeo1f1cally, Ver1taa ia 
presupposed in every philosophical argument; and veritas is 
God.nl3 The Tillich-Hartshorne interpretation, then, is that man 
implicitly knows that God is, or in other words, man is immediate-
ly aware ot God as Truth Itself, in any attempt ot speculative 
reason to state an objectively true statement. This implicit 
awarenesssot God becomes explloit in religious experience. Conse-
quently, Whitehead's point or departure in metaphysiaa cannot be 
described accurately without taking aooount of his description ot 
religious experience and its relevance to the presuppositions ot 
metaphysics. 
The oont'licting interpretations of Tillich-Hartshorne 
and Ohriatian-Lowe-Leclero on the fundamental presuppositions ot 
Whitehead's metaphysics and the relevance or religious experience 
to them raise a serious problem in the understanding ot White-
head's metaphysics. This study proposes to examine the serious 
problem ot the relevance ot Whitehead's description ot religious 
experience as the sense ot Deity to the fundamental presupposi-
12 Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead •a Idea ot God," .2.E.• 
cit., P• 538; Hartshorne, "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What 
Was True in 1 Idealism, 1 " .22• ~., pp. 573·582. 
13 Paul Tillich, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Reli-
gion," Union Seminary Quarterlz Review, I, no. 4 (May, 1946) p. 4. 
7 
tions of his metaphysics. Lowe and Leclerc have indicated that 
the ontologioal principle and the idE'lal or rationalism, namely, 
that the world is intelligible, are closely oonneoted fundamental 
presuppositions of Whitehead's metaphysios. Assuming what chap-
ter four will show, namely, that the ontological principle is 
only a restatement of the ideal of rationalism, this study will 
ex.amine the relevance of the sense of Deity to the ideal of ra-
tionalism, that is, to the function of speculative reason. For 
the function of speculative reason is to attain the ideal ot 
rationalism, a complete meta.physics, a complete understanding of 
the general, rational principles which all particular facts exem-
plify.14 
The purpose of chapter one is to discuss Whitehead'• 
definition of' apeoulative philosophy and its method as the defi-
nition of the function of speculative reason. Chapter two shows 
that the function of speculative reason is defended by rational 
religion and the religious intuition as the sense of' Deity. Chap-
ter three shows that the sense of' Deity and other defenses of the 
function of' speculative reason mutually supplement eaoh other. 
It will be pointed out that thE>se various defenses need to be ful-
filled by the best defense possible, namely, by the suooesst'ul 
working out of a speculative understanding of reality, For 
14 Whitehead, The Flmotion of Reason (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1958) p. 65. (Hereafter referred to as,!!!!.) 
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Whitehead's method of the working hypothesis demands that the 
function of speculative reason needs to be aohieved 1i11th some 
suooess: otherwise it would be a worthless ideal for man's civi-
lized life. However due to the imperfections of metaphysical 
systems, it is possible for man to lose hope in this ideal. Con-
sequently, Whit~head's appeal to the sense of Deity is important 
for man to continue to have faith in the ideal of speculative 
reason. Chapt~r four sums up these conclusions ot the previous 
chapters and considers two new problems related to thia study. 
In th1.s study ot the relevance of the a.esthet1o-rel1-
g1ous sense or Deity to the function of speculative reason, it is 
i~portant to point out that although Whitehead began his academic 
career as a teacher or philosophy at age 63, he was always in-
terested in the relevance of aesthetic and religious considera-
tions to man's life. The reader of chapter five of Science and 
_.....__......,_ -
!,h! Modern World, "The Romantic Reaction, n recognizes the signifi-
cant influence which the Romantic poets had upon Whitehead's met-
aphysioa.15 Whitehead's interest in Wordsworth and Shelley was 
acquired in preparatory schoo1. 16 He himself points out, "My 
15 ~- pp. 109-138. 
16 'Whitehe,1d, 0 Autobiographical Notes,'' .Ih! Phllosoph:r 9.! Alfred North Whitehead, ed. P.A. Sch11pp, p. 6. This article 
gives a brief autobiography of Whitehead. 
9 
writings on philosophy were all after I oame to this country 
[United StateiJ; but the ideas had been germinating in me for the 
better part of a life time. Some of them I had had when I was at 
school before ever I went up to the university."17 
Whitehead's marriage to Evelyn Willoughby Wade empha· 
sized what he had learned from the nature-poetry of the romantic 
revival. "Her vivid life has taught me that beauty, moral and 
aesthetic, is the aim of existence; and that kindness, and love, 
and artistic aat1sfe.ct1on are among its modes of attainment. 1118 
Whitehead accepted the Romantic poets' "protest against the ex-
clusion of value from the essence of matter of taot."1' Chapter 
two will especially examine how the sense ot Deity establishes 
for Whitetead that vslue is of the eseenoe of matter of fact. In 
do!r..g that, the sense of Deity helps to establish the fundamental 
presc.pposit1on of Whitehead's metaphysios, the function ot specu-
la.tive reason. 
(Boston: 17 Lucien Price, Dialogues of Alfred North Wh1. tehead Little, Brown, and Oo., 1954-Y-PP• 326-327. 
18 Whitehead, "Autobiographical Notes," .2.E• ..9.!!·• p. 8. 
19 ~, p. 138. 
OHAP.rER I 
SPEOULATIVE. PHILOSOPHY AS TEE FUNCTION OP SPEOULATIVE REASON 
The purpose of this chapter is to idtntify and define 
speculative ph1loaoph7 as the function of speculative reason. The 
exposition begins with a discussion of evolution and the functions 
of both speculative and practical reason. Thia consideration of 
evolution and reason offers a preliminary identification of the 
function of apeoulative reason. Then the chapter examines some 
ot the history of speculative reason in order to give an exact 
definition of speculative philosophy and its method. Speculative 
philosophy is the discipline in which Whitehead attempts to ful-
fill the function ot speculative reason. 
Before the exposition ot Whitehead's concept of the 
function of speculative reason, the difficulty should be raised 
of his presupposing his speculative understanding of evolution in 
order to explain the function of speculative reason. The diffi-
culty is whether or not Whitehead begs the question sinoe reason 
will be that wh1oh discovers this view ot evolution. Whitehead 
answers this difficulty by arguing that there is no way to begin 
in philosophy other than "to starat somewhere for purposes ot d1s-
l0 
ll 
courS«h But the philoaophp,_., aa he argues t'J:lom hia pHmi.e••t has 
already marked down every word and phrase in them a.a topics tor 
.ruture enqui17.n1 one wa:s of avoiding th• d1tfioult7 of begging 
the question in underatanUng the function ot apeculat1ve reason 
is to make a •tart somewheH, not forgetting that t;h.e starting 
point needs to be ra .... xam.tned. Another aspect of Whitehead•• 
avoiding this d1ttioul.t7 ia that he will appeal to tlaahea ot in• 
sight• to the intuitioa and. underatand.ing ot aelt•eTid.-e.2 
mrhe atteapt of U'Q' phtloaophio discourse should M to pi-oduo• 
aelt•ev14onee."3 The philosopher mat begin aomewheM but mu.at 
not a.aaume that where he begins :La a .tinali t7 neveit to be qUe•• 
tioned. Wh1 tehead. as.sens thia point beoauae ot an insight into 
the nature ot human lanauas•• the inaight that man•s experi$lld 
ot language is not a perteot lmowledge but bu tr1at'lJ' obaolll'-1ti•• 
connected with it.4 In t171ng to understand. the tu.notion of 
speculative reaaon Whitehead will appeal to tlaahea ot insight in 
order to avoid an7 begging ot the question. 
1 Whi tehead.1 Mod.ea _2' D\O!Elt (lfev~lU Haold.llD 
ao., 19)8) P• 23. 
2 i:R .. P• 6. 
3 5- P• 67. 
4 !l.t P• 23.$. 
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A. 
:iieeping in mind. that a stating point neede to be H• 
examined, Whitehead. otter>s "a prelWn&J.7 definition ot the tu.no• 
ti.on ot Reason, a de.tinition to be illuatr>ated, distorted., and 
enlai-ged ••• • !b!, :tunctiga ot Reuon ia .!St. ;eror.iot~ .~ a.rt ot 
lite."$ Ile explains thia definition b7 a diacuaaion ot the evo-
lutionist doctrine ot tl'M survival of the .f'itteat. Theite are two 
limitations ot the doctrine ot the aUl"W'ival of the titteat. The 
first ia that although the doctrine ma.y explain wl'J1' differing 
speoiea a.rise, it doea not apl)6U able to explain the origin ot 
living matter. For living matter> 1a compapativel7 deficient in 
survit"d value. Inorganlt things pera1et to?! S"•t lengthe ot 
ti.me whereu orgnnio things hal"dl.7 pe:.-sist at all. A rook ~ 
vivea for eight huntb-e4 million yeaa whereas the limit tor a 
tree is about a thouaan4 Y'G&re, tor a man a.bout a hundred yeua, 
tor a dog about twelve 7eara, to'I!' an inaect about one yea. 
1'he p:ttoblem tor the theo~ ot evolution ia to explain 
how complex organism with such detioient survival power ever 
evolve4. The doctrine or the survival of the t'i·ctest would ex• 
plain veey well WJ' l'Ooka have survived but not wh7 orgeaic thi 
have arisen trom inorganic matter.6 The second limitation is tha 
$ PR, P• 4• 
6 PP• 4•S. 
13 
this doctrine cannot explain why the trend of evolution hae been 
upwards. The upward trend is not explained by any doctrine of 
adaptation to the environment or ot the survival ot the fittest. 
The taot is not simply that living things have adapted to their e 
environments but just as muo~ that living things have adapted 
their environments to themselves. The more complex forms ot lite 
are actively modifying their environment, and it is very signiti-
oant that man actively attacks his environment.7 
Whitehead 1a neady to develop his preliminary definition 
ot the function ot reason: 
I now state the thesis that the explanation of th1a 
active attack on the environment is a three-told urge: 
(1) to live, (11) to live well, (111) to live better. In 
tact the art of lite is first to be alive, seoondlz to be 
alive in a satiatactor7 way, and thirdlx to acquire an in• 
crease in satisfaction. It is at this point ot our argu-
ment that we recur to the function of Reason, namely the 
promotion of the art ot life. The primary function ot 
Reason is the direction of the attack on the environment.a 
Hia thesis ot a three-told urge in life is an under-
standing which requires that reason be "a factor in experience 
which directs and orit1c1ses the urge towards the attainment of an 
end realized in imagination but not in tact."9 Whitehead is as-
serting that final causality is a partial explanation of lite. 
7 .l!l, pp. 7-8. 
a !ft, p. a. 
9 .!!!· p. 8. 
14 
Final causality, the grasping of a potential end as the formal 
cause of a living thing, requires that the living thing have a 
mental, non-physical factor which grasps the unaotualized, the 
non-physical. Reason or the mental factor of a living thing is 
the source of a three-fold urge involved in the art of life: the 
urge to live, to live well, and to live better. The art of life 
requires a three-told urge rather than simply the urge to live, 
since otherwise the facts of emergent evolution would be unintel-
ligible. The upward trend of emergent evolution requires more 
than just the urge to live and more than just the urge to live 
well, in order to continue evolutionary development. This three-
fold urge of the art of life does not involve three different 
types of causality but rather ls only one type, final causality. 
The final causality involved in the three-fold urge is the grasp-
ing of novel potential ends. 
Man's reason has developed out of this three-fold urge 
as life in its mental and physical aspects has become more com-
plex. The fundamental base of the activity of reason is purposive 
seeking of novel potential ends. Whitehead points out that the 
appetitlon of novel ends is anarchic in seeking to live well by 
perfecting the living thing and in seeking to live in a better 
way by changing the established order in an upward trend. The 
multiple species and mutations that have been lost in the struggle 
for existence in evolution bear witness to the anarchic novelties 
15 
introduced by the mental factor in living things. The novel ends 
cannot be completely anarchic since sheer anarchy means oomplete 
nothingness. For the appet1t1on of sheer anarchy by the mental 
faotor in a living thing would mean the mental appetition of such 
impossibilities as a square-cirole.10 Man's reason is the de-
veloped mental factor which seeks to live, to live well, and to 
live better. Man's reason seeks to live well by fulfilling in an 
orderly and satisfactory way the novelties projected by mentali-
ty. Man's reason seeks to live better by evaluating and ordering 
the projected novelties. In man's reason mentality has become 
self-regulative. By evaluating the purposes of mentality, reason 
introcuces a higher appetition into man's life. 11 Whitehead in-
siats upon final causality as a fundamental aspect of reason: 
Provided that we e.dmit the category of final causation, 
we can consistently define the primary function of Reason. 
This function is to constitute, emphasize, and criticize 
the final causes and strength of aims directed towards them, 
• • • Apart from this primary function the very exist• 
ence of Reason is purposeless and its origination is inex-
plicable. In the course of evolution why should the trend 
have arrived at mankind, if his activities of Reason remain 
without influence on his bodily aotlons. It is well to be 
quite clear on the p91nt that Rea.son is inexplicable 1.f pur-
pose be 1neffeotive.i2 
This theory defines the primary function of reason as 
10 
11 
12 
E,!, 
!,!, 
FR, 
-
i:p. 33-34. 
p. 34.. 
pp. 26-Zf'. 
16 
practical: (1) to constitute final causes, ths.t is, to live; (ii) 
to emphasize final causes, that is, to l!ve well; and (111) to 
criticize final causes, that is, to live b~tter. The function ot 
practical reason is to achieve a pu.rpose exterior to the satistao• 
tion of reason itself. In order to achieve this p~rpose, reason 
elaborates a methodology, a way of doing something. When the 
purnose is aoh1!"'vt::•d, praetieal reason is fulfilled and satia-
.fied.13 
~he operation of practical reason may be compared to 
and understood as an aspect of the evolutionary process. The 
discovery of a methodology tr.at solves a problem for man is quite 
similar to the discovery of a way to live for a species. '!'he use 
of this methodology solves the problem for man just as the use ot 
a way to live solves s difficulty in the environment for a 
speoies. The successful use of the methodology or way to live 
continues until fatigue or a new problem arises. At this point 
man or some species may refuse to overcome the fatigue or new 
problem and simply keep to the old way or doing things. But man 
or some speci~s may attempt to overcome the fatigue or problem b7 
sP-~king from the background of experience a novel potential form, 
a new methodology or way of living. If the new methodology is 
successful, the problem is overcome for man or some species; and 
13 f!!, p. 3'1 ~ 
17 
the upward trend of evolution continues. It the new method is un· 
successful, the problem is not solved; and a raoe of men or some 
species may die out. The discovery of a methodology by practical 
reason is in its essence the discovery of a way to live ~y the 
mental factor of a reality selecting a novel potential goai. 14 
Although the primary function of Reason is practical, 
namely, to constitute, emphasize, and criticize final oa~ses and 
the strength of aims towards them, reason also has a speculative 
function. In its apeculative f'unotion, reason is not subordinate( 
to any purpose othe~ than its own purpose of understanding every-
thing in terms of principles intelligible to itself. 3paoulative 
reason ia the result of a diaintereated curiosity in the intell1-
gibili ty of the world, the result of an ultima~e .faith that the 
world is intelligible. Reason fulfills its speculative function 
and gains its sole satisfaction when it understands all partiou-
lar facts in te.rn1s or general principles of reason. 15 
Whitehead suggests that this interest in the relation or 
partioular faots to general principles is an aspect or the charac-
ter of the modern mind as it has been influenced by science and 
Christianity. In previous epochs, geniuses such a9 Aristotle, 
Archimedes, and Roger 3aoon must have had this belief that every 
14 !fi, pp. 18-19., 
15 ,E!!, p. 37'!"38. 
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particular tact oan be conceived as an exemplification ot general 
pr1no1plea. In previous epochs there have always been practical 
men interested in particular tacts and men ot philosophic temper 
interested in general principles, but the uniting of these two 
interests has only been sporadic. Today, however, it is a common 
belief of the modern mind that the two intereata muat be united.16 
This belief is due to the great auocess ot science. 
Whitehead tinda two sources tor the great success ot 
science in modern Europe since the time ot Galileo. The f1rat 
source is the riae ot Naturalism in the Renaissance in which 
there ia an interest in natural occurrences and objects for their 
own sakes. Whitehead also points out the importance of the tech-
nology of the Benedictine monasteries in agriculture; thia tech-
nology kept the medieval mind in contact with particular tact.17 
IWhitehead remarks that the emphaa1a on natural things in the 
Renaissance was due to an aesthetic interest. "The whole atmos-
phere of every art exhibited a direct joy in the apprehension of 
the things which 11• around ua.nl8 The second source tor the 
•ucceaa of aoienoe comes trom Christian faith in God aa influenced 
~y Greek philosoph7 in the Medieval Scholaat1c1am. The medieval 
16 ~. pp. 3-4, 1. 
17 .fil1M, pp. 22-23. 
18 ..1.t:nf, p.- 23. 
19 
insistence on the rationality of God whose providence governed 
every particular faot helped to impress on the modern mind an 
instinctive belief in an intelligible order in nature. The 
Asiatic conception of God where God is either too arbitrary or 
too impersonal has not created such an instinctive belief •19 
Whitehead points out the importance of the instinctive 
quality of the belief in an order of nature. So long as men's 
activities in speculative thought are controlled by this settled 
instinct, it does not matter what men may say in words. Words of 
disbelief in the order of nature may ultimately destroy man's 
belief in the function of speculative reason. But until this 
destruction has occurred, words do not oount. These considera-
tions are important with respect to the history of scientific 
thought. For since the time of Hume, the fashionable soientifio 
philosophy has been to deny the rationality of so1enoe. Hume's 
denial of any possible knowledge of a necessary oonneotion be-
tween a oauae and its effect should give the result that soienoe 
oan only establish arbitrary connections between causes and ef-
fects. But implicitly scientists have ignored Humeta explicit 
rejection ot the cause-effect oonnection and have followed Hume's 
instinctive belief that cause and etteot are necessarily conneo-
19 ~. pp. 18'-19. 
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ted, that there is an order of nature. 20 The understanding or al 
the particular facts of nature in terms of general principles wil 
disclose the order of nature and thereby fulfill the function of 
speculative reason. 
B. The Relevanoe of Speculative Reason's History for ,!!! Exact ~efinit!on of Its Function and Method 
.......... ..-..;;;;.-......;;;..;;; ....... - - - ----
The preliminary identification of speculative reason's 
function given in the discussion of evolution and reason needs to 
be clarified. An examination of the history of speculative reaso 
will be offered in order to give an exact definition of the disci 
pline, speculative philosophy, and its method for fulfilling the 
function of speculative reason. 
When speculative reason first emerged as a distinguish-
able force in the life of man, it came in the form of sporadic 
inspirations. Prophets and seers spoke their inspirations ot 
moral insight and religious salvation. These speculative insights 
were relevant to the traditional ways and yet novel, transcending 
the old ways. However, the difficulty was and has always been 
that the world's experience of professed seers has been mostly 
untortunate. Among those claiming to be prophets, there are the 
insincere, the presumptuous, the ignorant, the incompetent, and 
20 ~, ~ •. 5 .... 6; or. David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Hu-
man Understanding, sections v and vr. ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1902) pp. 40-59. 
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the unbalanced. Speculative reason needed some method ot testing 
its sporadic inspirationa.21 
Then the Greeks "discovered the almost incredible secret 
that the speculative Reason was itself subject to orderly method. 
They robbed it of its anarchio character without destroying its 
function ot reaching beyond set bounds."22 It 1a the function ot 
speculative reason to understand all methods aa coordinated in a 
nature of things only to be grasped by transcending all method, 
that is, by piercing into the ultimate reasons beyond limited 
reasons. But in transcending all the auccess.f'ul methodologies ot 
practical reason and the mathematical and scient1t1o methods ot 
speculative reason, metaphysical speculative reason must be bound 
by some orderly method; otherwise its results will be untruatwor• 
thy. The Greeks replaced inspirations ot reason with speculative 
reason. They discovered how speculative reason is to be bounded 
by method even while it tranaoenda the limitation of any of its 
own methods and methodologies.23 
Whitehead explains the Greek discovery that speculative <· 
reason is itself subject to orderly method: 
21 !'!!,, pp. 66-67. 
22 !fi, pp. 66-67. 
23 !!!. pp. 65-67, 82. 
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The Greeks invented logic in the broadest sense or that 
term-•the logic of discovery. The Greek logic as finally 
perfected by the experience or centuries provides n set of 
criteria to whioh the content of a belief should be sub-jected. These are: (1) Conformity to intuitive experience: (11) Clarity or propositional content: 
(111) Internal Logical consistency: 
(iv) External Logical oonsistenoy: 
(v) Status of a Logical scheme with, 
(a) widespread conformity to experience, 
(b) no diaoordanoe with experience, 
(o) coherence among its oategoreal notions, 
(d) methodological oonsequences.24 
As perfected by the experience of centuries of mathe-
ma tios, science, and philosophy, the Greek logic of discovery 
provides a set of oriteria by which any speculative understanding 
of reality should be tested, whether the understanding be meta-
physical or non-metaphysical. It is a miaoonoept1on to hold that 
the criteria are easy to use. The Greeks and the medievals 
thought that clear and distinot premises which conformed to ex• 
per1enoe were very easily known. Accordingly, they were careless 
in their evaluation of premises and devoted to the elaboration of 
deductive systems. The philosophers of Modern Europe trom 1600 
to 1900 have also assumed that olear and distinct premises which 
conform to experience are easily known. In wbitehead•s view, the 
first two criteria, (1) conformity to intuitive experience and 
(11) clarity of propositional content, are extremely difficult to 
24 !!!!, pp. 67 -68. 
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fulfill. In fact there are difficulties with the fulfilment ot 
all five criteria.25 
The First Criterion 
-
The first criterion 1e that a belief should have oon-
formity to intuitive experience. One difficulty with fulfilling 
the first criterion is t~at there are always interpretative ele-
m~nts in experience. The Conceptual Order of experience, me.n's 
general way of conceiving the universe, controls to a great extent 
the interpretation of the Observational Order of experience, his 
direct, immediate discriminations of particular observations. 
Some theory ot reality, often unexpressed, is present in the ob-
servation ot reality, dictating what method is to be used 1n look-
ing for evidence and how it is to be interpreted. Unantio~pated, 
novel observations are rare ooourrenoes. Beoauae .. such obser~4:iO';; 
tions are unexpeoted, their sign1fioanoe may be lost if there is 
no soheme or ideas to interpret t~em.26 
A seoond difficulty with fulfilling the first criterion 
is the obscurity and variety of experience. The conventional 
view of experience is tbat conscious experience is a clear-out 
knowledge ot clear-cut items with clear-cut oonneotions with eaoh 
other. However, the evidence is against suoh an eq11ating of ex-
25 A!, pp. 198, 283-284; !!1 p. 68. 
26 _m, p. 12. 
perience with clarity of knowledge. The olarity cannot be sepa-
rated from the vagueness of experience. There is a focus of 
attention bringing to clear light a few items, having vague inter-
oonnectiona with dimly apprehended items. Besides this ambiguous 
character or an immediate moment or experience, the moments differ 
among themselvea in their meaning and importance tor a man. He 
can be alert, drowsy, excited, contemplative: man•s variety of 
phases ia 1nfinite.Z7 
A third difficulty with fulfilling the first or1ter1on 
is the f1n1tenesa of human intuition. Oonaciousnesa is able to 
know the world only through a selective emphasis from the totality 
ot experience.28 Any intuition is an abstraction, a selection, 
which haa assumed 1ta clarity and self-evidence by neglecting 
other faoeta of experience. These other facets of experience may 
have important modifications upon the self-evidence or the origi-
nal 1ntu1t1on.29 Since man's finite understanding is unable to 
grasp the totality of finite perapeotives in the universe by one 
aet ot understanding, no intuition of experience claiming to be 
self-evident is irreformably true.30 
Z7 ,!!, pp. 78-79. 
28 !fi, p. 22. 
29 .!!'ll pp. 143-144. 
30 ~. p. 58. 
Intuition of self-evidence on an abstract level such a1 
ma.thematics is absolutely true. But once that level is deserted, 
fundamental transformations ot meaning can ooour in the relating 
to the rest of exper1enoe.31 There is a sense of completion in 
an act of intuition, but the completion is not final. For the 
material understood presupposes an undefined environment which 
is in process of change. Hence understanding is never a finished, 
static state of mind but alway~ bears the character ot a process 
of penetrating, incomplete and partia1.32 
There are two modes of understanding a reality in pro-
cess: internal understanding and externa.l understangins. Inter-
!!!! underatand1BS conceives the reality as the unified outcome or 
1ts composite factors. The knowledge of the raotors in their in-
ter-relationship makes evident why the thins is what it is,.a uni-
fied outoome. An1 reality so understood is to be viewed aa an 
outcome in the strict sense of being a product or the interweaving 
ot ita composite taotora.33 There is no such thing tor Whitehead 
as the internal understanding or an abstract, unchanging tautology. 
Tautology as a prevalent modern doctrine holds that •two-t1mes-
three' is the same thing as 'six' and that, consequently, no 
31 !!111 p. 78. 
32 MT, p. 60. 
33 ~. p. 63. 
new truth is arrived at in relating the two phrases in an identi-
ty. Whitehead contends that suoh a sentenoe considers a prooeaa 
and its resulting outcome. The phrase 'two-times-three• indicate 
a torm of fluent process, and 1s1x 1 indicates a obaraoterization 
of its resulting outcome. Since there is no such entity as a 
mere static number, that is to say, since there are only numbers 
playing their parts in various processes in reality, it is not 
true that the process of fusing two groups of three necessarily 
issues in a group of six. It 1a not true that the process ot 
fusing two groups of three drops of water necessarily issues in 
one group of six drops of water; one drop could be the result or 
more than six could be the result. Internal unde~standJgg does 
oocur but does not result in mere tautologies.34 
Internal understandi!!g leads into external understand-
ing. This second mode of understanding "is to treat the thing as 
a unity, whether or not it be capable of analysis, and to obtain 
evidence as to its capacity for affecting the environment.•35 
Since the unified outoome of the interweaving of a group ot facts 
can itself become a factor in the realities which it oan causally 
affect, internal understanding does not suffice for a csomplete 
understanding of the reality in question. When this reality as a 
34 ,m:, pp/.124-125, 127-128. 
35 !2!, p. 63. 
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unified outcome or faotors beoomes itself a factor in another 
reality, another act of internal understanding is needed in order 
to grasp how the first reality becomes a factor in the unified 
outoome of the seaond reality. Aooordingly, internal and external 
understanding presuppose each other. The former mode conceives 
the thing as an outcome of its causal, composite factors, and the 
second mode oonoe1ves the thing as becoming a causal factor in 
the composition ot other realities.36 
These reflections on 1nte:rnal and external understand-
ing suggest another difficulty oonoerning the fulfilment of the 
first criterion that a belier should have conformity to intuitive 
experience. Since nothing is finally understood until its refer-
ence to process have been made evident, the truths that apply to 
an individual reality in process must apply to it as an individual 
in process, or else the truths are without meaning. The problem 
is how truth ean be general, applying to all ind1•1duala in 
process, and at the same time unique, applying to .aob individual 
in process as that individual ia. Whitehead's answer to this 
difficulty ia the use or analogy. Por example, it ms.y be possible 
to compare two ultimate units of reality in the following way: 
unity 'A' is different from unity 'B' ainoe the one is not the 
other; yet the unities are similar since both are the unified 
B6 J!l, p. 63. 
28 
outcomes of their composite factors. In seeking the general 
rational prinoiples that all ultimate real1t1cn exemplify, the 
procedure of rationalism is the discussion of analogy, the dis-
covery of identities (similarities) amid diversity. Por to state 
that the ultimate realities such as 'A' and 1B' are unities is to 
state a general principle applying to all ultimRte realities and 
at the same time to state a truth applying analogously to each 
different ultimate reality. ~he limitation ot rationalism is 
that the diversity of things makes it difficult to discover iden-
tities amid diversity 1n intuitive experience.37 
The Second Criterion 
The second criterion by which a belief should be tested 
!s the clarity of its propositional content. It ia Whitehead's 
view that this criterion is an ideal which man never fulfills 
completely. In the first plaoe, language never fully expresses 
intuition; man's understanding of experience needs more than the 
ordinary usages of words.38 In this sense, philosophy and poetry 
are similar, explains Whitehead: 11 ••• philosophy is mystical. 
For mysticism is direct insight into depths as yet unspoken. But 
the purpose of philosophy is to rationalize mysticism: not by 
37 .!:!£., pP. 133-134. 
38 Mr _, p. 68; PR, op. 17-20. 
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explaining it away, but by the introduction of novel verbal ohar-
aoter1zat1ons, rationally coordinated."39 Because language never 
fully expresses intuition, the P'allacy of the Perfect Dictionary 
roust be avoided. This is the belief "that n'Ankind baa conscious .. 
ly entertained all the tundaroental ideas which are applicable to 
its exper1enoe. Further it is held that human language, in single 
words or in phrases, explicitly expresses these ideaa."4o In 
accord with these refleotions, Whitehead maintains that the ex~~ 
preasion of an intuition in a proposition does not yield perfect 
clarity. 
Another difficulty with the fulfilment of the criterion 
of clarity of propositional content is that "apart from a com-
plete metaphysical understanding of the universe, it is very dit-
fioult to understand any proposition olearly and distinctly, so 
tar as concerns the analysis of 'its oomponent elementa."41 Since 
a proposition ha.a meaning about a reality interconnected with the 
universe, the proposition cannot be perfectly clear and distinct 
unless this background is completely understood in its important 
elements, that ia, in its metaphysical ele.ments.42 Human language 
'39 MT, P• 23S. 
}+O' 
.!:«, P• 235 • 
41 ..m p. 68 • 
42 PR, 
-
pp. 16-17. 
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obscures the conneot1ona of things since "single words, each with 
its diotionary meaning, and single sentences, each bounded by full 
stops, suggest the possibility of complete abstraction from any 
env1ronment.tt43 
However, suoh a suggestion is erroneous. Any reality 
in the universe essentially presupposes in its reality oonnectiona 
with the other realities in the universe. Internal undet§tandil}Ft 
should be used to conceptualize how the universe's realitiee are 
faotors in the unified outcome of a given :reality, and external 
understanding should be used to conceptualize how this given re-
ality can causally affect the universe. Sinoe any proposition 
about a reality presupposes perfeot internal and external under-
standing, the proposition is never p~rfeetly understood. For 
perfect internal and external understanding are ideals that man's 
finite intelligence can only strive to attain.44 
The Third and Fourth Criteria - __ ......,._._.. ............................ 
The third and fourth criteria tor testing the content ot 
a belief are internal logiosl oonsistenoy and external logioal 
consiateno7. The dittioulty with fult1111ng these criteria fol-
lows from the reflections about the ambiguity or the propositional 
43 11!',, P• 90. 
44 Hr, pp. 12-13, 90-91. 
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content. If the analysis of a proposition always leaves some am-
bigU1ty of meaning in rete:renoe to the rest of the universe, it 
is always possible that the propos1 ticn 1s el ther not self-consis-
tent or not externally consistent with other propositions already 
accepted as true.45 
If the first two or1 ter1a, con.f :.:-rmi ty to 1ntu1 ti ve ex-
perience and clarity of propositional content, ·were capable of 
easy deternination, the remaining criteria would not be needed. 
Also if the first four criteria aould be definitely f 1llfilled, 
then the fifth criterion would not be needed. Accordingly, the 
fifth ori terion is needed to make up for the difficulties,dn ful-
filling the first four oriteria.46 
!h.!. Fifth Criterion 
The fifth criterion is a belief should fit into the 
status of a logical scheme with (a) widespread oonforrnity to ex-
perience, (b) no discordance with experience, (c) coherence among 
its categoreal notions, and (d) methodological oonaequencea. This 
or1ter1on helpa to remedy the diffioult1e.a involved in fulfilling 
the first four criteria. 
A scheme or ideas stated in propositions which are 'log-
4S ll!1 P• 69. 
46 lj!, p. 69. 
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1oal' helps the fulfilment of the third and fourth criteria of in-
ternal and external logical consistency. For by a 'logical 
scheme' of ideas, Whitehead means that the propositions are logi-
cally consistent, that is, that they lack contradiction internally 
and externally, that the general ideas are defined in technical 
terms, and that the scheme ot propositions is in aooord with the 
principles or logical 1nferenoe.47 
A logical scheme ot ideas with 'coherence among its 
oategoreal notions' also helpa to fulfill the third and fourth 
criteria. "'Ooherenoe,' as here employed, means that the funda-
mental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppos4 
eaoh other so that in isolation they are meaningless."48 The 
essential interconnectedness or realities in prooess in the uni~ 
verse requires that the fundamental notions about these intercon-
nected realities be themselves interconnected, No idea about the 
essential interdonnectedness ot realities in process oan apply to 
the world if it is isolated from other ideaa.49 Such isolation 
is incoherence, the arbitrary disconnection of first prinoiples.50 
No rational defense can be given for incoherence. For a rational 
47 
_E!!, p. 5. 
48 !!!, p. 5. 
49 Leclerc, Whitehead's Meta2hiaios, p. 37. 
50 J!, p. 9. 
explanation cannot make coherent or connected that which is sup-
posedly absolutely inooherent, absolutely disconnected, absolutely 
isolated. Incoherence is a form of 1rrat1onal1sm; consequently, 
Whitehead's rationalism rejects incoherence in his attempt to dis-
cover the general rational (coherently connected) principles that 
all particular actualities exemplify. The acceptance of the func-
tion ot speculative reason is simultaneously the aooeptanoe ot co-
herence, the rejeotion of incoherence. Therefore, the construc-
tion of a logical scheme of ideas with •coherence among its cate-
goreal notions' should help to fulfill the third and fourth .2.£1· 
teria of internal and external logical consistency. The 'coher-
ence• of oategoreal notions requires internal and external logical 
consistency. For what is undefined or unexplained in one idea ot 
an actual entity receives explanation from the other ideas which 
are of equal generality with the first idea, that is, from the 
other ideas which also apply to the aotual entity.51 Metaphysioal 
51 l11,, P• 1: "There a.re no definitions of such ffeeta-
phys1oa!7 notions. They are incapable of analysia 1n terms of tac 
tors more far-reaching than themselves. f!.,ocordingl3] each must 
be displayed as necessary to the various meanings of groups of no-
tions, of equal depth with itself." Of. ,!!, p • .304: 11Thus to 
arrive at the philosophical generalization which is the notion of 
a final aotuality conceived in the guise of a generalization or an 
act of experience, an apparent redundancy of terms is required. 
The words correct each other. We require •together•, 'creativi-
ty', •concresoenoe', •prehension•, 'feeling', •subjective form:•, 
'data•, 'actuality•, 1becoming 1 , •process'." 
propositions will have internal and external logical consistency 
since •coherence' requires that the scheme of oategoreal notions 
exhibit their interconnections very clearly. 
'l'he 'logical scheme of coherent categoreal notions' 
helps to fulfill the second criterion of clarity of propositional 
content since the scheme provides the background within which any 
proposition should have meaning.52 Finally, the verification of 
this scheme by 'widespread conformity to experience• and 1no dis-
cordance with experience• helps to fulfill the firs~ oriterion of 
conformity to intuitive experience. For the d1reot verification 
or some ideas in the categoreal scheme is the indirect verifioa-
tion of the other ideas coherent with the verified ideas.53 White-
head emphasizes that the veritioation ot the scheme must be in 
those factors in experience whioh are 'stable.• This means that 
the 1ntu1t1on giving verification should not be confined to a tew 
special people or a few special occasions. The first discernment 
~y be due to an exceptional man in an exceptional moment, but 
later discernments should be available to other people at other 
niomenta.54 
In seeking verification in the •stable' faotors of human 
52 !!!. p. 10. 
53 !!!, p. 69. 
54 !f!, pp. 77-78. 
experience, speculative philosophy should especially attend to 
the evidence d1solosed in the welter ot established institutions 
aonstitut1ng the structures of human society throughout the ages. 
What those institutions presuppose and express represents impor• 
tant, enduring facts of experience. It is a commonplace that men 
disagree about practically everything, but the basis of every dis-
cord is some common experience, discordantly interpreted. One 
example is that the disoordanoe over moral codes gives witness to 
the faot of moral experience. Another example is that although 
menereate different institutions for different purposes, the very 
faot of institutions to effect purposes gives w1tnasa to the un-
questioned belier that foresight and purpose oan shape the atta1n-
m~nt of ends.55 
The verification of the scheme of oategoreal notions in 
the institutions of m~n show! how the soheme of ideas has 'metho-
dologioal oonsequenoes.•56 Thia is the best verifioation possible 
in that the scheme of o~tegoreal notions "issues in the establish-
ment of a praotioal teohn1que for well-attested ends, and that the 
speculative system maintains itself as the elucidation of that 
techn1que.n57 The scheme of oategoreal notions thereby gains the 
55 J!!!, pp. 85-86. 
56 ![!, p. 43. 
51 !'!!, pp. 80-81; in aocord with this text, Whitehead 
says that "metaphysics is nothing but the desoript1on of the gen-
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character of generating ideas coherent with itself and or receiv-
ing continuous verifioetion.58 This interplay of thought and 
practice, the progress from thought to practice and the regress 
from practice to thought. is the supreme authority. This inter-
play of thought and practice is the test to which speculative 
..... Q 
reason must submit its intuitions and generalizations.~' 
Another required ver1fioat1on of the scheme of oategor-
eal notions is that speculative philosophy should make the vari-
ous soienoes and their interrelations intelligible. As Ohristian 
comments, Whitehead's speoula~ive philosophy is meant to be both 
relevant to and consistent with well-founded ao1ent1fio theories. 
If the oategoreal scheme is incapable of interpreting a well• 
fou...~ded scientific theory, then the scheme is in that respect in• 
adequate and not veritied.60 Leclerc explains how Whitehead con-
nects speculative pbilosophy (metaphysics) with the various 
sciences throLtgh the discipline entitled cosmology.. Cosmology tt1a 
the effort to frame a scheme of the general character ot the 
present stage of the universe, 0 whereas metaphysics is the effort 
eralities which apply to all the details of praotioe." ]!, p. 19. 
58 E!!. pp. 69-70. 
59 !fi, pp. 80-81. 
60 !,B, p. 76. 
37 
to .frame of the general character of all possible stages of the 
universe. 61 Metaphysics as such ia not directly relevant to the 
sciences; what the soienoes require for a philosophical interpre-
tation is an application of the categoreal notions, an 1nterpreta• 
tion of the universe as it is at present in terms of a metaphysi-
cal scheme of ideas. This interpretation is cosmology. 5inoe 
philosophy of science is not possible without metaphysics as the 
basis from which science is interpreted, philosophy of science 
should be recognized as cosmology, not as a d.1so1pl1ne that can be 
done without metaphysical presuppositions. Consequently, cosmolo-
gy takes the place of the philosophy of science in Wl:.1tehead 1a 
publications of his second per1oe.62 
In Whitehead's view, metaphysics, cosmology, the schemes 
of the sciences bot~ natural nnd social, the sociological struc-
ture of technical methods ane of institutions, and the whole of 
man•s experience, including its aesthetic. moral, and religious 
aspects, are all mut~ally critics of each other. Reason inter• 
venes in the capacity of arbiter by a further exercise of specula-
tion, and all the elements of man•s lite, including the sohemea of 
the so1enaes, cosmology, and metaphysics, are mutually modified. 
The joint discipline of this mutual modification ~lim1nates errors 
61 Leclerc, .2.R• ~., p. 225. 
62 _!lli. 
3~ 
from the speculations of reason. 63 "The purposes of mankind re-
ceive the consequential modification, and the shock is transmitted 
through the whole sociological structure of technical methods and 
of inst1tut1ons."64 This interpla1 of thought and practice is 
the supreme authority, the test b7 which the errors of speculative 
reason are eliminated. 
However, this supreme authority tails to be final for 
two reasons. First, the evidence always remains confused, ambigu-
ous, and even contradictory •. Secondly, if speculative reason had 
ever accepted any speculations as finally and absolutely verified 
in this supreme authority of the interplay of thought and prac-
tice, all progress in history would have been stopped. 65 "The 
horrid practices of the past, brutish and nasty, would have been 
fastened upon us for all ages."66 Man should not accept that the 
praotioes of the present age are the final standard for all times. 
Whitehead insists on the necessity ot speculation even though it 
63 ,!!!!, pp. 76-77, 86-87; J!, p. vi; of.£!, pp. 82-85, 
where Whitehead points out that the Greeks (Plato and Aristotle) 
made speculation effective by (l) being unboundedly curious, (2) 
striving for coherent systems, (3) having interest in every field 
worthy of human endeavor, (4) seeking truths of the highest gener-
ality, and ($) having practical interests. 
64 J!!!, p. 87. 
65 !!!, p. 81. 
66 !!!,, p. 81. 
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does not yield praotioal benefits nor have immediate verification 
in facts and practice. Abstract speoulation gave European science 
its foundation long before the sciences oame into being. Conse-
quently, Whitehead argues, to set limits to speculation is treason 
to the future.67 In fulfilling the art of life, it is true that 
man lives and lives well, but he still feels the urge to live 
better. 68 
Consequently, no matter how well confirmed the eategor-
eal scheme may become, it must alwa7s remain a working h7pothesis. 
Speculative philosoph7 must embod7 the method or the working hy-
pothesis, since its first principles are reformable. Its first 
principles are the very points which speculative reason is trying 
69 to know. Speculative reason must avoid the dogmatic fallacy, 
the belief that the principles ot its working hypothesis ere clear 
obvious, and irreformable.70 It philosophy be based upon olear 
and distinot ideas, then the disoord of philosophers, competent 
and sincere men, implies that the function or speculative reason 
is a "will-o'-the wisp. But as soon as the true function of 
rationalism is understood, that it is a gradual approach to ideas 
67 ,!!!!, pp. 71-76. 
68 
•• p. 81. 69 !!. P• 286; Leclerc, .2.2• cit., p. 48. 
70 ~I,. p. 287. 
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of clarity and generality, the discord is what may be expected."71 
In accord with the reflections on these five criteria of 
the Greek logic of discovery, as perfeoted by the experience of 
centuries of speculation, Whitehead defines speculative philoso-
phy and describes its method. 
O. Speculative Philosophy !.! the Function £!.. Speculative Reason 
The discipline in which speculative reason attempts to 
fulfill its function la speculative philosophy: 
Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a co-
herent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms 
of which every element of our experience oan be interpre-
ted. • • • Thus the philosophical scheme should be coher-
ent, logioal, and in respect to its interpretation, applica-
ble and adequate. Here 'applicable' means that some items 
ot experience are thus interpretable, and 'adequate• meall§ 
that there are no items incapable of suoh interpretat1on.l2 
In this definition, the various refleations of Whitehead 
on the five criteria of the Greek logic of discovery can be dis-
cerned. First, in saying that speculative philosophy is the ,!l!-
deavour 12 frame ••• , he is pointing out that the activity of 
seeking first principles, the general ideas, is reason in its ba-
sio form. In its basic form, reason is not deductive reason but 
speculative reason which uses the method of the working hypothe-
71 !!!, pp. 87-88. 
12 !!!,, p. 4; or. Al· p. 285. 
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s1s.73 Speculative philosophy is n~ver a finished fact but some-
thing whioh man will always endeavour to do in attempting to ful-
fill the function of speculative reason. 
Secondly, in saying that the philosophical scheme should 
be coherent~ logical, Whitehead is referring to the fifth cri-
terion. 'l'his criterion requires tba t speculative reason should 
construct a logical scheme with coherence among its oategoreal 
notions. lhe scheme of general ideas is logical in so far as its 
propositions are internally and externally consistent, in so far 
as 1 ts general ideas are de tined in tecr...nical (ca tegoree:l} no-
tions, and in so far as the scheme of propositions is in accord 
with the principles of logical inference. The scheme of general 
ideas is coherent in so far ms the ideas of an actual entity con-
nected with the universe of actual entities are not arbitrarily 
disconnected but rather presuppose each other so that in isolation 
they are meaningless. What one idea of an actual entity presup-
poses and leaves unexpressed will be expressed in the other ideas 
which also apply to it. 
'l'hirdly, in saying that the philosophical scheme should 
be apElioable !!12 .!.£!9uate in its interpretation of every element 
of experience, Whitehead is again referring to the fifth criteri-
on. This criterion requires that the scheme of ideas have both 
73 Leolero, -22• cit., pp. 41-42. 
widespread conformity to experience and no discordance with ex-
perience. Applicabilitz means widespread conformity to, and 
adfquaoy means no discordance with, experience. 
The definition of speculative philosophy has both a 
rational side, expressed by the terms coherent and logical, and 
an empirical side, expressed by the terms applicable and adeguate. 
Whitehead explains how these two sides are bound together by show-
ing how an adequate soheme must be a neeessarz one: The adeguacz 
of the scheme for the interpretation of experienoe does not mean 
only adeguao1 for such experience as happen to have been consi<W:• 
ered.,; It means that all human experience is suoh that the items 
diaoloaed 1n this awareness muat be interpretable by the scheme. 
Consequently. the soheme is necessary in the sense that all ex-
perience as such ia interpretable hy the scheme. Provided that 
man limits his speculative understanding to that which cornmuni-
oates with immediate matter of fact disolosed in his experience, 
the aoheme will necessarily be applicable for the interpretation 
ot any matter of fact. For what does not communicate with immedi-
ate matter of fact diaolosed in awareness and experience is un-
knowable. and the unknowable 1s simply unknown.74 The scheme ot 
philosophic ideas is neeesaarilz true in that it is adequate for 
the interpretation of all matters of fact disclosed in experience. 
74 11!1 pp. 5-6. 
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"This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an 
essence to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, 
as a violation of its rationality. Speculative philosophy seeks 
that essenae.n75 
The key terms in Whitehead's definition of speculative 
philosophy have been considered; his definition may be restated 
as the function of speculative reason: Speculative reason's .func-
tion is to seek to frame a coherent, logical, neoessari system of 
general ideas which makes intelligible every element of experi-
ence by being applicable to 1t and adequate for the interpretation 
of any experience. These characteristics of metaphysical ideas, 
namely that they are completely universal or neoessacr, forming 
a system which is coherent, logical, applicable, and adequate, 
constitute the requirements whioh a metaphysical system has to 
fulf111.76 It is in terms of these requirements, as summarized in 
the fifth criterion of the Greek logic of discovery, that White-
head proposes the method of the working hypothesis for speculative 
philosophy. 
D. !h!. Method £!. S2eculative PhilosophJ 
Relying on his knowledge of the history of speculative 
75 .ffi, p. 6. 
76 Leclerc, .2.1?• ..£!l., p. 39. 
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reason, Whitehead adopts the method of the working hypothesis tor 
speculative philosophy by asserting that progress in speculative 
understanding has been achieved "by the complex process of gener-
alizing from particular topics, ot imaginatively sohemat1z1ng the 
generalization, and finally by renewed comparison of the imagined 
scheme with the di?"ect experience to which it should apply."77 
Whitehead is relying on hia exposition of the fifth criterion ot 
the Greek logic of discovery: any belief should fit into a logi-
cal scheme with (a) widespread conformity uo experience, (b) no 
discordance with experience, (c) coherence among its oategoreal 
notions, and (d) methodological consequences. This criterion im-
plies all that was stated in the above text. It implies that a 
logical scheme of ideas has been constructed by generalizing from 
particular topics and imaginatively schematizing the generaliza-
tions into coherence. The fifth criterion also requires verifi-
cation of the scheme through widespread <X>nformity to experience, 
no discordance with experience, and methodological consequences 
such as making intelligible the theories and discoveries of the 
sciences. 
Accordingly, Whitehead proposes that speculative reason 
use the following three step method whioh he compares to the 
flight of an airplane. (l) Reason starts from the ground of par-
77 ]!!!, p. 24. 
tioular observation. (2) Reason makes a flight in the thin air 
of imaginative generalization and sohematization or this general-
ization with other generalizations. (3) Reason lands fbr renewed 
observation rendered aoute by rational interpretation.78 Thia 
method does not seem complex, but its actual use is very complex 
because the three steps must be repeated over and over in the 
attempt to discover .!!! the metaphysical first principles which 
make intelligible .!!!. particular tacts. A further difficulty in 
the use of the method is that imaginative generalization of the 
correct metaphysical first principles must require a genius or 
the rank or Plato. Aristotle, Newton, and Einstein. Once such 
a genius has shown the way, it is possible for other men to grasp 
their insights and follow their reasonings. An explanation of 
the three step method needs to be given. 
First Stage g£, ,1h! Method 
Reason starts from the ground ot particular observation. 
Whitehead explains that the only point of departure available tor 
speculative thought is immediate experience which discloses to 
man the actual world. including man himself. He also insists that 
thought whioh is not for the sake or elucidation of experience is 
useless and unjustified thought.79 In appealing to experience for 
78 J!, p. 7. 
79 !!!, p. 6. 
the discovery of the necessary features of reality, Whitehead ia 
consistent with his ontological principle. According to this 
principle, the ultimate reasons (the metaphysical first princi-
ples or necessary features of reality) are only to be discovered 
in the composite nature of definite actual entities. Since the 
actual entities themselves must embody those necessary features, 
man must seek those features in his ecperience of those aotuali-
ties. 80 
In seeking these necessary features in experience, man 
oan only appeal to direct insight--to what Descartes termed .!B-
speotio. 81 Leclerc points out that this direct insight is not 
some separate and superior form of knowledge since it "is but a 
phase in one whole constituting the method of the working hypoth-
esis, the method by which, in the final analysis, all conceptual 
knowledge is atta1ned.n82 These direct insights are formulable 
into what Christian calls pre-systematic statements, "statements 
of facts Whitehead means to take aGoount of and do justice to in 
his speculative construotion. 1183 Examples of such statements 
are: "All things flow •••• There are many things. Things are 
11!.!S, ed. 
80 Leclerc, .2.2• ~., pp. 27-28, 43. 
81 .HI, p. 103. 
82 Leclerc, ..22• o1t., p. 46. 
83 Christian, "Some Uses of Reason," Relevance .2! White· 
Leclerc, p. 74. 
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1nteroonneoted. Aims are ef.feotive •••• The primitive experi-
ence is emotional feeling, felt in relevance to a world beyond."84 
These statements may be oharacter1ted as having their terms taken 
from ordinary usage, soienoe, religion, or traditional philosophy. 
Neither the logioal subjects nor the predicates of these state-
ments are expressed by terms taken from Whitehead's oategoreal 
scheme. The terms of these statements are non-systematio. 85 
Seoond Stage of lh!, Method 
The second step of the method is that reason imagina-
tively generalizes frOtl'l the particular observation and sohemat1zes 
this generalization with other generalizations. This generaliza-
tion and sohematization creates Whitehead's oategoreal scheme, a 
logioal scheme or coherent ideas formulated in technical or sys-
tema tio terms and statements.86 Systematic statements are state-
ments of relationships within the scheme in wh1oh all the terms of 
the statements, both logical subjects and prediaates, are derived 
from the oategoreal scheme, suoh as the statement, for example, 
"Every actual entity is present in every other actual ent1ty.n87 
Imaginative generalization from particular observation 
84 ~-
85 Ibid. 
-
86 Cf. 1!1 PP• 27.45, where Whitehead gives a concise 
statement ot his categoreal scheme. 
87 Christian, loo. cit. 
--
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is termed "1magina ti ve rationalization, ii 11 imag1nat1ve construc-
tion," and u'ph1losoph1c generalization; 111 Whitehead explains this 
last term as "'the utilization of speoific notions, applying to a 
restricted group of tacts, for the divination of the generic no-
tions which apply to all facts.• "88 Christian ·~ ... mments that this 
imaginative construction may be viewed as creating systematic 
statements as analytic statements. The truth of any particular 
systematic statement does not strictly depend on or follow from 
the truth of any pre-systematic statements. 39 Since there oan be 
no indubitable immediate assurance of the correctness of direct 
insight and its imaginative generalization, the imaginative gener-
alization must be ta.ken es an hypothesis and subjected to a care-
ful and elaborate procedure of ver1f1oat1on.90 
Sinoe the imaginative generaliz1t1on does not striotly 
follow from any pre-systematic statement, the problem arises how 
direct insights are to be generalized. In one sense, it is im-
possible to point out the positive connection betwe~n the insight 
and its generalization without examining eaoh case, since the 
generalization is unique each time it is done by the philosopher. 
But in another sense, the general character of the positive con-
88 .!!!, PP• 7-8. 
76. 89 Christian, "Some Uses of Reason," .2.R• .2.!!•• pp. 75-
90 Leolero, Whitehead's Metaphfsics, p. 48. 
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nection between a.direct insight and its generR11zat1on is analo-
gy. The procedure or Whitehead's rationalism is the discussion 
or analogy, the discovery ot identities amid diversity. An il-
lustration or Whitehead's method is his generalization trom the 
direct insight into human rreedom to the notion ot creativity 
(novelty), a notion that might be applicable to the novelty ot 
man's action and of any actuality in an analogous way.91 
Christian's emphasis upciin imaginative genel'alization aa 
construction tends to give the impression that Whitehead's cate-
goreal scheme is simply a construction without any basis in ex-
p©rience. This would be, however, a mistaken impression. The 
categoreal notions and statements are generalized by analogy rrom 
particular insights into experience. Still, Christian's main 
point, that syste:matio statements are not directly about the 
world .. but rather e.nalyt1osl statements about I'elationships within 
the oategoreal scht=1me, is .. ,,,rrect. 92 Because systematic notions 
91 Dewey, "Whitehead's Philosophy, .. Philosophical Re-
view, XLVI, no. 2 (Jan., 1937) pp. 171-172, and l1artshorne, --
~tehead, the Anglo-American Philosopher-Scientist," Prooeedinfa 
or American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1961, pp. i63-f7 , 
b'Otfi point oU-C speair:tc examoles or fiow Wfiltehead could have 1mag-
1nat1ve1y generalized by analogy some direct insights from man's 
experience of himself into metaphysical categories. 
92 01"..ristian, loc. cit., 11The entities listed in his 
categories of existence are not intuited•-though they may well 
have been suggested by elements in experience--or deduced; they 
are constructed." 
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are constructed, it follows that categories are what Whitehead 
dafinea them to be. 
Two kinds of problems might be raised a.bout the cate .... 
goreal soheme, the problem of its own logical consistency and co-
herence and the problem of its applicability to and adequacy for 
the interpretation of reality. In orde1• to prevent such problems 
from arising, two conditions should be followed for the success o 
the im&ginative construction. FiPst, the construction should bav 
its origin in a generalization of a particular factor discerned 
a direct 1~~1ght from such experiences as physical science, phys1 
ology, psychology, aesthetics, ethics, languages, or sociology.93 
Such generalizations can only be made at an advanced stage of 
thought upon the basis of antecedent analysis involved in more 
special fields of knowledge.94 The fulfilment of this first con-
dition ensures that the generalization will have an application to 
experience, at least to t~~t aspeot of experienoe from which the 
generalization was derived. 
The second condition for the success of imaginative con-
struction is that the two rationalistic ideals of coherence and 
logical perfection should be pursued. The requirement or eoher-
enoe is more important than the requirement of logical consisten-
93 !!!, P• 7 • 
94 Leclerc, 21?• 911., P• 46. 
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oy, sinoe the history ot philosophy shows that systems of philos-
ophy are not refuted but rather abandoned. The reason tor this is 
that logical contradictions are usually only temporary slips of 
the mind. After a first orit1o1am, a system's logical inconsis• 
tenoies may be able to be oorreoted. However, a system's inco-
herences may be discoverable only through a very thorough second 
criticism. For example, Descartes' philosophy was not refuted be-
cause of its logical 1noonsistenc1es but rather abandoned because 
ot its ~obereaoe, its arbitrary disconnection or first princi-
ples. His two kinds ot substance, corporeal and mental, illus-
trate incoherence.95 Por according to Descartes, a substantial 
individual •requires nothing but itself in order to exist,• his 
two kinds or substance are arbitrarily disconnected, neither one 
requiring the other tor its being. The attraction of Spinoza's 
philosophy is that it modifies Descartes• position into greater 
95 !!, pp. 8-9; Leclerc, .22• .2!!•• P• 48, points out 
that Whitehead holds that Descartes• insight into the oogito and 
point of departure from the subject's o..m •xperience are correct 
but that Descartes• generalizations ~om these insights were not 
suooesstul. Descartes committed the fallacy or misplaced con-
creteness in holding extension as such to be a metaphysical char-
acter of actual entities. Although he achieved the useful con• 
cept of extension as such, his mistake was to neglect the degree 
ot abstraction involved when considering how this notion applied 
to actual entities. Accordingly, Whitehead proposes that the 
success or speculative reason is to be measured by its concrete-
ness. ~' pp. 84-85; !!!• p. 11. 
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coherence, offering a one-substance world with different attri-
butes and modes.96 In so offering only a one-substance world, 
Spinoza is using Occam's razor, namely, that entities are not to 
be multiplied beyond necessity. Now the way in which the explan-
atory notions are not multiplied beyond necessity is to give each 
metaphysical notion the widest extension of which it seems capa-
ble. It is only in this way that the correct adjustment and co-
herence or ideas can be explored. Accordingly, the rationalistic 
ideal,coherenoe, suggests Whitehead, is another way or stating 
Occam's doctrine ot parsimony, namely, that the scope ot a meta-
physical principle should not be limited otherwise than by the 
necessity of its own meaning.97 It a metaphysical notion does 
not have the widest possible extension consistent with its com-
prehension, there will be incoherences in the metaphysical scheme. 
For the notion 1n question should apply according to its meaning 
but the scheme does not make it do so. 
When the oategoreal scheme has been oonstruoted and 
stated with the utmost precision and definiteness, the philosophe 
should then argue trom it boldly and with the constructive power 
of deductive logic. The propositions derived from the oategoreal 
scheme should then be confronted with the c1rou.mstanoes of ex-
96 PR, p. 10 • 
..... 
97 !!· pp. 304-305. 
perienoe to which they should apply.98 
Third Stage ££. !h!, Method 
In this step of the method, the primary advantage 
gained by observing in terms or the imaginatively constructed 
soheme is tha~ experience is not interrogated with the benumbing 
repression of common sense. Comroon sense observes by the method 
of difference: sometimes men see an elephant and other times 
not. The result is that an elephant is noticed when it is pres• 
ent because or the difference it makes. But the metaphysical 
first principles are always exemplified, whatever the experience 
may be. Aooordingly, it is a mistake to expeot simple accumula-
tions and systematizations of experience in terms of itself to 
reveal the metaphysical taotors. 99 This was the mistake 1n "the 
Baoonian method of induction, a method which, it consistently pur 
sued, would have left science where it found 1t. What Bacon omit-
ted was the play of a free imagination, controlled by the require-
ments of coherence and logic. itlOO 
When observation by the method ot difference fails to 
reveal factors which are always present in experience, these may 
yet be observable under the influence of an imaginatively oon-
98 _!!., p. 13; !!!1 p. 71. 
99 1!!1 pp. 6-7, 13. 
100 !ft, p. 1. 
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structed scheme. Scientific and philosophic generalities are not 
discoverable by simple accumulation and systematization ot obser-
vations, but only by observation directed by theory. 101 Without 
some theory presupposed as a working hypothesis, uit is impossi-
ble to know what to look for, and how to connect the sporadic 
observations ... 102 The explicit statement ot the categoreal sohe 
as a working hypothesis intelligently directs observation and 
decides upon the mutual relevance or various types or evidence so 
that the working hypothesis is capable ot meaningful veritioa-
tion.10.3 
A proposition or oonolusion derived trom the oategoreal 
scheme has three possibilities in confronting experience: "(1) 
the conclusion may agree with the observed facts; (ii) the con-
clusion m11y exhibit general agreement, with disagreement in de-
tail; (111) the conclusion may be in complete disagreement with 
the facts.ttl04 In the first case, the ca.tegoreal scheme is shown 
to make taots or experience intelligible. In the second oase, 
evaluation both ot the observation of faots and or the categoreal 
scheme is required. Thia history of thought shows that false in-
terpretations can be read into the observation of facts. In the 
101 Leolero, .2.'2• ill·' p. 45. 
102 AI, 
-
p. 284. 
103 AI, 
-
p. 286. 
104 PR, p. 13. 
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third oase, either the categoreal soheme must be limited to a 
speoial field and not be applied t.o all fields of experience, or 
the main cAtegories must be abendoned.105 The successful philo• 
soph1o generalization is confirmed in every field ot human exper-
ienoe and especially in religion, science, both natural and soci-
ological, and the wide self-evidence of o1v111zation.l06 In 
seeking such confirmation of its working hypothesis, speculative 
reason performs the useful function or promoting the most general 
systematization or civilized thought. 107 Speculative reason 
thereby JBa.intaina an active novelty of fundamental ideas illumi· 
nating the actions of man in oivilization. 108 
Christian warns that the verification of the antegoreal 
scheme is not the simple matter of finding perceptually isole.ble 
components in experience which illuatrnte Whitehaad•s categories 
of existence suoh as actual entities and nexus. In seeing a ta• 
ble, man is not seeing actual entities. Whitehead can say that 1 
seeing a table a man is looking at a nexus of actual entities. 
But such a statement is a post-systematic interpretation of ex-
perienoe. Man does not experience the 'fact• that the table is a 
lOS, _m, p. 13. 
106 .f!, p. 23; lf!, p. 145; !,!, pp. 307 ... 381 • 
107 ..ffi., pp. 25-26 • 
108 MT, p. 237. 
-
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nexus of aotual entities; rather he interprets the table as a 
nexus of actual entities. Post-systematic statements are not 
straight-forward desoriptions of what is experieno@d.109 Rsther, 
post-systematic statements are "statements in which facts and 
principles of various sorts are interpreted in terms of the cate• 
goreal scheme, for example: The finite things that endure through 
time e.re not actual entities but nerlis of actua.l ent1 ties. nllO 
Whitehead uses systematic terms to interpret non-systematic terms: 
"perception facts, so1ent1!'1o tacts, moral !'sots, and others are 
framed in terms of the oategoreal sohem.e.nlll 
In summary, Leclerc and Obristian have correctly empha-
sized the inductive aspect of Whitehe~d's methoe. Pre-eyetematic 
statements of self-evidences are made in the first step ot the 
method. However, 9'Uoh direct insights are self-evident only from 
the perspective reason takes, that is, only becPuse reason ignores 
other aspects of experience. Consequently, direct insight is not 
a superior form of knowledge but one aspect in the whole constitu-
ting the method of the working hypothesis. In the second step ot 
the method, generalizations and systematizations are made from the 
direct insights by analogy. A CRtegoreal scheme ot systematic 
11. 
109 Christian, nsome Uses ot Reason," 2.2· Jtl!., pp. 76-
110 !21£., pp. 75-76. 
11112!9.., p. 76. 
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terms and definitions is constructed to fulfill the requirements 
of logical consistency and coherence. These systematic statements 
are oonstruoted as analytically true in terms of the relationships 
ot the oategoreal scheme itself. The truth of any particular sys-
tematic statement does not strictly depend on or follow from the 
truth of any pre-systematic statements. S1noe there oan be no in-
dubitable immediate assurance of the oorreotness of direct insight 
and its imaginative generalization, the oPtegoreal scheme must be 
taken as an hypothesis and subjected to verification tests. In 
the third step of the method, the oategoreal scheme is tested as 
to its applicability to and adequacy for the understanding of all 
aspects of man's experience. Systematic terms and statements are 
used to make intelligible, post-systematic statements about, for 
example, aoientitio faots, moral faota, perception facts, aesthet-
ic experiences, and religious experience. 
In this chapter, the function of speculative reason has 
been identified in a discussion of reason and evolution. Since 
Whitehead admits the category of final aausality, as explanatory 
of emergent evolution, he defines the primary function ot reason 
to be: (1) to constitute final causes, that is, to live; (11) to 
emphasize final causes, that is, to live well; and (111} to criti-
cize final causes, that is, to live better. The function of prao-
t1oal reason is to achieve a purpose exterior to the satisfaction 
ot reason itself, whereas the function of speculative reason is to 
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satisfy its own purpose of understanding everything in tex-ms ot 
principles intelligible to itself. The Greek logio of discovery 
provides a set of five criteria by which any speoulative under-
standing of reality should be tested. It was in terms of these 
criteria that Whitehead defined speculative philosophy and its 
method for the fulfilment of the funotion of speculative reason. 
Speculative philosophy seeks to frame a coherent, ~os1oal, neoea-
sary system of genera.l ideas whioh makes intelligible every ele• 
ment of experience. Speculative philosophy uses the method of the 
working hypothesis 1n order to fulfill the five criteria of the 
Greek logic of discovery. Although direct insight is the point of 
departure for reason's speculations, it is not a superior torm of 
knowledge but one aspect in the whole constituting the method of 
the working hypothesis. The direct insight must be capable of 
being stated in systematic terms in order that it will tit in with 
and be verified by all of man's experience and knowledge. 
In light of the exact definition ot speculative philoso-
phy and its method, the next chapter will consider what evidence 
rational religion and the religious intuition as the sense of 
Deity can ofter for Whitehead's asswnption of the function ot 
speculative reason. 
CHAPrER II 
THE FUNCTION OF SPECULATIVE REASON CONSIDERED IN LIGHT 
OF RATIONAL RELIGION AND fHE; RELIGIOUS INTUI~ION 
AS THE SENSE OF DEITY 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider how the tune• 
tion of speculative reason is defended by rational religion and 
the religious intuition as the sense of Deity. The first section 
indicates that Whitehead pointed to a significant relationship 
between religion and the function of speculative reason. The 
second section desoribes Whitehead's view of rational religion, 
the religious intuition, and its interpretation in his metaphysics 
This seoond section serves as the context for the third section 
where the Modes .Q£ Thought sense of Deity is described as an evi• 
dence independent of his systematization of it. Next the fourth 
section considers how rational religion and the sense or Deity can 
serve as defenses or the function of speculative reason. Finally, 
the fifth section oc:mpares this chapter with other investigations 
of Whitehead, especially Till1ch 1s and Hartshorne•s. 
A. Speculative Reason .!BS Religion 
In Modes .2f Thoqght, in the lectures describing the 
$9 
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sense of Deity, Whitehead also views his philosophy as a pragma-
tism. "Pragmatism is simply an appeal to that self-evidence which 
sustains itself in o1vil1zed experience. Thus pragmatism ulti-
mately appeals to the wide self-evidence of civilization, and to 
the self-evidence of what we mean by •civilization•."1 Whitehead 
will exclude by dogmatic denial no solt-ev1denoe in his pragma-
tism. Despite the selective limitations or human consciousness, 
there is no rP-ason, apart .from dogmatic assumption, why human 
aonsoiousnesR could not have an intuition into some metaphysical 
.factor of the universe. 2 Such an intuition would be an awareness 
of a sel.f-~videnoe ot civilization. The evidence could not be de• 
nied without a denial of that aspect of civilization which is a 
necessary part of civilized experience. Consequently, such an 
ev1denae could not be denied without self-contradiction. 
Whitehead indicates that there is a self•evidenoe of 
civilization which may serve as a basis for assuming the function 
of speculative reason. There is a strong moral int~!tion that one 
of the ultimate elements in the good life of aiv111zat1on is spec-
ulative understanding for its own sake. 'l'his intuition is not a.a 
w14espread as other moral feelings are, but in the history or o1v-
1 ,m. pp. 144·14.$. 
2 Whitehead, "Remarks," The Philosophical Review, XLVI, 
no. 2 (Jan., 1937) p. 181. ---
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ilization it has been transmitted by outstanding 1nd1v1duals.3 
Such geniuses as Plato, Aristotle, Archimedes, and Roger Bacon 
have lived their lives ot reflection according to the function of 
speculative reason that all things are conceivable as exemplifica-
tions of general principlea.4 For both primitive man and the 
primitive aide of civilized man, "the universe is not so much un-
fathomable as untathomed--by this I mean undiscriminated, unan-
alyzed. • • • The very presuppositions or a coherent rationalism 
are absent. Such a rationalism presupposes a complex of definite 
~ 
tacts whose interconnections are sought."-' For primitive man and 
the primitive side or civilized man, the universe is not such a 
complex of interconnected facts that stimulates man to analyze and 
discriminate the connections. Rather, the universe is an obscure 
background shot across by isolated, vivid effects charged with 
emotional exoitementa.6 Consequently, what 1s necessary for the 
moral intuition of the function of speculative reason is an in-
sight into the presuppositions of a coherent rntionalism. What ia 
needed is an awareness of the evidence ot the universe as a com-
plex of interconnected facts that stimulates man to analyze and 
3 
4 
5 
6 
]!!, 
.m, 
!!:J, 
y, 
pp. 
p. 
p. 
p. 
38-39. 
37; SMW, 
-
p. 1. 
24. 
24. 
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identify the oonneotions. 
Whitehead indicates that this self-evident intuition ot 
the universe wh1oh is the presupposition of his ooherent ration-
alism is to be found in religious intuition: 
That we tail to tind in experience any elements intrin-
sically 1noapable of exhibition as examples of general theo-
ry, is the hope of rat1onaliam. Thia hope is not a metaphy-
sical premis~. It is the faith which forms the motive for 
the pursuit of all sciences alike, including metaphysics. 
In so far as metaphysics enables us to apprehend the 
rationality of things, the claim is justified. It 1s always 
open to us, having regard to the 1mperfeot1ons ot all meta-
physical ~ystema, to lose hope at the exact point where we 
find ourselves. The preservation of such faith must depend 
on an ultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellec-
tual action--that it should embody the adventure of hope. 
Such an intuition marks the point where metaphysios·-and in-
deed every so1enoe--ga1ns assurance from religion and passes 
over into religion.7 
Whitehead has stated the function of speculative reason, 
the hope, faith, and ideal of rationalism. The function of spec• 
ulative reaamn "is to pierce into the general reasons beyond limi-
ted reasons."8 This ideal forms the motive for the pursuit of all 
the sciences, especially metaphysics. !n .!.2 ~ !:!. metaphysics 
enables !!!!!!l ~apprehend 19!!,. rationalitz of things, 1h!, ideal .!!. 
Justified. Although man falls short of the perfect metaphysics, 
he should not give up the ideal. It is part of the nature of in-
tellectual action, in faot, or all civilized action, that it 
7 !!!. p. 67. 
a £!!, P· 65. 
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should embody the adventure ot hope; tor o1v111zat1on is in deoa7 
when its action is without adventure, without the striving for the 
unattainable ideal.9 The ideal of intelleotual speculation is an 
11infinite ideal • • • never to be attained by the trounded intelli-
gence of mankind. 1110 Yet this ideal essentially belongs to man. 
Man as man, as civilized man, oa.nnot but have a tendency to ful-
fill thia ideal of speculative reason, to know the ultimate rea-
sons of all tacts, their origin and their end.11 The self-evi-
dence supporting this ideal ia to be f;.O\lnd in "the deep oonnect1on 
ot the speculative Reason w1 th rel 1g1 ous intuitions. nl2 
B. Rational Religion ~ ,!h! Religious Intuition 
Since Whitehead has indicated that the self-evidence for 
the function of speculative reason is to be found in religion, it 
1s necessary to describe his notion of rational religion and the 
religious intuition prior to the examination of their releve.noe to 
the function of speculative reason. 
In order to ex~lain the nature of religious truth, 
Whitehead distinguishes between religious truth and mathematical 
truth. One ~ arithmetic, but he !! religious. What one be-
9 .!\!, p. 360 • 
10 !!!· p. 65. 
11 FR, p. 65. 
-
12 J!!l, p. 66. 
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lieves as mathematical truth has no intluenoe upon his moral char-
acter, but what one believes as religious truth should have an in-
tluenoe upon his moral character. A religious truth should Justi-
t:I.. a person by cleansing his eharaoter of faults and by developing 
his character towards the religious ideal of perfection. Conse-
quently, a religion may be defined as a system of general truths 
which trnnsform oharaoter when these truths are sincerely held 
and vividly apprehended.13 
This notion of religion emphasizes "the awful ultimate 
fnot, which is the human being, oonsoiously alone with itself, tor 
its own aake."14 Consequently this notion of religion directly 
contradicts '1the theory that religion is pr1:mar117 a social 
fact."15 Social facts are important to religion since there is no 
absolute abstraction or an individual from his environment. How• 
ever, society cannot be absolutely abstraoted from the individual 
men who compose society. Rel 1g1on is primarily what the individu-
al toes with his solitariness. What should develop from religion 
l) RM, p. lS: nYou use arithmetic, but you are reli-
gious •••• NO one is invariably 'Justified' by his tA."Ith in the 
mult1pl1oat1on table. But in some sense or other, justification 
ts the basis of all religion. Your character is developed aooo,rd-
1ng to your faith. This is the primary religious truth from which 
no one oan escape." 
14 !,H, p. 16. 
15 .!!!, p. 16. 
65 
is individual worth of oharaoter.16 
The emergence of religion in human history shows four 
factors: ritual, emotion, belief, and retionalization.17 Ritual 
and emotion predominate in primitive religion which is primarily 
social in that the individual cannot give up the cult or the tribe 
without giving up his identity as a meaber of the tribe.18 The 
last two factors, belief and especially rationalization, predomi-
nate in civilized religion and emphasize solitariness as consti-
tuting the heart of religious importance. "The great religious 
conceptions which haunt the imaginations or civilized mankind are 
scenes of solitariness: Prometheus chained to his rock, ••• the 
meditations of the 3uddha, the solitary Man on the Oross.nl9 
The purpose of ritual and emotion is explained in a 
myth. If the myth is about a person, real or imaginary, the rit-
ual is the primitive worship of the hero-person. The myth then 
serves as a religious belief, and the belief encourages specula-
tion about 1tselt. Just as ritual encourages emotion for its own 
sake beyond the mere response to practical necessities, so also 
religious belief encourages thought for its own sake, since the 
16 J!H, pp. 16-17. 
17 .fil:I, p. 18. 
18 .!!!, pp. 19, 28. 
19 .!!!1, pp. 19-20. 
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belief releases thought for a while trom its immediate environment 
of sensation and perception. The first stage of belief is marked 
by uncoordinated beliefs; and this is the stage at which the mass-
es of sem1-o1v111zed humanity have halted, the stage of. satisfac-
tory ritual and of satisfied belief without impulse towards higher 
things. 20 
The second stage of belief oocurs when the fourth fac-
tor, rfltional!zat!on, beoomes a part of religion. Rationaliza.tioI 
attempts to introduce into religi~ua beliefs a rational general!· 
ty; myths, when retained, are reorganized with the intention of 
making myth an aoeount of true historical oiroumstanoes which ex-
emplify the general ideas with adequate perfection. The life of 
Christ oould be used to exemplify the general idea of love of God 
and neighbor. The Hebrew religion in the last thousand years be-
fore the Cbr18t1an era went through this stage ot rationalization 
of belief. Whitehead explains how rational criticism is admitted 
1n principle as part of religion when custom no longer suffices to 
direct man's religious and moral life. Religious beliefs coroe un-
der the eveluation of individuals ~hen they use direct intuition 
(ethical, metaphysical, or logical). Religion now emphasizes the 
individual in his solitariness and his rational criticism of be-
liefs. Religion has become rational religion, a religion with a 
20 1Y1· pp. 23-28 •. 
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system of general truths which provide a coherent ordering both 
of man's specul&tive life and of his praotic~l life. Historical 
examples of rational religion inolude Buddhism, Mahometanisro, 
Jude.isr,i, and Ohr1stis.n1ty.21 
The search tor a system ot general truths as a coherent 
ordering of man's 11.f'e is exemplified by the book of Job in deal-
ing with the problem or evil. Joo 1s a good man who is suffering 
tremendous evils to himself and his family. The concrete circum-
stanoee of hiR .~uffering seem to belie the general doctrine that 
the justice of God is beautifully evident in everything that hap• 
pens. How can Job be a good man, and God let all these evils 
happen to h111t? Job is a good man. 'l'hese evils do happen to him. 
'l'herefore, the HE>brews a.rs wrong to believe that God will permit 
evils to happen only to evil men. 1'hus the book of Job contains 
a rational or1 tioislil of tb~ .Hebraic belie.1~ that evils happen only 
to evil men. 22 
However this rational eriticism does not solve the prob-
le~ of evil. The two great rational religions, Christianity and 
Buddhism, have attempted to deal with this problem. 31nee Bud-
21 !!!11 pp. 31, 35-36. 
22 fil1, pp. 48-49: "The1"e is also throughout the book 
the 'lndereurrent of fear lest an old-fashioned tribal god might 
take offense at this rational critioism.n Job is tearing to 
pieces the sophism that ell 1s for the best in the best of possi-
ble worlds, and that the juat1ce or God is clearly evident in 
everything that happens. 
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dhiam finds evil essential to the very nature ot individual ex-
perience, its doctrine solves the problem ot evil by preaching a 
moral doctrine that releases one from his individual personality1 
the source ot evil. Since Christianity holds that evil derives 
trom the contingency in the world, not trom the very tact ot indi• 
vidual personality1 its moral doctrine is to overcome evil with 
good. 23 The solutions of Ohristian1ty and Buddhism to ~he problem 
ot evil are solutions to be lived, just as religious truth in 
general is a truth that is to be lived, not used as a mathematical 
truth is used. In being lived, their solutions to the problem of 
evil are then to be understood. 
Relt,gion•s confrontation with the problem of evil pro-
vides an understanding ot another aspect or religion as the tong-
ing tor Justitiaation. Whitehead explains "that religion is the 
longing of the ,n:>irit that the tacts ot existence should tind jua-
tit1oat1on 1n the nature of existenoe. 'My soul th1rsteth tor 
God, 1 writes the Psalm1at."24 The religious need tor Just1t1oa-
t1on includes not only the need for moral purification and moral 
development but also the need to understand man•a predicament in 
~he problem of evil. The need for Justification must be fulfilled 
morally and ttPeoulatively by answering why evils happen to man, 
23 .!!!. pp. 48-49. 
24 !H, p. 85. 
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especially to the good man. In the doctrines or a r~tional re-
ligion, the raot of the existence of evil should find justifica-
tion in the nature or existence. A rational religion should have 
a system of general truths which provide a coherent ordering both 
of man's praotical life and of his speoulat!ve lite. 
Whitehead explains that the doctrines of rational re-
ligion are the outcome of a universal religious consciousness. 
Religious consciousness is universal in two ways. First, it is 
universal as opposed to tribal; that is, all the great rational 
religions have fundamentally the same conseiousness. Secondly, 
religious consciousness is universal in that it is a disconnec-
tion from immediate surroundings, that is, in that it is a oon-
soiouaness of something Pf!rmanent !.!l£ intelligible. The individu-
al in his solitariness onn get away trom the contusion of 1rmned1-
ate experience and everyday lite and try to find something perma-
~ _!ru! intelligible that gives meaning and Justification to all 
the world and ms.n's life.25 
The religious intuition is a oonsoiousness .2£ something 
oermanent and intelligible in so tar as it is a consciousness of 
the ultimate character of value in the universe: ~ - - - _' ______ _ 
This point of the origin of rational religion in solitar· 
iness 1~ tund~mental. Religion is founded on the concurrence 
of three allied concepts in one moment ot self-consciousness, 
concepts whose separate relationships to faot and whose mu• 
25 !!:!, pp. 47, 58-6). 
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tual relations to each other are only to be settled jointly 
by some direct intuition into the ultimate oharaoter of the 
universe. 
These concepts arei 
l. That of the value of an individual for itself. 
2. That of the value of the diverse individuals of 
the world for each other. 
3. That of the value of the objective world which 
is a community derivative from the inter•rela• 
tiona or its component individuals, and also 
necessary to~ the existence of each of these 
1nd1viduals.26 
The religious intuition occurs most easily in the indi-
vidual who sincerely seeks the meaningfulness of moral value: "In 
its solitariness, the spirit asks, What, in the way of value, is 
the attainment or life? And it can find no such value ;till it has 
merged its individual claim for value with that of the objective 
universe. Religion is world-loyalty. 1127 The religious intuition 
is a revelation of the ultimate aharaoter of universe as value, 
"apprehended as we apprehend the oharaoters of our friends •••• 
It is an apprehension of character permanently inherent in the 
nature of things. •t28 The rieligious intuition is "a direct intui-
tion ot a righteousness in the nature of things, .funoti.oning as a 
condition, a oritio, and an ideal. n29 l'he religious experienoe 
is a direot intuition of tta character or permanent rightness, 
26 
27 
28 
29 
!!!f, 
1!!1 
!!1 
,!!H, 
PP• 58-59. 
p. 60. 
PP• 60-61. 
p. 63. 
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whose 1nherence in the n1lture of things modifies both efficient 
and final cause, so that the one oonforms to harmonious cond1· 
tiona, and the other contrasts itself with an harmonious ideal."30 
The religious experience is "the intuition of immediate occasions 
as failing or succeeding in reference to the ideal relevant to 
them. There is a rightness attained or missed, with more or less 
completeness of attainment or ornission."31 
Whitehead clarifies the religious intuition in two ways. 
First, he argues that this direct apprAhenmion of a permanent 
rightness ''doea not inolude any direct 1ntu1 tlon of a definite 
person or individual."32 Many rational religions agree that there 
is no direct vision of God as this specific person or as that spe-
cific person. Con.f'uo1an, Buddhist, and Hindu philosophy agree in 
this, and so also do most Christian theologians and Greek think-
ers.33 Aooording to Whitehead, there is no direct vision of a 
personal God. For 1r the religious intuition is such a direct 
vision; then the various descriptions of religious experience by 
~itferent faiths would simply contradict each other with all their 
30 !!11 P· sa. 
.31 RM. 
-
pp. 60-61 • 
32 g, p. 61. 
33 .fil!, pp. 62-64. 
f'ive trends of thought could 
Whitehead's interpretation of these 
be investigated at some length. 
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dif i~erent personal gods. 3li 
Secondly, althouch there is no direct vision of a per-
sonal God, Whitehead holds tb8.t the religious 1ntu1 tion is the 
experienae of God as a charRcter of permanent rightness immanent 
in the nature of things. Whitehead explains: (1) that Christ 
represents rationalism derived from direct intuition; (2) that 
Christ assooiated God with the lm.111B.nence of the Kingdom of Heaven; 
(3) that the kingdom of heaven 1a God's pr1mord1alt consequent, 
and superjeot natures; and (4) that the religious intuition is the 
experience of the kingdom of heaven. 
(l) Christ represents for Whitehead rationalism derived 
from direct intuition: "The reported sayings of Christ are not 
forraularized thought. They are descriptions of d1~ect 1ns1ght. 
The ideas are in his mind as immediate p1otures, and not as anal-
yzed in terms of ebstraot conoepts.•35 For example, Christ sees 
intuitively the relations between 3ood men and bad men; he does 
not talk of goodness and badness. He does not analyze concepts, 
nor does he re-ason about facts. Rather, he uses the lowest ab-
stractions that language is capable of, if it is to be language 
and rational understanding at all and not the fact itselr.36 
34 .!!!'!1 pp. 62-64, 66. 
35 ~. pp. 56-57. 
36 !ll!, p. 57. 
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(2) Consequently, when Christ associates 11God with the 
Kingdom ot Heaven, coupled with the explanation that 'The Kingdom 
of Heaven is within you,, .. Whitehead understands Obrist to be 
describing an intuitive experience.37 Obrist is expressing a de-
oigive emphasis of the immanence or God in the world which was 
absent in the original Semitic doctrine ot God.38 
(3) The kingdom of heaven ia God's primordial, conse-
quent, and superjeot natures. In Whitehead's metaphyaios, there 
are tour creative phases in the universe. (1) There is God's pri-
mordial nature, the principle determining the grading ot values 
prior to the passage of actual things.39 This aspect of God is 
"the complete oonoeptual realization of the realm of ideal forms. 
The kingdQm of heaven is God. 4.0 This is the phase of the o·o~.ep_~~ . 
tual origination of the universe. (11) There is the phase of the 
physical origination ot many differing actualities 1n the universe 
In this phase, realities have both mental and physical aspects, 
but there is a deficienoy in the solidarity ot the individuals 
with eaoh other. The potential values or ideal forms ot th1a 
phase are derived from the immanence in the world of the first 
37 g, p. 72. 
38 !!!f, pp. 72-74.. 
39 !!!, p. 532. Gt. Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, 
pp. 109-202, for a brief treatment of God's primordial nature. 
40 ,g, p. 1$4. 
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phase, God's primordial na1rure. (111) There is God's consequent 
nature, the phase ot the universe in which the many actualities 
from the second phase are unified. This third phase ot the uni-
verse derives from the tirst two phases: trom the first, in that 
God's primordial valuing ot potential torms includes the appetite 
for actualizing the potential value of God's own consequent na• 
ture; and from the second, in th.at God must unify and preserve 
the universe as it is given to him with all its suffering and im-
perfections. In thia third phase, God is appropriately termed 
the kingdom of heaven since he uniDiea and preserves the values ot 
the universe with the actuality ot his own value. (iv) Lastly, 
there is the phase of God's superjeot nature in which God passes 
over into the universe, affecting the many new actualities with 
his consequent nature. The perfected actuality of the previous 
world as it has been preserved and valued by God•s consequent na-
ture passes over into the temporal world along w:i th the aim of 
God'• primordial nature toward the value of the future universe.4l 
(4) The religious intuition is the experience of the 
kingdom of heaven, the experience of God in his primordial, con-
sequent, and superject natures. The religious intuition is the 
direct apprehension of the primordial nature of God, "the prina1-
41 .m, p. 532. or. Leclerc, ~· cit, pp. 203-208 tor 
brief treatment of God a.a primordial and consequent; ct. also. 1!1 pp. 134•135 on the primordial, consequent, and auperject natures 
of God. 
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ple determining the grading of values," as immanent in the indi-
vidual providing him with his appropriate ideal of value for him-
self in relation to the value of others and the value of the world 
- ........... ....... ------ _..... ............. 
!:.!! ..! whole.42 The religious intuition is also the awarteness of 
the superjeot nature of God, i.e., the 1mm.a.nenoe or the consequent 
nature of God in the world, his preserving unir1oat1on and valua• 
tion of the past world. The love 1n the world passes into the 
love 1n heaven, the consequent nature or God, and floods back a-
gain into the world as the auperjeot nature of God.43 The super-
jeot nature, 1.e., the ilrmanenoe of the consequent nature, of God 
is that factor in religious experience whioh enables the individu-
al to conceptualize clearly the third element revealed in reli-
gious experience. For it is the immanence or God•a consequent 
nature that makes the individuals or the universe into a valuable 
communitr, a solidarity, both.!! derived from God's presArving 
un1.t'1cat1on and valuation of past actualities !!'!£ .!.! necessax:r for 
the existence of each present actuality as a potentially valued 
member of the kingdom of heaven.44 
This brief ocmparis:on of the religious intuition with 
Whitehead 1 s concept of the primordial, consequent, and superject 
42 !!,M, p. 60. 
43 !!!1. p. 532. 
44 fill, P· S9. 
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tures of God has helped to clarity what the religious intuition 
1soloses. The religious intuition is a direct experience of a 
oharaoter of permanent rightness, the kingdom of heaven, whose 
immanence in things modifies both efficient and final cause. Eff1 
lent causation in the world is modified by the efficient causa-
tion of this character of permanent rightness. Efficient causa-
tion in the present actualities is influenced by God's superjedt 
overflow of God's consequent nature into things. It 
is God's consequent nature which helps to make the world unified 
nd harmonious. Final causation in things is initially derived 
n each new thing from the final oBusation of God's primordial 
as immanent in things. God's superjeot nature, by its aim 
the value of the future universe, also affeots the final aims 
Both God's primordial finality and superjeot finality 
elp to unify the final causality of the many actualities in the 
In summary, the direct apprehension of God's primordial 
onsequent, and superjeot natures as immanent in the individual as 
character of permanent rightness enables him to know his .Q!fi! 
alue, the value .Q! 1nd1 viduala !2!! .!.!,gh other, and the value !1$_ 
world .!! .! oomm.unitx. 
The immanence of the kingdom of heaven is Whitehead's 
bristian solution of the problem of evil. The kingdom of heaven 
ries to overcome evil with good. Evil is the brute motive force 
r .fragmentary purpose, disregarding the eternal, harmonious ti-
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nality of the kingdom of heaven.45 When God 1s oonsequent nature 
is affected by something evil, i.e., by the result of fragmentary 
purpose, the harmonious finality of his primordial and superjeot 
natures presents new final causes to actualities. If the actuali-
ties achieve these final causes, harmonious purpose will overoome 
fragmentary purpose. Good will overcome evil by the power of 
God's persuasive ideals. 
Even more than providing for the solution of particular 
evils, the immanence of the kingdom of heaven makes eaoh present 
actuality a potentially valuable member of the kin~dom of heaven. 
The ultimate evil of the temporal world is that its actualities 
are temporal••that they cease to be. Past temporal aetualities 
have affected present actualities causally, but present actuali-
ties do not preserve the full immediaoy ot the past.46 Whitehead 
explains how the kingdom ot heaven solves this ultimate evil. 
God•a aim in his primordial nature includes the appetite tor his 
consequent nature. God's consequent nature is causally affected 
by temporal actualities, but God unifies and preserves their val-
ues achieved and their immediacy in himselr.47 Since the kingdom 
ot heaven solves the ultimate evil in the world, it follows that 
4S !!!!!, p. 276. 
46 .f!, p. 517. 
47 !!!, P• 524. 
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it is religious experience that discloses the ultimate good, the 
kingdom ot heaven. The kingdom ot heaven is the ultimate good, 
both as immanently providing the potential value for each actual-
ity and as immanently preserving the value ot each actuality in 
its immediacy. The kingdom ot heaven discloses in the religious 
intuition that the temporal individual !! valuable in an everlast-
ing way, that the individuals .!!! their mutual temporal relation-
ships .!.£!. valuable in an everlasting way.48 
This study agrees with Thompson'• study ot Whitehead's 
philosophy ot religion in that the religious intuition tor White• 
head is an "intuition disclosing a real order or permanence in the 
ultimate nature of things which is both productive and protective 
of value. n49 Thia study also agrees with 'l'hompaon that the perma-
nent rightness, immanent in the nature of things and modifying 
both efficient and final causality, is to be correlated with White 
head's metaphysical description of God's primordial, consequent, 
and superject natures.SO In evaluating Whitehead's description 
or the religious intuition as the foundation or rational religion, 
Thompson holds that Whitehead is content merely to formulate his 
48 J!, p. S25. 
49 Kenneth Thompson, Jr., Whitehead's f.hilosophy .Q! 
Reli,ion (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 
i<}63 p. s1. 
50 .!!:?,!g., p. 67. 
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description ot the intuition and is unable to answer questions 
about the precise nature and character of the data disclosed in 
the religious intuition. In questioning the precise nature and 
oharaoter ot the data diaolosed in the religious intuition, Thomp-
son does not mean that Whitehead made no attempt at clarifying 
the experience. For Thompson h1mselt, although he does not em-
phasize the interpretation of the experience as the immanence or 
the kingdom ot heaven, points out clearly and exhaustively how to 
correlate the rellgioua intuition with Whitehead's metaphysical 
description or God. What Thompson means is that the religious 
intuition aa stated by Whitehead is both vague and ambiguous as 
an evidence in its own right.51 
Thompson's interpretation is correct with regard to 
Religion in !b!, Making, but not with regard to Whitehead's last 
book, Modes ~ Thought. In the former work, Whitehead is content 
merely to formulate his assertion and to correlate it with h1a 
metaphysical description of God. He does state the religious in-
tuition in several ways; he does correlate it with the search tor 
moral value; he denies that it is an.experience or God as !h!! per-
sonal deity or as 19!! personal deity; he does interpret it in 
terma of the kingdom of heaven. However, the evidence of the re-
ligious intuition remains vague and ambiguous in its own right and 
.51 Ibid., P• 242. 
relies heavily for its truth value upon Whitehead's elaborate 
metaphysical description of God. However, in Modes 9.£. Thought, 
Whitehead's aim is to examine some of those general oharaoteriza-
tions of human experience whioh are presupposed in the directed 
activities of mankind. He makes no attempt to frame a systematic 
philosophy, but rather he condenses for publication those features 
ot his Harvard lectures which were incompletely presented in his 
previous worka.52 It is in this pre-systematic presentation that 
Whitehead reconsiders the religious intuition in order to clarify 
it in terms of itself apart from a teobnioal metaphysics. 
Whit~head himself considers an objection to his use of 
the religious intuition quite similar to Thompson's evaluatory 
remarks. An intuition merely experienced in exceptional moments 
1a simply a function of those moments. The intuition is a private 
psyohologioal faot and is without general evidential force. 
Whitehead answers the objection. Those intuitions which emerge 
under exceptional oiroumstanoes and remain knowable only under 
suoh conditions have only personal s1gnif1oanoe. But those intu-
itions which emerge under exceptional oiroumstandes and become 
knowable apart from those circumstances have more than personal 
significance; such intuitions have general evidential force. Suoh 
generally evident intuitions may be clearer under exceptional cir-
52 !f!'., pp. viii, 1-2. 
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oumstanoes, even though the intuitions should not be confined to 
such o1roumstanoea.53 Although Whitehead does not say so, it is 
the view of this study that the Modes g! Thought description of 
the sense of Deitz is his attempt to make the religious intuition 
generally evident. Consequently, the sense of Deity must be 
described before examining its relationship to the function of 
speculative reason. 
c. ±..!!! Religious Intuition .!! 1,!l! Sense .2£ Deitz 
The presupposition for the description of the sense of 
Deity is Whitehead's discussion of matter-of-fa.ct and importance 
in Lecture One of Modea B£, 'l'hough~. The notion of matter-of-fa.ct 
is the concept of something that simply happens, without purpose, 
without value, without importa.noe. "Matter-of-!'aot is the notion 
of mere existence. n54 '1Th1s grasp or factuality is one extreme or 
thought. Namely, it is the concept of mere agitation of things 
a.gita.ted."55 This notion of mere matter-of-faot is the hidden 
ideal of physical scientists who insist upon the exclusive impor-
tance of objectivity. The proverb that applies to nature applies 
also to the notion of importance: Expel nature with a pitoh-fork, 
and it ever returns. To uphold objectivity in scientific and re-
53 !!,H, pp. 64-66. 
54 m, P• 9. 
55 ~, p. 11. 
fleCtive thought as an ideal is to insist upon the importance of 
objectivity for man. The zeal for t~ttth presupposes that truth is 
important. Also sustained observation presupposes importance. 
For concentrated attention means disregard of irrelevancies; and 
this disregard can only be sustained by some sense of importance. 
Consequently, the sense or importance is embedded in the very be-
ing or human and animal experienoe.56 
Whitehead points out that it is difficult to use wo:rds 
to evoke a sense of this general character of importance. For 
words are generally used to 1nd1oate useful particularities. 
Great literature tries to go beyond the usual usaee of language 
and evoke such vivid feelings as the pervasive sense of impor-
tanoe.57 One way of characterizing importance ia "that it is that 
aspeot of feeling whereby a perspective is imposed upon the uni-
verse ot things felt.n58 The perspective an individual takes upon 
the universe is the result of his individual interests. Suoh a 
notion of importance as perspective tends "to reduce the concept 
of importance to mere matter-of-tact devoid of intrinsic inter-
est.1159 Physical scienoe can use this notion of perspective; "the 
56 11t' pp. io-12. 
r:7 Ml' 1 :;, _, p. • 
58 !!1 P• 1.$. 
59 .!f!, P• 15. 
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oonsequent soienoe is the scheme of physical laws which • 
• • ex-
presses the patterns of perspective as observed by average human 
beings. 1160 But Whitehead refuses to reduce importance to perspec-
tive. "Perspective is the dead abstraction of mere tact from the 
living importance of things felt. The concrete truth is the vari-
ation of interest; the abstraction is the universe in perspeo-
tive. "61 
In 1ns1at1ng that importance is more than mere perspec-
tive, Whitehead is speaking of the most primitive stage of dis• 
or1m1nat1on in human experience. He gropes for the appropriate 
words: Th~ '~rimary experience which lies below and gives its 
meaning to our oonao1ous analysis of qualitative detail ••• is 
a value-experience. Its baa1o expression ia--Have a care, here 1a 
something that matters! Yea, that is the best phrase.-the primary 
glimmering of consciousness reveals, Something that mattera."62 
There 1a a sense of worth at the base or our existence. Worth 
here is not to be conceived as a feeling which man simply subjec-
tively attributes to his grasp of reality. Rather, the sense of 
worth essentially presupposes that which is worthy. The sense or 
Something that matters is the sense of existence .tbr its own sake, 
60 ~. pp. 15-16. 
61 J!!, p. 15. 
62 ~. pp. 158-159. 
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of existence which is its own justification, of existence with its 
own character.63 
It is this sense of Something that matters which White-
head explicates as the sense ot Deity. This experience ot Some-
thing that matters provokes attention. Attention dimly discloses 
a three-fold character: Totality, Exte:rnality, and Internality. 
These are not clear concepts but dim presuppositions which guide 
conaoious analysis of details. Any experience of the world will 
assume as obvious the Totality of actual fact, the Externality or 
many facts, and the Internality of the one experienoing.64 
Whitehead insists that this three-fold character is 
"primarily a dim division. The senae of totality obscures the 
analysis into self and others. Also this division is primarily 
based on the sense of existenoe as a value-experience. Namely, 
the total value-experience is discriminated into this value-ex-
perience and those value-experiences."65 The fundamental basis of 
this description is that our experience is' a value-experience, ex-
pressing a vague sense or a power maintaining and realizing its 
own purpoae. 66 "Ou~ experience starts with a sense of power ••• 
63 m. p. 149· 
64 MT, 
....... 
p • 159. 
65 MT, P• lSo. 
........ 
66 _m, p. lSo. 
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Power is the compulsion ot composition [Ot aotual1t;i7. • • • The 
essence of power is the drive towards aesthetic worth tor its own 
sake."67 The drive or actuality towards aesthetic worth tor its 
own sake is the appetition of purpose, the appet1t1on o• self-im-
portance. "We have no right to deface the value-experience which 
is the very essence or the universe. Existence, in its own nature, 
is the upholding of value-intens1ty.n68 
This fundamental sense ot reality as a value-experience, 
with a power striving to maintain and realize its own purpose, is 
the sense or Something that matters. Whitehead has affirmed that 
this sense or Something that matters discloses dimly to attention 
a three-told character, Totality, External1ty, and Internal1ty, 
but he has not explained why attention reveals this character. He 
begins to explain that this sense or Something that matters first 
differentiates itself into "the sense of many existences with 
value-experience; and that this sense of the multiplicity of val-
ue-experiences again differentiates ••• into the totality ot 
value-exper1enoe, and the many other value-experiences, and the 
egoistic value-experienoe."69 
The Internality of the one experiencing Something that 
67 Jr!, p. 163. 
68 !!:t p. 151. 
69 .!!!· pp. 150-151. 
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matters is the clearest example of reality as value-experience. 
"Importance reveals 1tselt as transitions of emotion. My impor-
tance is my emotional worth now, embodying in itself derivations 
trom the whole, and tran the other facts, and embodying in itself 
reference to future £Value-experienoe~.n70 The Externality ot 
reality 11 revealed in so tar as tho aelt (Internal1ty) feels 
itself as deriving from the past, 1.e., trom other value-experi-
ences, and in so tar as the self feels itself as tending to commu-
nicate its own value-experience into the value-experiences or 
others. The Totality ot reality is revealed in so tar as the self 
feels itself as deriving from the Totality of value-experience of 
the past and as preparing its contribution tor the Totality ot 
value-experience or the tuture. 
The self feels itself as deriving .from Externa.lity, 1.e. 
fl"Om other value-experiences. The most explicit example ot deri• 
vation trom Externality is memory, "our realization ot those other 
actualities, which we conceive as ourselves in our reoent past, 
tuaing their self-enjoyment with our innediate present.n71 "It is 
the importance of the others which melts into the importance of 
the self. Actuality is the aelt-enjoym.ent ot importance. But 
this selt-enjo~nt has the oharaoter of the self-enjoyment of 
70 !ft, P• 160. 
71 ~. p. 161. 
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others melting into the enjoyment of' the one selt."72 The actual-
ity of the present self is constituted by a process of oompoa1-
tion from the past .facts that 11 have such closeness of reference tc: 
the immediate self that an intimate unity with them is claimed. 
In this way, the concept of self-identical enduring personal 
existence dawns. •t73 From one point ot view, namely, attending to 
the past, Whitehead holds that the "sense ot externality is based 
on the primary self-analysis of the process of composit1on."74 
'Ihe analysis discloses the most valuable tacts ot the past self 
becoming faotora in the present composition of the self as a pow-
er striving to maintain and realize its own purpose. 
Complementary to the point of view which attends to the 
past, there is the point or view whioh attends to the future. 
'!'his latter point of view also discloses the external! ty. Atten-
tion to the future is involved in the self's striving to maintain 
and realize its own purpose. The self's oonoeptual entertainment 
of unrealized possibility is, in its highest development, the en• 
tertainment of the ideai.75 This sense of the ideal is involved 
in the urge of the self to express itself. "Expression is the 
72 
.!:!I· p. 161 • 
13 lf!:, p. 160. 
74 Hr _, p. 163. 
7S MT, 
-
p. 37. 
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dit!'usion, in the environment, or something initailly entertained 
in the experience of the expressor.n76 "The more general notion 
of Importance is presupposed by Expression. Something is to be 
diffused throughout the environment which will make a differ-
enoe. 077 The self has the feeling that it has something important 
to express to others. This something important should become part 
of the importance of others. This impulse and urge to diffuse 
"is the most fundamental evidence ot our presupposition of the 
world without."78 Both the past and the future of the self dis-
close evidence for the externality of the world. 
There is another way in which attention to the future 
discloses the Externality of the world. Attention to the !'uture 
is involved in the self's striving to maintain and realize its 
own purpose, its ideal. The self's oonaeptual entertainment or 
unrealized possibility is, in its highest development, the enter-
tainment or the ideal. This sense or the ideal 1s one way or 
experiencing importance, in this case, something important that 
needs to be achieved by the self. This experience or ideals in-
cludes through memory the experience of having sometimes succeeded 
and othertimes failed. Whitehead explains how this experience 
76 .!!£, p. 29. 
77 .!!:. p. 28. 
78 J:!I, p. 29. 
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discloses the externality of the world: 
The intertwining of success and failure in respect to this 
final experience is essential. We thereby experience a re-
lation to a universe other than ourselves. We are essential• 
ly measuring ourselves in respect to what we are not. A 
solipsist experienoe cannot succeed or fail, tor it would be 
all that exists. That would be no standard ot comparison. 
Human experience explicitly relates itself to an external 
standard. The universe ie thus understood as including a 
source of ideals.79 
Whitehead's intuition may be explicflted in the following 
modus tollens conditional syllogism in order to elucidate its 
self-evidence: 
It the self were solus ipse, there would be no success 
or failure, in tact, no striving for ideals at all. For selt 
would be all that exists; and since it would be all that 
Could exist in a sol1psist1c world, it would be unable to 
experience a relationship to a universe of ideals other than 
1 ts elf'. 
But the self does strive tor idea.la, and further, does 
have auooeas and failure in its striving fbr ideals. 
Therefore, the self is not solus ipse. 
The self knows "the sense of external reality--that is to 
say, the sense of being one actuality in a world of actualities--
is the gift of aesthetic signifioanoe. This experience claims a 
relevance beyond the finite immediacy of any one oocaaion of ex-
perienoe. "80 "Importance, limited to a finite individual occasion 
ceases to be 1mportant.n81 The self as solus 1pse oeases to be 
79 !!1 pp. 141-142. 
80 _m, p. 165. 
81 l:f!'., p. 28. 
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important. In other words, Whitehead is affirming that the self's 
conviction in and sense of importance, Something that matters, is 
intelligible only if the self's importance continues and develops 
the importance of the past and prepares for the importance of the 
future. Attention to the past and future of the self reveal both 
how the self is 1n a process ot constituting itself from valuable 
tacts of its past and how the self has the impulse to diffuse the 
importance that it realizes into its environment. 
On the one hand, the selt (lnternality) feels its value-
experience as deriving from the past, namely, from the Externality 
or many value-experiences, and as preparing tor the future, that 
is, preparing to diffuse ita own value-experience into the Exter-
nali ty of value•exper1encea of others. On the other hand, the 
self (Internality) also teels itselt as deriving from the Totality 
of value-experience of the past and as preparing its contribution 
for the Totality of value•experienoe of the future. Whitehead 
affirms that this factor of the Totality of value-experience "is 
disclosed in our sense of the value, for its own sake, of the to-
tality of historic taot in respect to its essential unity. There 
is a unity in the universe, enjoying value and (by its immanence) 
sharing value."82 Whitehead does not give an analysis of the 
composition of the self (Internality) which reveals this factor of 
82 .,!!, pp. 163-164. 
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the Totality in the past of the self as he has done for the factor 
or Externality. Rather, he tries to evoke in the listener a sense 
ot how the VAlue of the present needs to be taken into the value 
of the Totality. 83 Thia "sense of the value of the details for 
the totality ••• is the intuition of holiness, the intuition or 
the aaored, which is at the foundation of all religion."84 This 
is the intuition that importance, limited to the importanoe of In-
ternality and Externality, ceases to be important. "Importance is 
derived from the immanence of infinitude .[f..e., Totality...J in the 
83 !!!:,, p. 164: "When we survey nature and think how-
ever flitting and superficial he.s been the animal enjoyment of its 
wonders, and when we realize how incapable the separate cells and 
pulsations of each flower are of enjoying the total ettect--then 
our sense of the value of the details for the totality dawns upon 
our oonsoiousness." 
Hartshorne expresses Whitehead's intuition of the need 
in moral experience for an ultimate preservation ot values real-
ized in the universe: "But even the most secular among us, es-
pecially when we are at our best, have a feeling of contributing 
to some permanent and oommon good. Without this feeling, one act 
must seem to us ss reasonable as any other, since the rational judgment of acts refers to the good on the whole and in the long 
run. Now how oan human 1nd1v1duals1 destined as they are for 
death, not only individually but, as it seems, collectively, ra-
cially, and lacking any but the most fitful and incomplete aware-
ness ot each otherfs values, or even of their own past values--
bow oan such as these serve any inclusive, permanent, common good 
unless there be a God whose unitary, sympathetic, and ceathless 
awareness, incapable ot forgetting, derive value from our momen-
ltary and fragmented welfRre'l" 
Hartshorne, "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was 
~rue in 1Ideal1sm,•" Journal£! Philosophz, XLIII, no. 21 (Oct. 
10, 1946) p. 582. 
84 ~. p. 164. 
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finite .Lf,..e., Internality and External1ty.sJ"85 "Everything has 
some value for 1tselt, tor others, and for the whole. This ohar-
acterizea the meaning of actuality ... 86 This meaning is the pri-
mary explication of the sense ot Something that matters in its 
three-told character. Neither Internality, nor Externality, nor 
Totality in any sense predeoes the others.87 The "dim meaning of 
taot--or actuality--is intrinsic importance for itself, for the 
others, and tor the whole. 088 The religious intuition is the ex-
perience ot the three-told character ot Something that matters, 
the inter-connected values of selt, others, and the whole. 
In Modes _g! Thoyght, Whitehead identities the religious 
intuition as the sense ot Deity.89 He uses the sense ot Deity to 
refer to value-experience and to the self's experience of ideals. 
This double usage oooura in the following t~x.t: 
Apart from this sense ot transcendent worth, the otherness of 
reality would not enter into our oonsoiousness. There must 
be value beyond ourselves. Otherwise every thing experienced 
would be merely a barren detail in our own solipsist mode of 
existence. We owe to the sense of De1ty9the obviousness of the many actualities ot the world •••• 0 
85 !!'.· p. 28. 
86 lfl, p. 151. 
87 11£, P• 159. 
88 !f!, p. 159. 
89 ,m:, pp. 140-142, 163-164. 
90 J:r!, p. 140. 
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The sense of transcendent worth is the sense of Deity. 
This is the experience of values as other than, as beyond, the 
present self. Value-experiences are other than the present self 
in two ways: first, as achieved value-experiences in the past; 
and secondly, as ideals, i.e., as value-experiences to be achieved 
in the future by self and others. Both the otherness of reality 
and the multiplicity of other actualities is disclosed in the 
sense of Deity. The otherness of reality especially is revealed 
in the self 'a experience of ideals only partially achieved. If 
the self were solipsistic, it would not measure itself by ideals, 
by something other than itself; nor would it tail to achieve its 
ideals, since it would have no external standard of comparison to 
judge itself by. This external standard of comparison is a source 
of ideals other than the self. The multiplicity of other actual• 
ities is disclosed in the analysis of the self as a process ot 
constituting itself from many valuable taota of its past. The 
analysis of the self also discloses the impulse of the self to 
diffuse the value that it has realized into the otherness of ita 
environment. We owe to the sense of Deity the obviousness or the 
otherness of reality and of the many actualities in reality. 
Whitehead has used the sense of Deity to refer to value-
experienoe and to the experience of ideals. He also uses the 
sense ot Deity to refer primarily to Deity, that factor which uni-
ties the many value•experiencea ot the universe into the value of 
94 
the Totality and which is the source of the ideals striven after 
by all value-experiences. This usage occurs 1n the following 
text: "We owe to the sense of Deity ••• the obviousness ot the 
unity of the world for the preservation of the values realized 
and for the transition to ideals beyond realized faot."91 White-
head's intuition is that only Deity, immanent in experience as 
the ultimate preserving unification of value-experiences and as 
the source of the world's unity ot ideals, could make intelligi-
ble the unity of the transcendent universe for the preservation 
of values realized and for the ideals of the universe.92 Immanent 
in experience as the unification of value-experiences, Deity is 
the Totality which is directly experienced.93 Immanent in exper-
ience as the source of ideals, 1.e., of potential values to be 
realized, Deit7 is the external standard to which "human experi-
ence expl1o1tly relates itselr."94 
In summary: Whitehead has used the sense of Deity to 
refer both to value-experience and the experience of !dee.ls and to 
Deit7 itself as the ultimate unification or value-experiences and 
as the ultimate source of ideals. This multiple meaning of the 
91 ~. p. 140. 
92 J:!!!, PP• 140, 142. 
93 _m:, pp. 150-151, 158-160, 163-164. 
94 _m:, pp. 141-142. 
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sense of Deity is used by Whitehead to explain the obviousness ot 
the otherness of value-experiences, the obviousness of the multi-
plicity of vnlue-experienoes, the obviousness of the unification 
of value-experiences, and the obviousness of the unity or the 
ideals of value-experience. The Modes £! Though~ description of 
the sense of Deity is Whitehead •s attempt to -1ce-'&efl,rally evi-
dent the religious intuition of the three-fold character of So~e­
thing that matters, the 1ntercormeoted values ot self, others, 
and the whole. Whitehead indicates that this aense of Deity AX-
hibits itself in several ways, such as, "the sense of morality, 
the mystic sense ot religion, the sense of that delicacy of ad-
justment which is beauty, f;.n~ the sense of necessity tor mutual 
connection which is understanding."9S It is the purpose of the 
next section to show how the sense of Deity as the sense of neces-
sity tor mutual connection may serve as a defense of the function 
of speculative reason. 
D. The Function of Spt?oulative Reason Considered in Light SJ.t. 
ltltional Reliiion and The Religious Intuition as the Sense .Ql 
Deitx 
The relevance of the religious intuition to the function 
ot speculative reason can best be considered after a consideration 
or the relevance of rational religion. These two aspects will be 
considered in turn: (1) rational religion, and (2) the religious 
9$ !f!, P• 37 • 
intuition. 
(1) The relevance of rational religion as a way of life 
to the function of speculative reason is found in Whitehead's em• 
phasis on justification. He has explained that rational religion 
should have a system of general truths which Justify a person by 
cleansing his character of faults and by developing the oharaotar 
towards the religious ideal of porfection. Rational religious 
truth is that which fulfills man's longing for justification. ae-
lig1on1s confrontation with the problem of evil reveals another 
aspect of religion as the longing for Just1f1oat1on. Religion is 
the longing of the spirit that the facts of existence should find 
justification, 1.e. finality, in the nature of existence. The 
religious need for justification includes not only the need tor 
moral purification and moral development but also the need to un-
derstand man's predicament in the problem of evil and the need to 
be rescued from this predicament. 
Speculatively, the need for justification can be ful-
filled by answering man•s question of why evils happen to man, es-
pecially to the good man. Praotically, the need for Justification 
oan be fulfilled by a religious life in which evil is overcome or 
escaped from in some manner. There is an ultimate evil in the 
temporal world deeper than any speo1f1o evil: all temporal reali• 
ties cease to be. By itself the temporal world does not provide 
for the unification and preservation of values achieved. Rational 
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religion attempts to solve this ultimate evil of the temporal 
world and the problem or speaifie evils in the world. One who 
lives religion has a deep longing of the spirit that the !acts of 
existenoe should find justification in the nature of existence. 
As the longing that the facts of existence should find 
justification, 1.e. final1~y, in the nature of existenae, rational 
religion supports the function of' sp~oulative :'."'•?ason. A person 
who lives religion hopes that the facts of existence, includir..g 
speoif!o evils and the ultimate evil of the temporal world, will 
find meaning (that is. a justification, a purpose, a value) in 
the nature of reality. In so tar as his religion hae been ration-
ally critioized, that is has become a rational religion, this 
person will tind little or no difficulty in acoppting the ideal 
or speculative reason. "Religion is the translation of general 
ideas into particular thoughts, particular emotions, and particu-
lar purposes; it is directed to the end or stretching individual 
interest beyond its self-defeating particularity.n96 Religion 
seeks a world•enoompassing finality. The rationalism encouraged 
by rational religion can easily overflow into the valuable human 
project of metaphysical speculation, for example, about the nature 
of the particular temporal realities and their relation to a pos-
sible permanent and intelligible reality whioh is non-temporal. 
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11Ra1. 1g1on is an ultimate craving to in.fuse into the insistent 
part1oular1 ty of emot-t.on that non-temnoral genera.11 ty wh1oh pri-
marily belongs to conceptual thought s.lone. 1197 As an ultimate 
craving to understand particulars in terms of general principles, 
religion is e demand for an intellectual justifioation ot brute 
experience. This c:'ernand hes been the motive power in the advance 
of European science. In this sense the speculative so1entif1o 
interest 1s only a variant form of religioue interest. Scientific 
devotion to truth as an ideal is very similar to religious de-
votion to morlil and religious Justification as an 1deai.98 
The correlation of the ideal of' sneeula.tive reason with 
religion as the longing that the f~ots of existence find justifi-
cation in the nature of existence presupposes the aooeptanoe of 
rational religion. The religious intuition as the basis of ra-
tional religion must now be examined as to its possible oorrela-
t1on with the function of speo~lative reason. 
(2) The religious intuition as the sense of Deity oan 
serve as e defense of the tunotion of speculative raason in that 
the s~nse of Deity involves a sense of neoessity of mutual oonnec-
t!on. Whitehead has indicated that "rationalism presupposes a 
97 .f!!, p. 23. 
98 .m, p. 24. 
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complex or definite tacts whose interconnections are sought."99 
But rational religion is based on an intuition into the ultimate 
character of the world. This intuition discloses the values or 
self, of others, and of the world as a community derivative from 
the interrelations of its members and as necessary tor their con-
tinued existence. The dim but fundamental meaning ot an existing 
actuality is intrinsic importance, 1.e., intrinsic justification, 
purpoae, value, tor itself, tor others, and for the whole. This 
sense of the three-fold scheme of Something that matters is "our 
primary experience which lies below and gives its meaning to our 
conscious analysis or" the world.100 
Any experience of the world will assume as obvious the 
totality of actual tact (the whole), tbe external1ty of many 
faata (the others) and the 1nternal1ty of the one experiencing 
(the selt). This three-told scheme or something with intrinsic 
justification is the presupposition which any experience requires. 
It is also the self-evident insight into the presupposition ot 
any attempt to explain existing actualities. For it existing 
actualities are not experienced to have intrinsic importance for 
themselves, tor others, and tor the whole, then such actualities 
do not exist tor their own sake; they do not exist with their own 
99 .!!!· p. 24. 
100 J!!, p. 158. 
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justification. To exist without importance is to exist without 
value or purpose. To exist without purpose, without justifica-
tion through final causality, is to be a mere matter of taot in-
oapable of being understood as an element in a system. 101 
Whitehead also indicates that the religious intuition 
is the basis, the ultimate premise, of any rational evaluation of 
oonsoious determination of actions. This point may be used to 
support the function ot speculative reason.102 The ultimate prem 
ise of any :rational understanding of particular actualities is 
disclosed in the religious intuition as a general character of 
rightness inherent in the nature or things. This ultimate charac 
ter of the universe is experienced as intrinsic importance tor 
self, others, and the whole. To exist as a self with suoh im-
portance, that is, to exist with such interrelationship with 
others and the whole by final causality, is to exist capable of 
being understood as an element in a system. 
The sense of Deity diaoloses both the ultimate source 
101 ]!!!, p. 21. 
102 !!!, pp. 66-67: "• • • there is ••• a rightness 
in things, partially oontormed to and partially disregarded. So 
far as there is conscious determination of actions, the attain-
ment of this conformity is an ultimate premise by reference to 
which ouz- oho1oe of immediate ends 1s oritioized and swayed. The 
rational satisfaction or dissatisfaction in respect to any par-
ticular happening depends upon an 1nttt1t1on which is capable of 
being universalized. Thia univeraaliaation of what is discerned 
in a particular instance is the a~peal to a general ohs.raoter 
inherent 1n the nature or things. 
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ot potential value, 1.e. meaning or finality, in the universe and 
the ultimate end or preserving un1t1oat1on of values or meanings 
achieved in the universe. The explication of this intuition of 
Deity as the ultimate source and end of meaning in the universe 
necessarily establishes the function of speculative reason. In 
this experience of Deity, man knows that metaphysical reasons 
oan be given for the tacts in the universe; man knows that the 
ultimate reasons for meaning in tacts, both their ultimate source 
and their ultimate end, can be given.103 In fact, they are given 
in that very experience. 
This section has explained how the sense of Deity as 
the sense of necessity ot mutual connection serves tor Whitehead 
as the intuited evidence defending the .function of speculative 
reason. The next section desoribe1 the agreement of this study 
with other investigations on Whitehead. 
E. The AS!!eement of this Study with Other Investi~ations ot 
lrtirtehead, iipecii'Iii Hartshorne'a ,!!l!! Tillich a --
The thesis ot this study, the positive oonneotion be-
tween the sense of Deity and the tunotion ot speculative reason, 
agrees with the results of studies done by Belaief, Oobb, Harts-
horne, T1111oh, and Thompson. The agreement with these investi-
gators will be taken in that order. 
103 !!J, p. 65. 
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In a consideration of Whitehead's methodological presup-
post11ons, Belaief has conoluded that Whitehead's "vision of the 
world as a creative process of internally related 1nd1v1dual1t1es 
ultimately grounded in, and everlastingly moving toward, a final 
total unity or value and order ••• has led him to the faith ot 
rAt1ona11sm."104 Underlying this faith in reason's speoulat1ve 
tunotion, there ls, Belaief points out, an intuition ot 1nf1n1ty, 
a religious experience, expressed as the 1d&al limit toward which 
the world progresses, and therefore, towards which philosophical 
description aims.105 However, Belaiet baa not differentiated the 
descriptions ot the religious intuition in Religion .!n the Makin_g 
and Modes 91.. Thoughi, as this study has done; nor has she pointed 
out Whitehead's explicit correlation ot the sense or Deity with 
the sense of necessity of mutual connection which is understand-
ing. 
Belaief does point out that the religious experience at 
the basis ot Whitehead's rationalism should be related to an ar-
gument in Process .!!!4 Reality tor God's consequent nature as the 
principle of truth. 106 While he is discussing truth as an ideal 
104 Lynne Belaief, The Ethics of Alfred North Whiteheac (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia-Un!versity, 1964) p. 30. 
105 ~ •• pp. 30-Jl. 
lo6 Ibid., p. 35; Belaiet makes no t'urther comment on 
the argument besides that simple statement. 
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limit, namely, fully expressed propositions, Whitehead states the 
following argument: 
The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite 
natures of the organic aotue.lities of the world obtain ade-
quate representation in the divine nature. Such representa• 
tions compose the •consequent nature• of God, whioh evolves 
in its relationship to the evolving world without derogation 
to the eternal completion of its primordial oonoeptual na-
ture. In this way the •ontological pr1no1ple 1 is maintained 
s1noe there can be no determinate truth, correlating impar-
tially the partial experiences or many actual ent1ti8A• apar 
from one actual entity to which it aan oe referred. 1 
Sinoe there is no other reference to this argument in 
wh1tehead•s writings, its meaning for his metaphysics has general 
ly been neglected. This argument is similar to Josiah Royoe•a 
argument in his article, "The Eternal and the Practioal."108 
Royoe•s and Whitehead•s oonclusiona are the same. Royce conclude 
that the Eternal Knower 1a invariant and yet growing because the 
world grows. 109 Whitehead concludes that God's consequent nature 
evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without deroga• 
tion to the eternal completion of his primordial conceptual na-
ture. Royce's main premise is that man in asserting a judgment 
to be true expresses a need tor truth. 110 Although Whitehead has 
107 J:!!, pp. 18-19. 
108 Josiah Royce, "The Eternal and the Praot1oal," ?he 
Develo~ent 91 American Philosophz, eds. Muelder and Sears (BoS:-
ton: oughton Mifflin Co., 1940) pp. 246-261. 
109 .12!,g., p. 261. 
110 Ibid. 
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not expressed the premises of his argument, he must have the same 
main premise. For his oonolusion is that God is the actual en-
tity who determines truth, who correlates impartially the partial 
experiences of many actual entities. 'l'his conclusion is the re• 
sult of the ontological principle, both in so tar as reasons can 
be given (only through actual entities) and also 1n so far as it 
states that there is a final truth, that final reasons can be 
given.111 
Whitehead'• main premise must be the same as Royce's, 
namely, tba t there is a need for a final truth. 1'here is a need 
for a final impartial correlation of the partial experienoea ot 
the many actual entities, since otherwise there would be no truth. 
This need for truth is essential to man since eve~y judgment which 
asserts that there is truth expresses thereby a need for truth. 112 
Therefore, this need tor a final determination of impartial truth 
must be fulfilled by an actual entity capable of such a final de• 
termination. Such an entity oan only be God since tbe finality ot 
his primordial nature encompasses all possible actual entities 
(potential values). This all-encompassing finality makes God 
111 Ot. chapter four for further discussion of White-
head's ontological principle. 
112 Whitehead nowhere identifies the oremises or his ar-
gument, but these presuppositions can be discovered in his dis-
cussion or his theory of judgments as both a coherence theory and 
a correspondence theory inl!!,, pp. 290 rr. 
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capable ot being causally affected by, ot being related with per-
fect feeling and knowledge, to everry temporal actual entity with-
out partiality. Every temporal aotual entity has only a perspec-
tival or limited finality whioh makes it capable of being related 
to any actual entity only with partiality. Only God through the 
perfection ot the unchanging finality or the primordial nature is 
capable of perfectly knowing the world as it continues to grow 
and afteot his consequent nature.113 
John Oobb otters a suggestion tor interpreting this ar-
gument for the primordial and consequent natures as the ground ot 
the possibility ot truth. He believes that Whitehead is arguing 
from the sense, that all men have, "that there is some structure 
to which our formulations more or lesa adequately approximate."114 
This sense ot "reality as a whole" is exactly what Whitehead meana 
by the sense ot Deity. Because man experiences the structure ot 
reality as a whole, he is dimly aware that all his judgments are 
trying to express the truths that Deity knows perteotly. 
Oharles Hartshorne identities the Modes ,2' Thousht ex-
perience or Deity with Whitehead's Ro1cean argument.llS Thia 
113 !!. pp. $23-524. 
114 Oobb, A Christian 
Westminster Press, 1965J p. 166. 
oonneotion between this sense or 
sense ot Deity. 
Natural Theologx (Philadelphia: 
Oobb does not point out the 
"reality as a whole" with the 
llS Hartshorne, "Whitehead'• Idea ot God,"!!:!.!. Philoao-
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studyagr&ea with Hartshorne that the sense of Deity is self-evi-
dent but obscure and that consequently the experience needs to be 
emphasized, pointed out, through the effects it has on the rest of 
man•s experience. Hartshorne is oorreot when he says that one of 
the etteots which the experience ot Deity causes is that truth is 
objective. The sense of Deity as the structure of reality as a 
whole gives man the sense that bis judgments are trying to apprcxx.-
imate that objective structure. Although Hartshorne identifies ·. 
the sense of Deity with Whitehead's Roycean argument, Hartshorne 
also distinguishes the two passages, since the sense of Deity can 
be a religious experience of the value of reality as a whole. 116 
Thia study has emphasized the latter aspect, the experience of the 
value of reality as a whole. For in Modes .2.! Thought, Whitehead 
emphasizes the dim but t'undamental experience as a sense of *Some-
thing that matters• in a three-told scheme, Internality, External• 
ity, and Totality. It is the sense ot the value ot the Totality 
of the universe wh1oh enables Whitehead to identify this experi-
ence as th& sense of Deity. Hartshorne does not emphasize this 
sense of Deity as intuitively given in experience. But Hartshorne 
is correot when he says that the sense of Deity serves as the 
foundation of Whitehead's Roycean argument. Hartshorne is also 
•f"' 
·--------"· ~t. 
116 Hartshorne, •Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What 
Was True in 'Idealism,'" .2.i?• oit., p. 582. 
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correct when he says that the sense of Deity serves as the basis 
ot moral life and ethical theory. 117 For as Whitehead said, 
"Everything has some value for itself, for others, and tor the 
whole. This characterizes the meaning ot actuality. By reason 
of this character, constituting reality, the conception of morals 
arises."118 
Tillich's interpretation of Whitehead agrees with Harts-
horne in holding that there is an awareness of something ultimate 
in value and being in every human or intentional act, whether the 
aot is theoretical (tor the sake ot truth) or practical (tor the 
sake or good}.ll9 Tillich bolds that the fundamental commitment 
which directs Whitehead's philosophical approach is a type of 
mystical or religious experience, namely, the awareness of value-
produoing processes. This perception and oonoeption of reality 
is based on an immediate experience or something ultimate in value 
and being ot which man can become aware intuitively.120 Although 
Tillich does not off er an analysis of tbe Modes !2t.. Thoµgbt des-
cription of the sense of Deity, he is correct in identifying 
117 See above, this chapter, p. 91, footnote 83. 
118 ~. p. 1$1. 
119 Tillich, "The Two Types of Philosophy ot Religion," 
Union Seminaty Quarterly Review, I, no. 4 (May, 1964) pp. 10-11. 
120 Tillich, Systematic Theolo"ff, Vol. I (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, l951J pp. 9, J. 
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Whitehead's fundamental point of departure as the awareness of 
value-producing processes, which awareness is based on an immedi-
ate experience of Deity. This sense of Deity is relevant to spec-
ulative reason as the sense of necessity of mutual connection of 
all the value-experiences in the universe, and to praotioal reas-
on as the sense ot the interconnected values of self, others, and 
the whole. 121 
Thompson has pointed out that Whitehead's rationalism 
"finds justification or at least exemplification in immediate 
experience 1n that immediate experience discloses complex entities 
having temporal duration and which are in the process of trans1-
t1on. "122 In intuitive experience there is disolosed an experi-
ential complexity-unity of different factors. This unit1 of the 
many bas an aesthetic harmony which is to be expressed in a ra-
tional understanding. 123 However, Thompson argues, the extension 
of this description of immediate experience be1ond immediate ex-
perience presupposes a doctrine of empirical analogy: "L!i'h1lo-
sopb1cal generalization presupposes as a metaphysical ground a 
uniform structure of experience such that the essential constitu-
tion of one entity is empirically analagous to that of others."124 
121 l:!I1 P• 37 • 
122 Thompson, 
.21?• oit., p. 79 • 
123 Ibid. 
-
124 Ibid •• p. Bo. 
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When metaphysical generalization is an inductive inference beyond 
immediate experience, there must be an actual ground for the in-
ference. Thompson concludes, referring to Whitehead's discussion 
of the presuppositions of scientific generalization that if ana-
logical inference is to be possible, there must be an actuality 
which is the ground, the presupposition, of the possibility of 
metaphysical truth. This actuality is God. 12S 
Thompson does not argue that this ground of the possi-
bility ot metaphysical truth oould be known intuitively and be 
related to the function of speculative reason. He was probably 
influenced by Whitehead's statement that these non-statistical 
judgments are not in any sense religious. 126 Whitehead's corre-
lation of the sense of Deity with the function of speculative 
reason occurred in Modes ot ~hoygh~, the book whioh Thompson did 
not emphasize. Onoe the sense of Deity is so correlated, an ob-
12.$ .!!?!,g. l ''Now, •in every inductive judgment, there 
is ••• contained a presupposition of the maintenance of the gen-
eral order of the immediate environment, ao far as ooncerna actual 
entities within scope of induction.• .Llll, p. 3117 ••• rhus, 'the 
basis of all probability and induction is the fact of analogy be-
tween an environment presupposed and an environment directly ex-
perienced.' [fR, p. 31.!l:l Beyond the principle of analogy must be a 
faot of analogy if inference is possible and if the ontologioal 
principle is valid. Thus the .method of metaphysical generaliza-
tion, particularly as it involves inductive inference, presupposes 
a non-statistical ground of inference which is itself actual. To 
this actuality Whitehead gives the name •God'." 
126 .!fi, pp. 314-315. 
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seure passage ot Whitehead becomes intelligible. 
Faith in reason is the trust that the ultimate natures of 
things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere arbi-
trariness. It is the faith that at the basis or things we 
shall not find mere arbitrary mystery. • • • This faith 
cannot be justified by any inductive genAralizntion. It 
springs from direct inspection of th~ nature of thin£s as 
disclosed in our own immediate present experience. i!T 
This is Whitehead's strongest statement calling for an 
intuited evidence (which Thompson has not appealed to) that de-
fends the function or speculative reason. To experience this 
faith in reason is to know that man in his experience is more than 
his own particular experience. To experience this .faith is to 
know that human experience, dim and fragmentary as it is, yet 
sounds the utmost depths or reality. 128 To experience this .faith 
is Mto know that detached details merely in order to be themselves 
demand that they should tind themselves in a system of things: to 
know that this system inoludea the ha?'mony of logical rationality, 
11129 and the harmony of aesthetic achievement. • • • The aestheti& 
religious sense of Deity has been discovered to be the intuited 
evidence disclosing the universe as a harmony of logical rational-
1 ty and aesthetic achievement. 
This chapter has tried to show a positive connection 
127 ~' P• 27. 
128 !H!!, P• 27. 
129 ~' PP• 27-28. 
111 
between the function of speculative reason and the sense or Deity. 
Whitehead indicated that his philosophy is a pragmatism whioh 
seeks the self-evidence which is a necessary part of civilized 
experience and of what is meant by civilization. There ie a 
strong moral intuition that the good life of civilization is spec-
ulative understanding for its own sake. This intuition is unlike-
ly to occur in primitive man and the primitive side of civilized 
man. For they lack the intuition of the universe as a complex of 
interconnected facts that stimulates man to understand the facts 
by analyzing and discriminating the connections; they lack the 
intuition into the presuppositions of a coherent rationalism. In 
attending to his primary experience. oiY111zed man rinds that the 
basis or rational religion is the religious intuition, the sense 
or Deity. This is the experience of the interconnected values of 
self, others, and the whole of the world.as derivative f'rom the 
valuable interconnections of its members and as neoessary for the 
continued existenoe of value. This is an evidence which White-
head has systematized in his metaphysics; but he has also des-
cribed it independently, sinoe it is a primary experience. This 
evidence 1s the presupposition or civilized experience for White-
head both in its speculative and practical (moral, aesthetic, and 
religious) aspects. It is relevant to speculative reason's func-
tion, since the sense ot the 1nteroonneot1ons of reality, stimu-
lates man to analyze and identify the interconnections. The evi• 
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denoe 1s also relevant to practical reason's function of achieving 
value, whether the value be moral-religious or aesthetic. The 
sense of the interconnected values ot self, others, and the whole 
as preserving the values of self and others is for Whitehead the 
presupposition of man's moral-religious life and his aesthetic 
life. As the presupposition of speculative and practical reasons' 
functions. the sense of Deity is necessarily affirmed by man for 
Whitehead in any attempt to achieve the good of oiv111zat1on which 
their functions seek. 
This study continues to emphasize the connection between 
the function of speculative reason and the sense of Deity. As an 
evidence for the function of spedulative reason, the sense of 
Deity should not be accepted apart from Whitehead's other defenses 
of his rationalism. In aooord with his method of the working 
hypothesis, no evidence or theory should be accepted apart from 
the total evidence and theories of bia philosophy. Thus the next 
chapter studies bow Whitehead's defenses or speculative reasonta 
function and the sense of Deity mutually supplement eaoh other. 
OHAPrER III 
THE SENSE OF DEITY AND OTHER DEFENSES OF THE FUNCTION OP 
S.PEOULATIVB REASON AS SUPPLEMENTARY TO EACH OTHER 
The purpose of this chapter is to study how the sense of 
Deitya.ndother defenses or the t'unotion of speculative reason 
supplement each other. There are three main d1v1a1ona to the 
ohapter: first, Whitehead, Hume, and the sense of Deity; second-
ly, Rationalism, Irrationalism, And the sense of Deity; and third• 
ly, Whitehead, Dewey, and the sense ot Deity. The general ap~ 
pN>aoh ot each section is twofold. First, various defenses whiob 
Whitebaad gives of speculative reason's function are described. 
Secondly, this chapter raises objections to those defenses and 
then shows how the sense of Deity can serve as an evidence an-
swering these objections. However, the other defenses supplement 
the sense of Deity as a defense or speculative reason's function 
just as much as it supplements them. It will be pointed out that 
all these various defenses need to be fulfilled by the sucoeasf'ul 
working out ot a speculative understanding of all particular tacts 
1n terms of general principles. For Whitehead's method of the 
working hypothesis demands that the ideal of speculative reason 
113 
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needs to be achieved with some success; otherwise it would be a 
worthless ideal for man's o1vil1zed life. However due to the 1m-
perfeotions of metaphysical systems, it is possible for man to 
los• hope in this ideal. Consequently, the appeal to the reli-
gious intuition is important for man to continue to have faith 1n 
the ideal of speculative reason. 
A. Whitehead, l!Y!!!!1 and the Sense .2! Deity 
Whitehead points out that "since the time of Hume, the 
fashionable so1ent1f1o philosophy has been such as to deny the 
rationality of science. This oonclusion lies upon the surface of 
Hume's philosophy."1 For Hume holds that every effect is a dis-
tinct event from its cause and that neither the oause nor the ef-
fect discloses any information about the other. 2 Since any con-
nections between cause and effeot "must be entirel1 arbitrary, it 
follows at onoe that soienoe is impossible; except in the sense ot 
establishing entirely arbitrarz connections wh1oh are not warran-
ted by anything 1ntrins1o to the natures either of causes or ef• 
feota."3 Hume's position on the oause-effeot oonneotion consti-
tutes a serious objection to Whitehead's position that the func-
tion of speculative reason is to understand all particular facts 
l ~. P• 5. 
2 1!!1!!. pp. 5-6. 
3 !!!!f; P• 6. 
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in terms of general principles. For if the connections between 
facts (causes and effects) are entirely arbitrary as Hume holds, 
then there would be no und~rstanding of the oonneotions between 
facts which could be expressed in general principles. However, 
Whitehead's position differs from Hume's on the experience and in-
telligibility of the oause-etfect oonneotion. 
Whitehead analyzes the presuppositions involved in 
Hume's denial of the.experience of the necessary connection of 
oause and effeot. In Hume•s theory or perception (experience), 
the mind is entirely wrapped up in the observation of the present 
moment. The mind is only conscious ot its passively received 
sense-data in the present moment, and it is impossible for the 
mind to go behind the present moment in order to discover the 
causes of the presently observed sense•data.4 The assumption be-
hind Hume's theory of experience ia his theory of time as pure 
succession. Whitehead points out that this concept of time !s 
easily held although it is a mistake. For the usual observations 
emphasize the discontinuity or outer temporal events. The correct 
view of time emphasizes the succession of our inner acts of ex-
perience and thence derivatively the succession of outer events 
perceived in those acts. This succession is the derivation of 
state from state, with the later state showing oonfol'mity to the 
York: 
4 Whitehead, Sngbolism, 11! Meaning !:!ls! Effeot (New 
Macmillan, 1927) pp. 32•JJ. 
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anteoedent.S ttTime in the conorete is the contormation ot state 
to state, the later to the earlier; and the pure succession is an 
abstraction from the irreversible relationship of settled past to 
derivative present. 116 
Whitehead defends his view of time by distinguishing 
two kinds of perceptions presentational immediaoy, the awareness 
of sense-data wh1oh Hume bas pointed out; and causal efficacy, 
the awareness of a reality's derivation from its imrn.ediate past-
environment. 7 Whitehead agrees with Hume's analysis of sense-data 
as vivid; precise, and barren. 'rhere is no directly perceivable 
oonneot1on of the qualities perceived with the intrinsia charao-
8 ters of the objects qualified. However, Whitehead argues that 
man experiences effioient causality in the mode ot perception 
named causal effioaoy. This is a primitive experienoe, the per-
ception of conformation to realities in the environment. This per· 
ception of the pressure from the world of things is especially 
strong when vivid sense-perception in the mode of presentational 
immediacy is weakened as in a strong enx>tional state.9 A strong 
s .!2!,g •• PP• 34-35 • 
6 Ibid., p. 35. 
7 121!!·' p. .31. 
8 Ibid.' pp. 23-25. 
9 12!!·, pp. 43.44. 
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emotion auoh as fear involves the experience of retreating from 
the object feared, of being affected by the action or threatened 
aotion of the object feared. One cannot retreat from mere sub-
jeati vity sinoe subjectivity is what one carries with himself. 
Consequently, the emotion of fear is not an ~xperienoe of man's 
own subjectivity simply, nor an experience of sense-data, but 
rather a clear recognition of a aausally efficacious object af-
fecting man. 10 '.I'h1s experience of causal efficacy is confirmed 
by the practical beliefs of man. In practice, Whitehead points 
out, we never doubt the conformation of the present to the immedi-
ate past. ''The present fact is luminously the outcome from 1 ts 
predecessors. one quarter of a second ago. • • • If dynamite ex-
plodes, then present fact is that issue from the past which is 
consistent with dynamite explod1ng.nll It is clear to Whitehead 
that man does experience efficient aausat1on and that Hume is 
therefore wrong to deny any experience of the cause-effect rela-
tionah1p. 
Accordingly, Whitehead directly denies Hume's doctrine 
of simple ooourrence whereby a moment of time simply occurs with 
no intrinsic connection with the past: 
I directly deny this doctrine of •simple occurrence.• 
10 Ibid., P• 45. 
11 .!J?.!g., pp. 45-46. 
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There is nothing which 'simply happens.• Such a beliet is 
the baseless doctrine of time as •pure succession.• The al-
ternative doctrine, that the pure suooess1on of time is mere-
ly an abstract trom the tundamental relationship of conforma-
tion, sweeps away the whole basis for the intervention of 
constitutive thought, or constitutive intuition, in the for-
mation of the directly apprehended world. Universality of 
truth arises from the universality of relativity, whereby 
every particular actual thing lays upon the universe the ob-
ligation of conforming to it. Thus in the analysis of par-
ticular fact universal trut~I are df•ooverable, those t:rutha 
expressing this obligation. 2 
Hume's theory of time as sheer succession disoonneota 
cause and effect. His theory thereby attacks man•s belief in an 
order of nature. However, Whitehead has a notion of time as con-
formation whereby every particular actual thing lays upon the uni-
verse the obligation of conforming to it. His theory or time de-
fends the intelligibility of modern man's 1nstioot1ve belief in 
an order of nature. Every particular fact can be conceived as 
part ot an orderly world since each fact exemplifies the general 
principle of efficient causation. Por the notion ot: time as oon-
tormat1on means that every particular aotual thing lays upon the 
universe the obligation of conforming to it, of being causally af-
fected by it. This analysis constitutes a defense of the function 
ot speculative reason. Por the analysis of particular fact oan 
disclose universal truths. 
It is important to point out that in the last cited text 
Whitehead rejects the intervention ot constitutive thought (such 
12 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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as Kant•s aatego~ies) and of constitutive intuition (suoh as Kant~ 
forms of sensibility, spaoe and time) and thereby rejects Kant's 
Qrit~gue ~ Pure Reason. Whitehead points out that Kant followed 
Hume in assuming the radical disconnection of sense impressions 
gua ~, but Whitehead holds that suoh disconneotion occurs only 
in perception in the mode of presentational immediaoy. 13 In per-
ception in the mode of causal eff1caoy, there is experienosd the 
conneotion, the necessary relationship, of the immediately past 
environment as causally affecting the present experiencing sub-
ject. In the feeling-experience ot time as oonfol'll'Jat1on, that is, 
in the feeling-experience or efficient causation, Whitehead has 
his basic rejection or Kant's form of sensibility. time, and of 
his ~ priori categorization of time into the efficient causation 
principle as limited to the phenomenal world. For perception in 
the mode ot causal eftioaoy is not an experience or merely one's 
~wn subjectivity but rather of the objective world as causally 
~ffeoting the subject. Whitehead's answer to Kant's position, 
nowever, needs to justify that this experience ot the objective 
~orld as causally affecting the experiencing subject oan be oon-
oeived as disclosing the noumenal, 1.e., the 1ntell1g1ble, world. 
~he problem is how oan Whitehead defend the principle of efficient 
oauaation as intelligible in its own right, 1.e., as disclosing 
13 J.!, pp. 172-173. 
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the nou.~enal, intelligible world. 
Whitehead doea defend the prinoiple or efficient causa-
tion as intelligible in its own right. He states "'the principle 
ot efficient, and final oausation•• as the "'ontological prino!-
ple'"s "Thia ontologioal pr1no1ple means that aotual entities 
,Lthe final real things of which the world is made uJil are the only 
reasons; so that to search for a reason is to searoh for one or 
more actual entit1es.n14 Whitehead defends the ontological prin-
ciple by attempting to reduoe it to the principle of contradiction 
"It is a contrad1ot1on in terms to assume that some explanatory 
tact can float into the actual world out ot nonentity. Nonentity 
is nothingness. Every explanatory tact refers to the decision 
and to the etfioaoy of an actual thing."15 Whitehead holds that 
entity should receive an explanation or reason for its entity from 
entity. For if entity did not receive an explanation from entity, 
entity would be explained by nonentity, which is absurd. Nonenti• 
ty is nothingness, and nothingness explains nothing. It is clear 
for Whitehead that entity cannot be explained by, that is, re-
duced to nonentity but rather that entity should be explained by 
entity itslef. Aa so stated, the ontological principle defends 
the function of speculative reason, for all particular entities 
should be intelligible in terms of the entities themselves. 
14 _!!, PP• 36-37, Category of Explanation, xviii. 
15 j!, P• 73. 
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Veateh 1 s anelysia of another formulation of Whitehead's ontolog1• 
cal principle is helpful in understanding Whitehead: "Apart from 
things that ar" actual, there is nothing, nothing in raot or in 
efficacy• Lf!!, p. 6,h?."16 Veatch defends this as a "metaphysioal 
principle which is simply • • • its own reason tor being true. 
For that anything should in tact be or be causally efficacious 
without actually be1ng--th1s is simply unthinkable; it is even 
seli'•oontradictory."17 Veatch calla such a metaphysical truth 
analytic, 1.e., evident in and through the statement itself and 
not through anything else. On the one hand, this meaning or ana• 
lytic agrees with Kant in that the predicate is analytically con-
tained in the subject. In the statement, •Anything that is a tact 
or that is causally efficaoious must be an actual thing (an actual 
entity),' the predicate is contained in the notion or the subject. 
But on the other hand, this meaning or analytic disagrees with 
Kant in that the statement is a faotual truth. For if it is known 
that something is causally efficacious, this causally efficacious 
thing is known as an actual taot (an actual entity). The know-
ledge that it is an actual entity is more than the knowledge ttlat 
it is causally etficacioua.18 
16 Henry Veatch, "The Trutha of Metaphysics, n The Re-
view 9.1. MetaRhiaics, XVII, no. 3 (March, 1964) p. 375. -----
17 Ibid., PP• 375-376. 
18 ~., p. 379. 
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Two defenses of the function of speoul~tive reason have 
been described, (1) Whitehead's notion of time as the oon£ormat1on 
ot the present to the efficient causality of the past and (2) his 
ontological principle. Difficulties may be raised about these 
defenses which can receive an answer from the sense of Deity as 
an evidence. 
(1) Against Whitehead's notion of time the difficulty 
may be raised that Whitehead has generalized the notion of time as 
contorm.ation. The question needs to be asked: what justifies the 
generalization? Whitehead's answer is that universality ot truth 
arises from the universality of relativity, whereby every actual 
thing lays upon the universe the obligation of conforming to it.19 
But this answer is not sufficient. For the universality of rela-
tivity is precisely what is in question. Whitehead could claim 
that it is probable that every particular actual thing causally 
affects the universe. But this suggestion of probability would 
not justify as necessarily true that there is so complete an order 
ot nature that the function of speculative reason is to understand 
all particular facts as illustrating the same general rational 
principles. 
·rhe sense of Deity as the 'I'otal1ty which preserves the 
~alues realized in the universe and which shares its preservation 
19 Whitehead, Symbolism, pp. 38-39. 
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helps to complete the above defense of speculative reason's func-
tion. For this sense of the Totality is an evidence disclosing 
that it is necessary that every particular actual entity causally 
affects the universe. On the basia ot this evidence, 1 t is neces-
sarily true that there is so complete an order of nature that the 
function of speculative reason is to understand all particular 
facts as illustrating the same rational principles. 
(2) The defense of the function of speculative reason 
by the ontological principle's reduction to the principle of con-
tradiction is successful only if one grants that all particular 
facts are intelligible in terms of general principles. If every 
particular fact is 1ntell1g1ble, then entity cannot be reduced to 
nonentity; but if every faot is not intelligible, it does not fol-
low that entity cannot be reduced to non-entity. It is clear that 
the attempted reduction of the ontological prinoiple to the pr1nc~ 
ple of contradiction is only a restatement in different words ot 
the function of speculative reason. 
Moreover, Sherburne unwittingly raises a further diffi-
culty in stating that Whitehead 1s "system requires God in the 
first place simply to preserve the ontological principle."20 The 
20 Donald Sherburne, A Whiteheadian Aesthetic (New 
Haven: Yale Universiyy Press, 1961) pp. 36.37-;-
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difficulty is that, on the one hand, the ontological principle is 
used as a part'1al basis of the proof of God 1s existf'noe, but, on 
the other hand, the system requires God to nreserve the truth ot 
the ontological princ1ple. 21 Veatoh's defense ot the ontological 
principle is inadequate because the formulation which he quotes 
and explains as selt•evident is taken out or context. 'Rbe full 
text is: "By this recognition of the divine element the general 
Aristotelian principle is maintained that, apart from things that 
are actual, there is nothing--nothing either in tact or in ettioa-
oy. "22 The problem remains, how can one affirm that the ontologi-
cal principle is true without qualification unless one knows that 
God, the divine element, exists as the basis of metaphysical 
reasons?23 
The key to answering these difficulties by the sense ot 
Deity is found in Whitehead's statement that the ontological prin• 
21 or • .!!.· p. 48 for one statement of how the ontologi-
cal principle together with the analysis of temporal actual enti• 
ties require tor Whitehead the conclusion that a non-derivative, 
eternal actual entity exists. 
22 ,!!, p. 64. 
23 ]!, p. 28: "The •ontological principle •••• fJ.fil 
the principle that the reasons for things are always to be found 
in the composite nature of definite actual ent1ties--1n the nature 
ot God for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and in the nature 
ot definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to,a 
particular environment. The ontological principle can be summar-
ized as: no actual entity, then no reason." 
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oiple oonstitutes "the first step in the description of the uni-
verse as a solidarity ot many actual ent1t1es."24 Stokes explains 
that 11 •solidarity• means that the universe ls an organic whole. ••25 
The plurality ot actual entities produces a single, common result 
whiah is the universe without the entities losing their individu-
ality. 26 Stokes points out that this "notion of the unity in or-
der ot the universe is Whitehead's articulation of Wordsworth's 
nature .!!l solido. Its technical formulation is Whitehead's onto-
logical principle. 1127 Stokes explains that: 
"This principle expresses Wordsworth's experience or 'that 
mysterious presence ot surrounding things, which imposes 
itself on any separate element that we sat up as an individ-
ual for its own sake.• /!MW, p. 12.l] It involves the ais-
oovery that the universe-TS made up of entwined interconnec-
ted entities that are suffused with modal presence of others. 
Acoordingly, the whole or nature is involved in the tonality 
of each actual entity."26 
Stokes's comments on the ontological principle need to 
be supplemented by the discussion of the sense or Deity. Only the 
sense of Deity, tl's sense of the interconnected values or self, 
24 _m, p. 65. 
25 Walter Stokes, "Whitehead's Challenge to Theistic 
Reality,,. ~ ~ Scholasticiam, XXXVIII, no. l (Jan., 1964) p. 2. 
26 ~., PP• 2-3; ct. J!B, p. 2$4. 
Z'l Stokes, ll• .ill•, p • .). 
28 Ibid. 
-
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others, and the whole universe, establishes in one intuitive aot 
that actual entities constitute a universe. Other intuitions can 
establish the interoonneotions of some actual entities as causally 
intertwined, but not of all actual entities as causally inter-
twined. The text which Stokes cites trom Science .!!lS! !h!, Modern 
World emphasizes the interconnections of some actual entities as 
causally intertwined with others, but not of all actual entities 
as causally intertwined. There is another text in the same chap-
ter which definitely emphasizes the Totality, the whole of the 
universe: "Both Shelley and Wordsworth emphatically bear witness 
that nature cannot be divorced from its aesthetic values; and 
that these values arise from the cumulation, in some sense, or the 
brooding presence of the whole onto its various parta."29 The ex-
perience of the brooding presence or the whole which gives rise to 
values bas been explicated by Whitehead as the sense of Deity, the 
sense of the interconnected values of self, others, and the whole 
universe. Consequently, the ontological principle should be rec-
ognized as Whitehead's way of starting to express in a systematic 
metaphysics the solidar'ity ot the universe which the sense of 
Deity establishes as an unsystematized, intuited evidence. 
Because the sense of Deity discloses Deity as the ulti-
mate source or potential values and as the ultimate end or pre-
serving unitioation ot values realized in the universe, this ex-
29 SMW. p. 127. 
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perienoe is a defense of the ontological prine1ple.30 For reasons 
are 1n faot known to be found for entity in entities themselves, 
especially in that entity named Deity. The problem of the circu-
lar argument raised against Veatch with rega:r-d to the knowledges 
of the ontological principle and of God may be solved in the fol-
lowing way. The s~nse of Deity ls a presystematio evidence which 
Whitehead will not let any theory explain away or deny.31 It is 
an evidence which defends the basic presupposition of any attempt 
at metaphysics, namely, the presupposition of the function of speo 
ulat1ve reason that all actualities are intelligible. This point 
of departure in metaphysics, the p~~suppos1t1on of the funotion ot 
speculative reason, however, can receive other defenses. These 
other defenses are more easily stated due to their olar1ty, e.g. 
the clarity of the reduction of the ontological principle to the 
principle of oontrad1ction. The formulation of the function ot 
speculative reason 1n terms of the ontological principle 1s part 
or Whitehead's attempt to develop the technical principles of his 
metaphysics. Such p:rinoiples allow him to examine the evidence of 
all of man's experience and thereby to clarity the relationship 
between Deity and the world in a systematic metaphysics. The clar. 
1t1oat1on does not prove what was previously unknown, namely, that 
30 or. chapter J, p. 33. 
31 JY.!, pp. 79-80. 
128 
Deity exists. Por the basic presupposition or metaphysics, name• 
ly, the presupposition of the function of speoula.tive reason, re-
lies ultimately on the sense of Deity. 
Before an examination of how the sense of Deity supple-
ments defenses of speculative :reason, it is appropriate to point 
out that the context of the description of the sense or Deity in-
cludes a contrast or Whitehead's notion of experience with Hume's 
notion of experience. Whitehead points out that Hume•s fundamen-
tal assumption is that sensa are primary since they are clear and 
definite. These senaa disclose no experience or the necessary 
oonnection or cause and effect. All of man's emotions and 1nten-
tions are merely concerned with senaa. It is this part of Hume•s 
doctrine which Whitehead denies. Whitehead attempts to base his 
own epistemology on the self-evidence of experience just as Hume 
did. Hum~•s mistake is to take clear-out experienoe of the human 
adult as the primary faot of human experience. Obscurity is the 
primary faot of human experienceJ clarity is something secondary. 
The unDDrn child in the womb lives and has experience, as shown 
in his reactions to stimuli. Yet his experience can hardly be 
said to be olear"out even though he definitely lives in the ob-
scure-feeling context or and in reaction to the nourishing womb of 
his mother. Clear-cut sensations help to make us hum.an but they 
do not make ua live.32 
32 ~. pp. 152-158. 
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What Whitehead is suggesting here but not identifying is 
his dist1not1on between perception in the mode or presentational 
imroediaoy and perception in the mode of causal efficacy. The for-
mer does not reveal the oause-effeot connection, whereas the lat-
ter does reveal it as a fundamental taot of reality. It is by 
perception in the mode of causal efficacy that there occurs the 
"primary experience which lies below and gives its meaning to our 
conscious analysis of qualitative detail," that is, to our con-
scious oeroeption in the mode of presentational immediacy.33 This 
primary experience establishes an A ~rior1 structuring of any ex-
perience in that it universally acoompanies every experience. 
This primary experiential structuring of experience is a sense or 
Something that matters in a three-fold scheme, Totality, External-
1ty, and Internality. Any experience of the world will assume as 
obvious the Totality of aotual faot, the External1ty of many fact~ 
and the Internality of the one experiencing. This threa-fold 
scheme is the background of metaphysical neoessiti~s which any 
experience of the world presupposes.34 
33 !fI, p. 150. In identifying the primary experience 
(which lies below the conscious analysis of qualitative detail) 
as the sense of Deity, the sense of the interconnected values of 
self, others and the universe as a whole, Whitehead is identifying 
the metaphysical factors of any experience, of any actual entity. 
For •act or experience• and 'actual entity' are two names for one 
and the same metaphysical reality, the final facts of which the 
universe is oompose4. l!it p. 28. 
34 !I.1 P• 159. 
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No matter how abstract the selections of consciousness 
may become in the mode or presentational immediacy, there is al-
ways present in consciousness an instinct to see how these selec-
tions, 1.e., abstractions, are oonneoted with the totality re-
vealed in perception in the mode of causal eftioaoy. Whitehead 
illustrates this instinct, which is the reverse of abstraction, 
with a consciousness, first attending to a sensory detail in the 
mode of presentational immediacy, and then attempting to see how 
this detail fits into a concrete whole such as a picture. However 
the point made 1s the general one that consciousness always tends 
to see how an abstraction fits into the totality of immediate ex-
perience.JS 
This instioot is present in oonaciousnesa because there 
is always a dim sense ot the realities trom which selective ab-
stractions are made. The abstractions arise from the primitive 
stage of discrimination in experience, namely, from perception in 
the mode of causal efficacy, in which the concrete totality of 
value experience is known. The process of abstraction from the 
totality points back to the totality.36 However, Whitehead points 
out thats 
••• consciousness, which is ttie. supreme vividness of 
experience, does not rest content with the dumb sense of impor-
JS ~. PP· 169-170. 
36 lJ!, p. 170. 
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tanoe behind the veil. Its next orocedure is to seek the 
essential connections within its own conscious area. This is 
the process of rationalization. This process is the reoog-
ni tion of essential connection within the apparent isolation 
or abstracted details. Thus rationalization is the reverse 
of abstraction, so far as abstraction can be reversed within 
the area or oonsoiousnesa.37 
Oonsoiousneas does not rest content with a dim awareness 
ot importance as somehow a tundamental experience of reality. 
Rather oonsoiouaness tries to elicit that awareness as much as 
possible. A vivid apprehension or reality as valuable is the 
sense ot Deity, the interoonneoted values of self, others and the 
whole. This evidence defends the function of speculative reason 
but does not give a complete speculative understanding of the met-
aphysical necessities underlying all particular actualities. Such 
a complete speculative understanding 1s to be achieved by the pro-
cess ot rationalization, which is the reverse of the process ot 
abstraction. Abstraction is the process ot selecting particular 
details from the totality; rationalization is the process of re-
discovering the totality, the metaphysioal necessities, underlying 
all particular details. Whitehead has expressed the function or 
speculative reason with the notion of •rationali•ation• and haa 
connected it with the sense of Deity. Rationalization is the pro-
cess or criticizing abstractions: first, completing them by di· 
reot comparison with oonorete intuitions of what is universal 
37 ~' P• 170. 
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(metaphysically necessary) in all actualities; and secondly, har-
monizing the abstractions and placing them in their proper order 
as abstraotiona.38 
In this section. two defenses of speculative reason's 
function have been studied, Whitehead's notion or time as per-
ceived in the mode of oausal efficacy and his ontological princi-
ple. These two defenses have been found to have assumptions which 
can be established by the sense of Deity. However, the evidence 
for those defenses also helps to support Whitehead's description 
of the sense of Deity. First, the notion of perception in the 
' 
mode of causal efficacy explains how the past actual entities as 
temporal (Externality) and as eternally preserved in God's conse-
quent nature (Totality) oan be peroeived as causally affecting the 
experiencing self (Internality). Secondly, the ontological prin• 
ciple's reduction to the principle or contradiction is one way of 
expressing the 1ntelligib111ty of the sense ot Something that 
matters in the three-told scheme. For the sense or Something 
that matters, of the interconnected values of self, others, and 
the whole, is the aense "ot existence tor its own sake, ot exist• 
enoe which is its own juatification."39 
The importance ot the ontological principle in the de-
38 !!!!!. pp. 126-127. 
39 !!1 p. 149. 
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fense ot speculative reason oan be developed further by an e xam1-
nat1on of Leclerc•s interpretation of Whitehead's rationalism. 
It will be shown that Leclero 1s argumentation needs to be supple-
mented by the sense of Deity. 
B. Rationalism, Irrationalism, ~ !!'!.! Sense £.!: Deitz 
Leclerc notes that the attempt to fulfill the function 
ot speculative res.son "is the pursuit of rationalism to its !'ul-
lest extent: 1t ia the endeavour to discover the final •reasons' 
for things. According to the ontological principle these reasons 
are to be discovered in 'the composite nature or definite actual 
entities.•"40 Metaphysical reasons, reasons of the highest abso-
luteness, are to be found in God: oosmological reasons, reasons 
for particular environments, are to be round in the nature or tem-
poral actual entities.41 
In order to defend Whitehead's rationalism, Leclerc 
quotes the following text: 
That we fail to find in experience any elements 1ntr1ns1· 
cally incapable ot exhibition as examples of general theory, 
is the hope of rationalism. This hope is not a metaphysical 
premise. It is the faith which forms the motive tp~ the pur-
su1 t of all sciences alike, including metaphysios.4-G 
40 Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, pp. 2'7-28. 
41 !J!, p. 28. 
42 !!1 p. 67. 
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Leclerc comments that the acceptance of the rational endeavour of 
trying to understand reality, whether in soienoe or philosophy, 
involves the acoeptanoe, tacit or explicit, of the function of 
speculative reason as an ideal. Any rational attempt to deny the 
ideal of rationalism would be selt-oontradiotory.43 For any ra-
tional attempt to deny the ideal of rationalism would be the ao-
ceptanoe of irrationalism, the aooeptanoe ot inooherence.44 "In-
ooherenee is the arbitrary disconnection of first prinoiples."4S 
Two first pr1no1plea or explanations are arbitrarily disconnected 
in so far as no explanation can connect the two explanations and 
no explanation can be given as to why no explanation can be given. 
For to give an explanation tor the 1mpoas1bil1ty of connecting 
two first principles would be to connect supposedly disconnected 
first principles. Therefore no rational defense can be given for 
irrationalism since a rational defense would make coherent and 
rational that which is supposedly absolutely incoherent and 1r-
rat1ona1. 46 
Leclerc points out that irrationalism is "the denial 
that •reasons• or general principles are attainable, either at 
43 Leclerc, .2.12• cit., p. 37. 
44 !219.·' pp. 35, 37. 
4S ..§, 'P· 9. 
46 Leclerc, .2.2• oit., p. 35. 
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all LJos1t1viam?, or beyond a certain point--usually that which 
the special sciences happen to reaoh.47 Whitehead has serious 
objections to both forms of 1rrat1onal1sm, Positivism and the lim-
itation of speculation to science. 
Whitehead offers one discussion of the Positivist posi-
tion that no general explanations are possible at all, by examin-
ing the discovery of the planet Pluto. The discovery of Pluto 
was based on observed deviations of the orbits of the planets 
Uranus and Neptune from their calculated orbits. The calculation 
of orbits was based on the law of gravitation as followed by the 
then known planets and their effects on Uranus and Neptune. But 
their observed motions deviated from the predicted paths. The ob-
served deviation in orbital path was described by a mathematical 
formula. At this point, prior to the discovery of Pluto, White-
head points out that every positivist should have been completely 
sat!sfied.48 "A simple description had been evolved whioh fitted 
the observed facts. They .£the positivist.!? could now relapse in-
to their unexplained persuasion that in the future these formulae 
would oontinue to describe the motions of Uranus and Neptune.«49 
But one astronomer, Percy Lowell, was not satisfied; he remembered 
Ibid • 
............... 
48 !,!, pp. 161-162. 
49 .Alt p. 162. 
136 
the law or gravitation. He calculated the direction and magnitude 
of the vector component of aooelerat1on as it would be caused by 
an imaginary point representing a planet moving round the sun in 
an elliptic path, even more remote than the orbit of Neptune. 
Lowell ohose a path for this imaginary planet, so that the magni-
tude of the acceleration of Neptune varies as the inverse square 
of the distance between Neptune and the moving imaginary planet. 
His prediction that there is another planet was verified at the 
Lowell Observatory in Arizona.50 
Whitehead oQncludes from his discussion of the discovery 
of Pluto two points. First, Positivism has a truth to its doc-
trine that description is an essential aspect of scientific meth-
od. aut secondly, scientific method does not involve only accur-
ate description even though the description may be a generalized 
one such as the law of gravity. Man has the desire to obtain the 
exolanatorz description (the understarxiing) of the generalizes 
description and the particular description of fact. Man desires 
an understanding of particular and general fact in terms of gener-
al principles which oan justify the S?eculative extension of a 
generalized description, such as the 10.w of gravity bey,::md actual, 
particular instances of observation. In attempting to find the 
exelanatorz description, scientific method is seeking to fulfill 
50 !,!, pp. 161-162. 
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the t'unotion of speculative reason.51 
Whitehead oarefully considers the other form of irra-
tionalism besides Positivism, namely, the limitation of specula-
tion to scienoe. This second form or 1rrat1onalism claims that 
speculat1v~ understanding is a proper goal or science but not of 
metaphysics because the methodology of soienoe has been suooess-
ful but the methodology or philosophy has not been.52 Whitehead 
answers this rejection of metaphysics by showing that the objec-
tion presupposes that the method of philosophy is dogmatio.53 He 
explains that philosophy "he.s been haunted by the unfortunate no-
tion that its method is dogmatically to indicate premises which 
are severally clear, distinct, and certain; and to erect upon 
those premises a deductive system ot thought.n54 Philosophy has 
been haunted so, suggests Whitehead, because Western philosophy 
was helped into being by the development of mathematics. In imi-
tation of mathematics' deductive procedure, philosophers have 
tried for clear and distinct premises as the basis of a deductive 
system.55 
51 AI, 
........ 
p • 164. 
52 ,m, P• 20. 
53 181 p. 20. 
54 181 pp. 11-12. 
55 l!1 pp. 15-16. 
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Whitehead rejects suoh a oonoept of philosophy's method. 
Just as it is a mistake to believe that the foundations of ma.the-
matios are clear, distinct, and certain, so also it is a mistake 
to believe that the foundations of philosophy should be clear, 
distinct, and oertain.56 Whitehead holds that: 
••• the accurate expression of the final generalities is 
the goal of discussion and not its origin •••• 
• • • Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic state-
ments ot the obvious; they are tentative formulations or the 
ultimate generalities. 
It we consider any soheme of philosophic categories as 
one complex assertion, and apply to it the logician's alter-
native, true or false, the answer must be that the scheme is 
false. The same answer must be given to a like question re-
specting the existing form~lated principles of any soienoe.57 
The point is that soienee does not have any special oer-
ti tude whioh philosophy is laoking. Neither Rhilosonhy nor soi-
.!!12.! should 12.! viewed !.!. dogmatic statements of the obvious ~ 
!!.!, tentative formulations .£! general Erinciples. For it is not 
true that science has been succeeding for centuries, whereas 
philosophy has been failing ror- centuries. Both science and phil-
osophy have had partial success in reaching their goals. 
In defense of his understanding of science and philoso-
56 PR, p. 12: Whitehead refers to his work coauthored 
with Bertrand RUssell, Principia Mathematica; or • .!£, P• 144: The 
history of science is .full or such examples of sciences bursting 
through the bounds of their original assumptions. Even in pure 
abstract logic as applied to aritbmetia, it has within the last 
half century been found necessary to introduce a doctrine of types 
in order to corr~ct the omissions of the original premisses." 
57 J.!, pp. 12-13. 
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phy as having only partial success. Whitehead points out, "We no 
more retain the ~hysics or the seventeenth century than we do the 
Cartesian philosophy of that century. Yet within limits, both 
systems express important truths. ,.5B 'lihe Galilean-Cartesian 
mechanistic conoept or material bodies launched modern science on 
its tr1U11lphant career. the high point which this theoretical 
structurA allowed science to attain is well symbolized by Newton.S4 
Although science has gone beyond Newton's formulae, they were not 
false; rather they were unguardedly stated. Einstein's formulae 
are not false; rather they are unguardedly stated. We do not yet 
know the limitations or Einstein's formulae, but when they may be 
discovered they will constitute a yet more subtle limitation to 
Newton's formulae. Soienoe does not start with clear and distinct 
elements in experience and proceed to elaborate these elements as 
premises with pure deduction. Rather it prooeeds by tentative 
fo~ulations of particular and general descriptions (speculative 
under9tandings). In this manner, science is suooessful in reach-
ing some understanding of the world even though it cannot claim 
dogmatic finality of ti'!uth.60 
In a similar w<J.y, philosophy is successful. The seven-
58 lfi, pp. 20-21. 
59 A!t p. 145. 
60 ,!!!!. P• 53. 
140 
teenth century meohan1st1o oonoept of nature has a partial truth 
which Whiteheac tries to incorporate into his own philosophy. The 
mPohanistic oonoept of nature has a aonsonanoe with common-sense 
observation. There are bits of matter in the universe; whether 
these oits of matter are dirt, rooks, drops of water, or planets, 
they are simply bits of matter. These bits of matter are the same 
throughout any stretch or time or even in an instant of time. The 
relations between these bodies are simply spatial relations which 
can be changed only by loeal motion. This concept of nature was 
to be the presupposed support supplying the terms in which the 
answers were to be found to all further questions suoh as about 
the meaning of life, mentality, and the interrelations of matter, 
life, and mentality. Whitehead has no doubt that this concept of 
nature expresses large, all-pervading truths about the world, but 
he questions how fundamental these truths may be.61 He argues 
that the mechanical conoept of netut'e which denies the meaningful-
ness of final causality cannot explain the emergent evolution of 
life and mentality, especially of man. 62 F..e aonciludes with a con-
cept of nature which would explain emergent evolution and at the 
same time explain the downward, mechan1oal trend of nature.63 In 
61 l'.!r1 pp. 175-177. 
62 or., oh. l, pp. 12-14. 
63 !!!. pp. 3-34. 
this way, Whitehead himself shows how a philosopher incorporates 
the truths expressed in other philosophies and shows the limita-
tions and qualifications of those truths. He shows that the his-
tory of philosophy manifests some suooess in fulfilling the func• 
tion of speculative reason. 
Since philosophy shows this success, the objection ia 
ill-founded which attacks as unsuccessful, philosophy's attempt 
to fulfill the function of speculative reason. 
Whitehead further defends speculative philosophy as 
necessary for the oritioism and evaluation of scientific interpre-
tations of reality. Interpretation of reality did not begin with 
philosophy. Philosophy is the search for more adequate cr1tia1sm 
and for more adequate justification of the interpretations which 
we employ in science and religion and even in philosophy itselr.64 
For philosophy is never a finished produot but rather a way of 
life, an attitude of mind towards doctrines never completely undett· 
stood.6S 
No knowledge is ever completely understood since oon-
sciousness 1s always selective of a few elements from the fullness 
of experience. 66 Whitehead explains that our disciplined know-
64 _m, p. 22. 
6$ 1:!!• PP• 233-234. 
66 .f!!, P. 22; J!I, p. 168. 
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ledges are a combination or the Observational Order (direct d1s-
or1minat1ons of particular observations) and the Conceptual Order 
(a general way of oonoe1v1ng the Universe). There is no point in 
human history at which we can say that man was having pure obser-
vations. The Observational Order is always interpreted in terms 
of the Conceptual Order.67 Moreover, the Oonceptual Order dic-
tates the Observational Order to a great extent; that is, theory 
dictates what evidence to look tor and how to interpret the spor-
adic observations of evidence. One example is found in Hume•a 
philosophy. If we try to find in the ObserY,ational Order direct 
evidence of the interconnectedness ot things, we will not succeed, 
Whitehead points out, if we follow Hume. On Hume'• theory, the 
only data originating reflective experience are sense impressions. 
Examining such sense-data, we find that no one sense-datum dis· 
closes in itselt any information as to any other sense-datum. 
Therefore, on Hume's theory, there is no direct evidenoe for the 
interconnectedness of things.68 Hume's theory has dictated what 
evidence to look rorl 
However, not only does theory dictate what evidence to 
look for and how to interpret it, but it is also true that the Ob-
servational Order itself is s€leotive. The mode of perceptive ex-
67 A!· pp. 198-199. 
68 !!; p. 283. 
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perience named presentational immediacy (the awareness of sense-
impressions) is usually dominant in ma.n's consciousness. This 
mode ot perception does not disclose the interconnectedness of 
things. The other mode of perceptive experience named causal ef-
ficacy (the awareness or being affected by other realities in the 
universe) only becomes dominant to man in primitive experiences 
such as strong emotions. This mode of perception does disclose 
the interoonneotedness of things. How has Whitehead become aware 
of this evidence ot interconnectedness? On the one hand, he has 
done so through his insight that theory is only a working hypothe• 
sis due to the faot that theory dictates what evidence to look for 
and how to interpret it. Thereby Whitehead was aware that a 
theory other than Hume's could have been possible which would al-
low other evidence. On the other band, Whitehead has been able to 
find this evidence of interconnectedness because he has tried to 
be open to the fullness o.t'experienoe. Therefore Whitehead sug-
gests two ways of correcting the defioienoies in man.•s interpre-
tation and awareness of the Observational Order. First, novel 
concepts suggest novel possibilities of observational discrimina-
tion. That is to say, novel theories suggest novel possibilities 
of evidence. Secondly, novel observations help to modify old 
theoriea. 69 
69 !!1 pp. 198-199. 
In the evaluation ot Conceptual Orders and Observational 
Orders, philosophy should especially consider the select~vity in-
volved in both science and religion. Whitehead points out that 
there is a grave divergence between science and religion in their 
respective emphasis or different aspects or experience. Religion 
is concerned with the harmony of rational thought with the per-
son's reaction to the peroepta from which experience originates. 
But science is concerned with the harmony or rational thought with 
the percepta themselves apart from the meaning and value of the 
person perceiving. By insisting on philosophy's close relations 
with religion and with science, natural and soolologioal, White-
head intends to tree philosophy once and for all from the objec-
tion that it is useless speoulation.70 
It is the function of speculative reason to harmonize, 
refashion, and justify man's divergent theories and intuitions as 
to the nature or things, especially those from religion and the 
so1enoea. Speculative reason has to insist on the scrutiny of the 
ultimate ideas and on the retention of all the evidence in attempt-
ing to understand all particular fact in terms of general princi-
ples. In Whitehead's view, the attempt to fulfill the function of 
speculative reason ls the most effective ot all the intellectual 
pursuits. Speculative reason builds cathedrals before the workmen 
70 ]!, p. 21. 
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have moved a stone, and it destroys them before the elements have 
worn down their arohes. Speculative reason is the architect of 
the buildings of the spirit, and it is also their solvent. Speo-
ulati ve reason works slowly. Thoughts lie sleeping tor ages; and 
then, apparently suddenly, mankind finds that they have embodied 
themselves in the lives and institutions of man.71 
Speculative reason•a function is to criticize and evalu-
ate the selective abstractions or the Observational and Oonoeptual 
Orders in two ways. First, speculative reason should harmonize 
abstractions by assigning to the~ their right relative status as 
abatractions.72 In this way, s,peculative reason avoids the falla-
cy of misplaced concreteness, which, for example, seventeenth 
century meohan1st1c so1enoe committed in neglecting the degree of 
abstr.action involved in its consideration of reality as simple 
bits of matter.73 Secondly, speculative reason should complete 
abstractions by direct comparison with more concrete intuitions ot 
mankind penetrating into what is universal in concrete tact.74 
71 ~. PP• ix-x. 
72 !}!!Ji PP• 126-127 • 
73 ..!!, P• 11; !!!f, PP• 7$, 8$. 
74 ~. pp. 126-127; it is significant that Whitehead 
appeals to the testimony of the great poets as very important for 
philosophy: ''Their survival is evidence that they express deJ~P 
intuitions of mankind penetrating into what is universal in con-
crete fact." The significance or this emphasis on aesthetic 
experience is developed by Whitehead in his description of the 
rel! 1 u 
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Leclero•a interpretation of Whitehead's rationalism has 
been described and completed by a discussion of Whitehead's re-
jection of two forms of 1rrat1onal1am, Positivism and the limita• 
tion of speculative understanding to science. The difficulty 
raised against the ontological pr1no1ple may also be raised a• 
gainst Leolero•s interpretation of Whitehead's rationalism. It 
may be granted that one who accepts rational and coherent explana-
tion cannot give a rational explanation ot the irrational and in• 
coherent. but the difficulty ia that it is not clear why one 
should accept rational explanation. The positing or irrat1onal1am 
and incoherence is irrational only tor one who accepts Whitehead's 
concept of the function of speculative reason. He himself points 
out that •1t is always possible to work oneself into a state of 
complete contentment with an ultimate irrationality. The popular 
poa1t1v1st1o philosophy adopts this attitude."75 
Consequently, Leolero•s interpretation of Whitehead's 
rationalism needs to be completed by Whitehead's own rejection ot 
1rrat1onalism in Positivism and the limitation or apeoulatlve 
understanding to science. Whitehead's rejection ot irrat1onal1am 
may be accepted. He has shown that science does involve more than 
description slnoe it also involves explanatory description (under-
standing). Also, he has shown that an evaluation of the special 
75 ~. PP• 202-203. 
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sciences• selectivity in knowledge of the world is needed and that 
philosophy should do the job of harmonizing abstractions. But the 
question may be raised whether or not Whitehead has shown that it 
is the function of speculative reason to complete the abstractions 
of science by comparing them with concrete intuitions of the uni-
verse which reveal what is universal in all facts? In view of the 
selectivity of science, some discipline is needed which evaluates 
that selectivity .. But should philosophy assume that its function 
is to understand all particular facts as intelligible 1n terms ot 
general principles? In view of Whitehead's understar.ding of soi-
enoe• the assumption of the function of speculative reason as the 
ideal of reason appears very plausible. For just as science un-
derstands the general prinoiples of a particular epoch of the 
world, ao also the reflective thought which evaluates so1ent1t1c 
explanations• selectivity should do so in terms or general princi-
ples which apply to all possible epochs and facts of the world. 
Whitehead assumes the function of speculative reason as an ideal 
to be fulfilled. This ideal of rationalism is the hope that we 
fail to find in experience any elements intrinsically unintelligi• 
ble in terms of general principles. However, it is clear that the 
plausible assumption of the ideal or speculative reason is not a 
necessary just!fioation of this ideal. 
However, Leolero 1s interpretation of Whitehead's ration-
alism must be accepted as fundamentally correct. For Whitehead 
does say that faith in reason ttdoes not embody a premise from 
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which metaphyaioal theory starts; it is an ideal which is seeking 
satistaotion. In so far as we believe that doctrine, we are all 
rationalists."76 Leolero•s interpretation has defended White-
head's faith in reason without making it a premise from whioh 
metaphysical theory starts. Leclerc has taken Whitehead at his 
word and tried to make sense out of it. What Leclerc has said is 
fundamentally consistent with Whitehead's faith in reason and his 
rejection of Positivism and the limitation of speculative under-
standing to science. 
However, this chapter has shown that the ontological 
principle, one of Whitehead's fundamental metaphysical premises, 
is basically a formulation or the function of speculative reason. 
Consequently, Leclerc should have round an inconsistency in White-
head's statement that faith in reason's speculative function ia 
not a metaphysical premise. The reason that Leclerc did not find 
an inconsistency is primarily that the basic text of Whitehead 
which he commented on was quoted out ot context.77 Leclerc tailed 
to consider jhe connection of the ideal of speculative reason with 
religious intuition. The religious intutiion discloses the sense 
of Something that matters, the sense of the interconnected values 
of self, others, and the whole, the sense of existence for its 
76 PR, P• 67. 
77 Full text ia quoted in chapter 2, p. 62. 
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own sake, the sense of existence which is its own justification. 
This intuited evidence answers the difficulty raised against Le-
olero 1s interpretation of Whitehead's rationalism, namely, it ia 
not clear that one should accept rational explanation, the func-
tion of speculative reason. One should accept rational explana-
tion of reality as the ideal of speculative reason because the 
sense of Deity is the sense of existence which is its own juatiti-
oation. On the one hand, this intuited evidence complements the 
attempts at justifying the function of spedulat1ve reason by re-
jecting both Positivism and the limitation of speculative under-
standing to science. But on the other hand, Whitehead's rejection 
of these two forms of irrationalism complements the sense ot Deit7 
as a defense of the f'unotion of speculative reason. The examina-
tion of scientific explanation shows that the scientist is seeking 
a speculative understanding of reality and that his selectivity in 
knowledge, as well as the selectivity of other knowledges, needs 
to be harmonized and criticized by speculative philosophy's intui-
tions of what is metaphysically necessary in all tacts. 
c. Whitehead, Dewey, and the Sense .2£. Deitz 
The previous section has shown how Leolerc's interpreta-
tion of Whitehead's rejection of 1rrat1ona11sm and the sense of 
Deity are mutually supplementary defenses ot the function of spec-
ulative reason. This section will show how Whitehead's rejection 
of Dewey 1 s interpretation or speculative philosophy and the sense 
lSO 
ot Deity are mutually supplementary defenses ot the function ot 
speculative reason. 
Dewey attempts to show how Whitehead's concept of spec-
ulative philosophy oan be given an emp1r1c1at•pragm.at1o interpre-
tation. Dewey points out that the task ot philosophy tor White-
head is to frame descriptive generalizations of experience. Dewey 
as an empiricist agrees with this without reservation eapeoially 
since Whitehead emphasizes that elucidation or immediate experi-
ence is the sole justification for any thought. 78 Although White-
head calls the method of philosophy Rationalism, Dewey argues that 
Whitehead's Rationalism is not the Rationalism with whioh empiri-
cism is at odds. This latter Rationalism is concerned not with 
descriptive generalization but ultimately with ~ 2rior1 generali-
ties from whioh the matter of experience itself can be derived. 
However, Whitehead's Rationalism emphasizes not ~ Rriort general-
ities but the immediately existent actual entities by the ontolog-
ical principle ... ,These actual entities,• he says, •are the final 
real things of which the world is made up. There is no going be-
78 John Dewey, "Wh1 tehead' s Philosophy," The Philosoph-
ical Review, XLVI, no. 2 (Jan., 1937) p. 170; PB, p.""1>:" It the 
winter meeting of the Eastern Division of the liiierioan Philosoph-
ical Association in 19.36, John Dewey and Whitehead met for a 
oolloquium on Wh1tehead 1s philosophy. Dewey offered an interpre-
tation of Whitehead's speculative philosophy, and Whitehead re-
sponded to Dewey's paper. 
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hind actual entities. They are the only reasons tor anything. ,,.79 
Dewey does admit that Whitehead wants the descriptive 
generalizations to form a coherent, logical, necessary system of 
gen~ral ideas which can interpret every element or experience.BO 
Thi1 concept of speculative reason makes Whitehead's Rationalism 
more like traditional Rationalism, but Dewey says that an empiri-
cist should agree in proceeding "as logically as possible, striv-
ing to present findings that are coherent, that are even 'neoes-
sary•, if the necessity in question be that or olose-knit relatio 
to one another without omiasions and superfluities in the general-
1zed descriptions or experience. 
• • • 
u81 
Dewey's empirioist-pragmatic interpretation of White-
head's concept or philosophy proposes a genetic-tunotionai method 
tor reason. This method ls closely allied to the method of the 
natural sciences. Man's reason or thinking ooours because of 
some problem occurring in his experience-nature. Ideas that arise 
in the problem context emerge originally as suggested solutions. 
These ideas are not something to be known in themselves; rather 
they are instruments with which the problematic situation may be 
resolved. An idea is only something to be used in controlling and 
79 Dewey, 12.9,. ill•; 1!1 P• 27 • 
8o Dewey, loo. o1t.; .m, p. 4; Mi p. 285. 
81 Dewey, .22• cit, p. 171. 
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ordering the materials and processes ot experience; an idea is 
not something to be known and appreciated as a speculative pene-
tration into ultimate reality.82 
Dewey indicates that another interpretation of White-
head 1 s concept ot philosophy is possible which is allied with 
traditional Rationalism. Thia interpretation views the method of 
reason in philosophy as similar to the procedure of the mathemat-
ical logician. Reality itself is presupposed to have certain 
necessities in its make-up. The generalized description of these 
necessary elements should be statable inra succinct s7stem ot 
definitions and postulates. The deductive interweaving and expli-
cation or these definitions and postulates should result in a 
logical• coherent. necessary system or ideas which can interpret 
every element of experienoe.83 
Dewey contrasts the genetic-functional concept of reason 
with the 1ntu1tional-struotural concept of reason of tra.ditional 
RPtionalism. The genetio method of reason treats ideas and ex-
perience not as something to be known by immediate insight, but as 
something to be used to make experience more fruitful and meaning-
ful. In contrast, the intu1tional method of reason treats experi-
ence as something to be known by speculative insight so that a 
82 Ibid., P• 175. 
83 ~ •• p. 174. 
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general scheme of the universe can be formulated. The tunotiona.l 
method of reason understands ideas as instruments with which the 
functioning processes of experience can be made more valuable. In 
contrast, the structural method ot reason understands ideas as 
expressive of the intelligible structure ot reality.84 
Dewey asks Whitehead to say which concept ot reason ia 
primax-y in Whitehead's philosophy, the genetic-funot1onal or the 
intu1t1onal-struotural concept. Dewey wants him to aay that prao-
tioal reason•a genet1c•funot1onal method is a more fundamental 
oonoept than speculative reason's 1ntuit1onal-struotural m.ethod. 85 
In chapter one, we have seen Whitehead define the func~ 
t1on ot reason as primarily practical, namely, (1) to constitute 
final causes, that is, to live; (11) to emphasize final causes, 
that is, to live well; and (111) to cr1tio1ze final causes, that 
is, to live better. 86 However, in h1a direct reply to Dewey, 
Whitehead refuses to emphasize praotical reason to the resulting 
exclusion of speculative reason and metaphysics. The evolutionary 
prooess of the world not only requires the genetic-tunctiona~ 
concept of reason but also requires the 1ntu1t1onal-structural 
concept ot reason in order to understand the ultimate principles 
84 ~ •• p. 175. 
85 ~ •• pp. 175, 177. 
86 Ot. above, oh. 1, PP• lJ-18. 
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ot existence which express the necessary connections within the 
changing world.87 As one example or such a necessary truth. 
Whitehead turns Dewey's argument around and agrees with him, "The 
compound word •senetic-tunctional• means an ultimate metaphysical 
principle from which there is no escape.n88 
The fundamental answer which Whitehead gives to Dewey 
to show the possibility of metaphysical statements is an analysis 
ot methematica and its relationship to the world. Whitehead's 
direct response to Dewey can be best understood by discusaing it 
with two other defenses of metaphysical knowledge: (1) Whitehead 
considers how the togetherness of things in one universe requires 
general conditions such as those expressed in mathematics; and 
(2) he considers the proposition, 'one and one make two,• as an 
example of a metaphysical proposition. (J) His direct response 
to Dewey is a suggested comparison of the poopositiona of algebra 
with those of metaphysics. 
(1) Whitehead considers how the togetherness of things 
in one universe requires general conditions such as those e:xr;, .. _ 
pressed in mathematics. Pure mathematics is not a science devoted 
simply to the exploration of quantity and number, but rather it is 
thought moving in the sphere of complete abstraction from any par-
XLVI. no. 87 Whiteheadt ''Remarks," !!l! Philosophical Review, 2 (Jan., 19371 P• 179. 
88 ~., p. 181. 
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ticular instance of what it is talking about. 89 Pure mathematics 
is the realm of complete and absolute abstraction. "All you 
assert is, that reason insists on the admission that, 1f any en-
tities whatever have any relations which satisfy suoh-and-suoh 
purely abstract oond1tiona, then they must have other relations 
which satisfy other purely abstract oond1t1ons."90 
Whitehead argues that the togetherness of many things 
in an overall unity requires an aesthetic harmony (a system) of 
general conditions. For in order to have suah an overall unity, 
the many things must be harmoniously related. The general condi-
tions of this overall unity must themselves be harmoniously re-
lated, since otherwise there would be no overall unity. This 
aesthetic harmony of general conditions is what reason tries to 
discover. Thia aesthetic harmony of many realities in one over-
all unity and of the general conditions is the primary article of 
metaphysical doctrine. For the aeathet1o harmony means that rea-
son will not be disappointed in its searoh for the general condi-
tions that apply to that one overall unity.91 
The general conditions which apply to the overall unity 
will necessarily apply to all the many realities that are unified 
89 ~. pp. 31-32. 
90 SMW, pp. 31·32. 
91 ~. p. 40. 
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in or connected with that unity. If there ia a reality whioh is 
not connected with that unity, then no statement can be made about 
it except that man is in ignorance about it or its poasibility. 
This qualitication of ignorance about a supposedly existing reali-
ty unconnected with the overall unity or an experiential moment 
for man is not a limitation upon man's ability to know metaphysi-
cal truths. Rather, this qualification is the basis for White-
head's assumption that the full universe discloses itself to man's 
experience with every element in that universe entering into the 
ha:rmony of that experiential unity. It is impossible to deny 
this assumption. For it is impossible to know an entity supposed-
ly unconnected with experience without thereby connecting it with 
that experienoe.92 nApart from the experiences or subjects there 
is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness."93 Therefore, 
Whitehead argues that the subject can discover 1n his experience 
truths that apply to all realities. The only realities which man 
can know about are those which relate themselves to man's experi-
ential unity. Those realities which do relate themselves to man's 
experience must have the same general conditions (essence) as 
man•s experience sinoe its unity requires an aesthetic harmony of 
general conditions. What is not in any way related to the uni-
92 ~. p • .38. 
93 J!, p. 2s4. 
157 
verse of man's experience is simply unknowable by man. Therefore, 
the universe disclosed to man's experience must have an essence 
(an aesthetic harmony of general conditions) whioh forbids rela-
tionships beyond itself as a violation of its aesthetic harmon~. 
The function of speculative reason is to disolose that essence in 
a ·scheme or necessary truths, truths that apply to every .faot of 
the uni verse of e.xper1enae. 94 
(2) Another way in which Whitehead uses mathematics to 
show the pos,ibility or metaphysical truths occurs in his analysis 
of the proposition, •one and one make two.• To express a neces-
sary truth, a proposition must fulfill three conditions. First, 
it must be meaningful .for anyone who conceives it. Secondly, 
the proposition must be general in that its truth-value is asser-
ted about actual-entities, the .final real things or which the 
world ia made up. If these first two conditions are fulfilled by 
a true proposition, the third condition is already t'ultil~ed. 
Por the third condition is that the proposition have the same 
truth-value 1n each of its uses; and a true, universal propos1t1o 
is necessarily true of all its particulars. However, if the first 
two conditions are fulfilled by a false proposition, the third 
condition is not thereby fulfilled. For a false, universal propo-
sition 1s not necessarily false of all its particulars. So a true 
proposition must fulfill the first two conditions (thereby auto-
-6. 
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ma.tioally fulfilling the third), and a false proposition must ful 
fill all three conditions in order to be metaphyaioal propositio 
A metaphysical proposition has the same truth-value, no matter 
what the cosmic epoch might be.95 
Having offered these oriteria for a metaphysical propo-
sition, Whitehead points out that sometimes we certainly like to 
think that we do know such propositions. But, reflecting on the 
mistakes of the past respecting the foundations of geometry, he 
suggests that it 1s wise to reserve some soept1oism about man's 
claim to have metaphysical knowledge. By an analysis of the prop-
osition, •one and one make two,' he attempts to give some just1t1-
oat1on first, for man's claim to have metaphysical knowledge, and 
secondly, for some soeptioism about this olaim.96 
First, he attempts to justify man•s claim to have meta-
physical knowledge. He explains that the proposition •one entity 
and another entity make two entities• appears to be a meaningful 
truth to any subjeot which would oonoeive it. It thereby fulfills 
the first oriterion ot being meaningful. Further, the proposition 
is general in that its truth-value is asserted about actual enti-
ties. For in Whitehead's theory, every actual entity possesses a 
unique self-identity, and therefore no two actual entities can 
95 J:!!, p. 300. 
96 1!!· pp. 300-301. 
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ever combine into a unity other than that which respects their 
unique self-identities. The proposition therefore fulfills the 
second criterion of generality. As a truth which is meaningful 
and general, the proposition has fulfilled the first two oondi· 
tions and should be aooepted as metaphysical knowledge. 97 
Secondly, Whitehead tries to justify some scepticism in 
regard to man's claim to have suoh metaphysical knowledge. He 
points out that we often assert the above proposition, •one entit' 
and another entity make two entities,• thinking it to be metaphys-
1oal, when it is not so. The assumption which helps to make the 
proposition metaphysically true is that the two entities are oon-
tre.ries, incapable of being joined together to make simply a new 
unity which has dissolved the previous two entities. If that 
assumption is not true, then the proposition can sometimes be 
true and sometimes false. Therefore, 1t would not be a metaphyai-
oal knowledge. Whitehead points out th.at we hardly ever apply 
arithmetic in its pure metaphysical sense. We usually make as-
swnptions, seldom made explioit, wh1oh justify the use of some 
mathematical propositions in our particular cosmic epooh.98 
97 PR, p. 301; Robert M. Falter, "The Plaae of Mathe-
:mat1os in Whitehead's Philosophy," Alfred North Whitehead: Esaa;a 
.2!! His PhilosophI, ed. Kline (Englewood D11frs: New Jersey, 196 J 
pp. ""'"4.!-44. 
98 !!!• PP• 301·303; Whitehead's concept of actual enti• 
ties as the fundamental uni ts of rea.11 ty does not dirt~ctly apply 
to the every day world known by man. The entities which common-
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Whitehead explains the assumptions we have to make abou 
the proposition, •one and one make two.• First, one thing is be-
ing added to another thing, not itaelt. Secondly, the two things 
added together must be the proper sort ot things which added to-
gether issue in the proper group which we call two things. And 
thirdly, we must assume that the change ot oiroumstanoes that oc-
curs each time the proposition is used in a different context is 
unimportant. Common sense seems to tell us what we need to know 
about the meaning of the proper sort of togetherness and about the 
meaning of unimportant change of oiroumstanoea. But common sanse 
makes assumptions which must be understood as the background ot 
the meaning ot its statements. Because common sense usually ne-
glects the background ot ciroumatanoes, Whitehead refuses to rely 
completely on the analysis of this background by oommon sense it-
selt. 99 
In this second defense of the possibility or metaphysi-
cal statements, Whitehead has attempted to show cause both for be-
sense man knows are built up out ot many aotual entities. Accord-
ingly, since our mathematical propositions are often referred back 
to the world of common sense, mathematical propositions are truths 
about this cosmos, but not truths about every possible oosmos, 
1.e., not metaphysical truths. 
99 Whitehead, "Immortality,".!!!! Philoaophx of Alfred 
North Whitehead, ed. Soh11pp, pp. 699-700. \lih!tehead also points 
out that we cannot rely on the clarity revealed by the methods of 
the exact sciences because their methods are limited by their 
apeo1t1o selectivities. 
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11ev1ng that the proposition, 'one and one make two,' is true witt~ 
out qualification about actual entities, and for reserving some 
scepticism as to this claim to metaphysical knowledge. The para-
dox of Whitehead's simultaneous defense and scept1oism is clari-
fied in the next defense of the possibility of metaphysical prop-
ositions by his appeal to algebra's method for handling the back-
ground of circumstances in common sense knowledge. 
(3) Whitehead's direct response to Dewey in defense of 
metaphysical knowledge is a suggested comparison of the proposi-
tions of algebra with those of metaphysics. The method of alge-
bra shows the best praotioal remedy of the obscurities involved 
in the background assumptions of comm.on sense knowledge. Alge-
bN 'a method helps to remedy ambiguous, unolear, and indistinct 
language by four assumptions. (1) Connectives such as 'ot•, 'is', 
•and~, and •or• are chosen as capable of being expressed in a 
system of postulates in which the connectives receive mutual def-
inition and in which these oonneotivea are assumed to have invari-
able meaning. (ii) These connectives are used to relate and join 
together various concrete realities which are expressed by the de-
vice of the real variable. Again, it is assumed that the unspeci-
fied entities indicated by the real variables have meanings which 
do not differ in different contexts. (111) It is assumed that the 
patterns of real variables thus oonneoted are meaningful. (1v) 
Finally, it is assumed that when the algebraic meaning is oom-
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pleted by substituting the realities symbolized by real variables 
for the variables, the meaning or the oonneotives is not ohanged. 
This last assumption is that, even though the meaning or the oon-
neoti ves does ohange when substituting the concrete realities wit 
all their oiroumsta.noes tor the variables, contrary to the assump-
tion (i) that the connectives do not change their meanings, yet 
the change in meaning of the connectives is irrelevant.loo 
The basic connectives ot algebraic symbolism are like 
metaphysical principles (necessities) that underlie all partioula 
tacts. The real variables of algebraic symbolism are like the 
particular tacts which exemplify metaphysical principles. Just 
as in algebra the basic connectives are assumed to have an invari-
ant meaning or a meaning that changes irrelevantly when the reali-
ties are substituted for the variables, so in speculative philoso-
phy the metaphysical principles are assumed to have an invariable 
meaning or a meaning that changes irrelevantly when the particular 
facts exemplify the metaphysical principles. In algebra this suf-
fusion of the connectives with the things connected made difficult 
the discovery of the fundamental principles or arithmetic which 
would exclude as impossible any alternative formulation of the 
basis of arithmetical truth. In a similar way in the world, the 
suffusion of metaphysical principles with their exemplification 
100 Whitehead, "Remarks," .22• -2.!!•• p. 183. 
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made difficult the disaovery of metaphysics and still now makes 
difficult the disoovery of the fundamental principles of metaphys-
ics which would exclude as impossible any alternative formulation 
of metaphysical truth. In both algebra and metaphysics, the ab-
straction of the invariable necessities from the exemplification 
of these principles shows why the necessities appear to be known 
clearly, but the suffusion of the invariable necessities with 
their exemplifications shows why the necessities are only decep-
tively clear. Although tbe perfect algebra is not yet formulated, 
the algebras which man has elucidated up to this day have a prag-
matic justification. They work; we use them to change human life. 
In a similar way, we should expect that although the perfect meta-
physios is not yet formulated, the metaphys1os which men have at-
tempted to elucidate should have a pragmatic justit1cat1on. That 
is to say, we should expect that a metaphysics should make man's 
practical experience mean1ngfu1.lOl 
Through this comparison of algebra and metaphysics and 
101 ~., pp. 180, 183-184. or. !B. PP• 42-43: "The 
enormous advance in the technology of the last hundred and fifty 
years arises from the tact that the speculative and the practical 
reason have at last made contact. The speculative Reason has 
lent its theoretic activity, and the practical Reason has lent 
its methodologies for dealing with the various types of facts. 
Both functions of Reason have gained. in power. The speoule.tive 
Reason has acquired content, that is to say, material for its 
theoretio activ1 ty to work on, and the methodio Reason has ac•·~ 
quired theoretic insight transcending its immediate limits.'' 
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their pragmatic justification, Whitehead may seem to be reducing 
speculative reason to a subordinate role to praotieal reason. It 
P'.18.Y seem that he has made metaphysics only a scheme which is used 
tor Zl'llking practical aot1v1ty more fruitful, but it is not so. 
For he is only pointing out that a metaphysics whloh is without 
relevance to man's practical activity is not a good metaphysics 
since it omits a s1gn1t1cant aspect of man•s experience. Since 
practical activity is so pervasive of the whole world whether it 
is exemplified in the human world or non-human world, metaphysics 
may be seen as "the description of the generalities which apply t 
all the details of praotice. 11102 A metaphysics is not simply a 
speculative understanding of the general principles underlying al 
particular facta but also a guide for intelligent practical aet1v 
1ty. At the same time, a metaphysics is not simply a guide for 
intelligent practical activity but also a speculative understand-
ing of the necessary principles which all particular facts exem-
plit'y. 
Three defenses of speculative reason's function have 
been described: (1) the appeal to the unity of man's experiential 
world; (2) the appeal to man's oonfidenoe that some mathematical 
propositions are metaphysical knowledges; and (3) the appeal to 
the pragmatic justification of the assumption that such metaphys1-
102 ]!, p. 19. 
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cal knowledges do not change their meaning or change only irrele-
vantly when they are exemplified. 
(l) The following 'difficulty may be raised against that 
first defense in order to show how the sense or Deity supplements 
it. In appealing to the unity of man's experiential world, White-
head has assumed that there is an essence to the universe which 
forbids relationships beyond itself as a violation of its aesthet-
ic harmony. This is an assumption because Whitehead holds that 
the total universe must be related to man'a unity of experience 
since anything outside this unity is simply unknowable. It may 
be granted that the truths which disclose the essence of the uni-
verse as experienced by man are metaphysical (necessary) in so tar 
as they apply to everything experienced. But the difficulty re-
mains that such truths may not be metaphysical if there are facts 
whioh exist but are neither related to man's unity of experience 
nor intelligible in terms or suoh truths as do apply to the uni-
verse of man's experience. 
Christian points out that the supposition that there is 
nothing beyond our experience is the supposition that there is 
nothing which is absolutely transcendent. This supposition is the 
justification for constructing a categoreal scheme in terms of 
which everx actual entity oan be interpreted. Christian evaluates 
this supposition as justifying only the oonoeption ot a logical 
harmony of being, 1.e., a unity in thought but not necessarily in 
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faot. 103 "The supposition that all things are interconnected in 
some systematic way does not, of itself, justify us in going fur-
ther and saying there is a harmony of being in some other and 
stronger sense. 0104 Yet, Christian points out, "Whitehead does 
go further. In the last Part of Process and Real1tx, in the f!na 
chapters ot Adventures E.! I~eas, and elsewhere he speaks of a 
'Harmony of Harmonies' ./J;!, p. 361] which is both the basis ot 
morality and the object of religious experienoe.nl0.5 In light ot 
this evidence, Christian draws the conclusion that Whitehead's 
speculative philosophy is not putte speculative philosophy proceed 
ing onl1 from a speculative interest. A religious interest has a 
basic influence on Whitehead's attempt to do speculative philoso-
phy.1o6 Reterring to two passages, one from Science and lb.! 
Modern World and the other from Prooeaa and Reality, Ohristian 
suggests that Whitehead is asking the basic religious question in 
two torms: "What is it that rightly claims worship?" and "What i 
the (ultimate) source of refreshment and oompan1onah1pf"l07 
103 William A. Ohristian, "Some Uses of Reason,"!!:!!, 
Relevance !]£. Whitehead, ed. Leolero, pp. 84-8.5. 
104 1!?!.,g., p. 85. 
10 .5 .!!?!,g. 
106 ~ •• pp. 85-86. 
107 Christian refers to these two passages: "The vi-
sion claims nothing but worship ••• •" SMW, p. 268. "It L°the 
primordial actual entit.tf is here termed TlJ<id 1 ; because the oon-
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This study agrees w1 th Ohr-1st1an' s 1nterpreta.t1on but 
proposes beyond his view that the r-eligious intuition as the sense 
of Deity is an important evidence e3tabl1shing Whitehead's meta-
physical assumption of the unive~se as an aesthetic harmony. 
Christian has not analy,ed the sense of Deity as Whitehead's 
attempt to make the religious intuition generally evident. The ex• 
~erienoe or the Totality as the ultimate souroe and end of all par-
ticular actualities (values) is an experience of the solidarity of 
the universe, of the ultimate rationality and aesthetic harmony ot 
the universe. Thia experience is an intuited evidence which neces-
sarily justifies the assumption that there is an essence to the 
universe which forbids relationships beyond itself as a violation 
bf its aesthetic harmony, its rationality. 
(2) and (3) Whitehead's appeal to a pragmatic justitioa-
~ion of the ideal of speculative peason also needs to be supple-
~ented by the sense or Deity. For Whitehead himself argues that 
~the formation of a general idea--suoh as the idea of the Order or 
Nature--, and the grasp or its importance, and the observation ot 
lts exempl1t1oa~1on in a variety or instances are by no means the 
necessary oonsequenoes of the truth of the idea in quest1on.nl08 
~emplation or our natures, as enjoying real feelings derived rrom 
the timeless source of all order, acquires that 1subjeot1ve form' 
~r refreshment and companionship at which religions aim." 
108 !Ml!· p. 6. 
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This idea or the Order of Nature is the ideal ot speculative 
reason, for this idea means "that all things great and small are 
oonoe1vable as exempl!f1oat1ons of general principles which reign 
throughout the natural order."109 Therefore, for Whitehead himselJ 
the pragmatic just1f1oat1on ot the truth or the ideal of specula-
tive reason does not show that the ideal is necessarily true. 
Thia difficulty of the 1neuffio1enoy of such a pragmatic 
juat1t1oat1on may be solved by the definition of Whitehead's pbi-
lophy as a pragmatism described in ohapter two. Pragmatism is 
Whitehead's appeal to that self-evidence which sustains itself in 
o1v111zed experience. One suoh selt-evidenoe is the strong moral 
intuition that speculative understanding for its own sake is one 
pf the ultimate elements in the good life of o1v111zat1on. The 
1ntu1t•d evidenoe whioh is at the basis of the moral intuition of 
the f\ination of speculative reason is the sense of Deity. Por the 
~ense ot the interconnected values of self, others, and the whole 
diaolosea the universe as a complex or interconnected tacts that 
stimulates speculative reason to believe and hope that the connec-
tions can be analyzed and identified in order to be stated as 
the general principles that underlie all particular tacts. 
'l'hia chapter haa;studied how the sense of Deity and 
other defenses of speculative reason's function are mutually sup-
109 ~ .. p. 7. 
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plementary. On the one hand, the sense of Deity defends crucial 
assumptions which these other defenses make; but on the other hand, 
these other defenses show how the assurilpt1on ot speculative rea-
son's function is consonant with the following evidences examined 
in the three parts of this chapter. (l) Perception in the mode of 
causal efficacy discloses the necessary connection of cause and 
effect, and the reduction of the ontological principle (the princi-
ple of efficient and final causality) to the principle of contra-
diction expresses the 1ntelligibll1ty of the cause and effect con-
nection. Perception in the mode of causal effioaoy is an experi-
ential evidence whioh helps to explain how the sense of Deity is 
the primary experience underlying all human awareness. The onto-
logical principle is a olear way of stating how the sense of Deity, 
the sense of the interconnected values of self, others, and the 
whole, is the sense of existence which is its own justification. 
(2) Whitehead's examination or the scientific endeavor and his 
~onaequent rejection of Positivism and the limitation of speoula-
tive understanding to science show how the sc1ent1.f 1a endeavor is 
in accord with the ideal or speculative reason. (3) Whitehead 
~bowed that the togetherness of things in one universe requires 
general conditions such as those expressed in mathematical under-
•tandings or the world. The attempt to gain a speculative under-
•tanding ot the world is similar to the attempt to gain a mathe-
matical understanding of the world. Whitehead also showed how 
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speculative philosophy uses a method similar to that of algebra 
for the handling of ambiguity and possible change of meaning in 
the fundamental principles of each discipline. 
The sense of Deity and other defenses of speculative 
reason's function have been discussed as supplementary to each 
other. By themselves, these defenses do not constitute the actual 
doing or speculative philosophy, although they have important evi• 
dences to contribute. Whitehead's method or the working hypothe-
sis requires that the ideal of speculative reason be treated as 
tentatively accepted until it is successfully attained to some de-
gree. "In so tar as metaphysics enables ua to apprehend the ra-
tionality of th~ngs, the claim .[the ideal of speculative reaso'!i/ 
is justified."llO Since such a pragmatic justification does not 
establish the necessary truth of the ideal of speculative reason 
•nd sinoe it is always possible tor man to lose hope in this ideal 
due to the imperfection of all metaphysical systems, the preserva-
tion of such faith in reason must depend upon an ultimate moral 
~ntuition. 111 This moral intuition was shown in chapter two to be 
tounded 1n Whitehead•s description or the religious intuition as 
~he sense of Deity. 
110 !!!. p. 67. 
111 1!!1 p. 67. 
OHAPI'ER IV 
CONCLUSION 
A. Solution to the lz:oblem Ef. .!Ul!.! Studt 
The Introduction stated the problem to be an examination 
or the relevance or the sense of Deity to the function ot specula-
tive reason. Chapter one has identified the funotion of specula-
tive reason by a discussion of reason and evolution. Since White-
head admits the category of final causality as explanatory of emer 
gent evo,lution, he defines the primary function of reason to be: 
(1) to constitute final causes, that is, to live; (11) to emphasiz 
final causes, that is, to live well; and (11i) to criticize final 
causality, that is, to live better. The function of praotioal 
is to achieve a purpose exterior to the safisfaation of 
itself, whereas the function of speculative r~aaon is to 
atisty its own purpose of understanding all matters of faot in 
erms of principles intelligible to itself. The Greek logic of 
isoovery provides a set of five criteria by which any speculative 
derstanding of reality should be tested. It is in terms of 
hese criteria that Whitehead defines speculative philosophy and 
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its method for the fulfilment of the function of speculative rea-
son. Speculative philosophy seeks to frame a coherent, logical, 
necessary system of general ideas which makes intelligible every 
element of experience. Speculative philosophy uses the method of 
the working hypothesis in order to fulfill the five criteria of 
the Greek logic of discovery. Although direot insight ia the 
point of departure for reason•s speculations, it is not a superior 
form of knowledge but one aspeot in the whole constituting the 
method of the working hypothesis. The direct insight must be ca-
pable of being stated in systematic terms in order that it will 
fit in with and be verified by all of ~n's experience and know-
ledge. 
Chapter two has shown a positive connection between ra-
tional religion and the religious intuition as the sense or Deity. 
n the one hand. and the function of speoulat1ve reason. on the 
ther. Rational religion as a way of life involves the longing of 
an that the faots of existenoe, particularly the ultimate evil of 
emporal, valuable realities oeas1ng to be, should find justifioa-
ion, that 1s. value or finality. in the nature ot existence. Oon-
equently, rational religion seeks an all-encompassing value or 
inality for the particular, valuable, temporal realities. As an 
lt1mate craving to understand particulars in terms of general 
rino1plea, that is, in terms of an all-encompassing finality, 
ational religion is a demand for the intellectual justification or 
rute experience. The rationalism enc 
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can easily overflow into the valuable human project of attempting 
to fulfill the function of speculative reason by scientific, 
mathematical, and metaphysical speculation. 
Chapter two went on to show that since rational religion 
presupposes the religious intuition for Whitehead, rational reli-
gion\ defense of speculative reason's function needs to be com-
pleted by the examination of the sense of Deity. The sense of 
Deity provides an intuited evidence or the reality ot the all-
enoompaasing finality which rational religion aeeka. The sense of 
Deity ia the experience of the interconnected valuea of salt, 
others, and the whole of the world as derivative from the valuable 
1nteroonneot1ona of its members and as necessary for the continued 
existence of value. Thompson bas described how thia evidence is 
systematized in Whitehead's metaphysics, but Whitehead baa also 
described it independentl7 of that systematization. The sense 
ot Deity is the presupposition of civilized experience tor White-
head both in its speculative and practical aspects. It is rele• ... 
vant to speculative reaaon•s function because tbe sense of the .!!!· 
terconnectiona or reality stimulates man to anal7ze and identity 
the 1nterconnect1oa1. As the sense of the neoessitJ ~ mutual 
connection of actualities, the sense of Deity ia an intuited evi-
dence at the base ot Whitehead's moral intuition that speculative 
understanding for its own sake is one ot the elements ot the civi-
lized life of man. Tbe intui!tion required tor the presuppositionoj 
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rationalism is an intuition ot the universe as a complex of inter-
connected facts~ The sense of Deity is the intuition disclosing 
that the dim but fundamental meaning of exis·ting actuality is in-
trinsic importance (i.e., intrinsic just1f1oat1on1 purpose, value) 
for itself, for others, and for the whole world. To exist with 
such justification through final causality interconnected with the 
final causality of other actualities and of the whole is to be a 
matter of fact capable of beini understood as an element exempli-
fying the general principles by which all actualities are oonnec-
ted • 
.............. 
Just as the sense of Deity is relevant to speculative 
reason's function, so also it is relevant to practical reason's 
function of achieving value. The sense of the 1nteroonneoted val-
ues of self, others, and the whole as preserving the values of 
self a.~d others is for Whitehead the presupposition of man's moral· 
religious life and his aesthetic life. As the presupposition of 
speoulat1ve and praotioal reason's functions the sense of Deity is 
neoessarily affirmed by man in any attempt to achieve the value or 
civilization whioh their functions intend. The interpretations of 
Hartshorne and tillich are correct in pointing to the sense of 
Deity, the sense ot the interoonneoted values of self, others, and 
the whole. as a fundamental presupposition of Whitehead's specula-
tive and practical philosophy. 
In showing how the sense of Deity and other defenses of 
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speculative reason's function supplement each other, chapter three 
indicated the inadequacies of the Christian-Lowe-Leclerc interpre• 
tation. Christian's !nterpretation .!!. correct !!! showing !h!! 
Whitehead's systematic notion .2! Q.gg, !·~·• of the primordial, c2n• 
sequent, and superjeot natures, !! ~ derivative notion g,t White-
head's oategoreal scheme ~ !.Q. understand reality. However, 
Ohr1at1an, ~ • .!!!S Leclerc !J:! not correct !!l omitting ~ rele-
vano! ,g! the sense g! Deity £Q ~ function ,2! S£eoulat1ve reason 
!.! stated !!l the ontological Rrinoiple, one .2!_ the fundalqental 
Rr1no1ples .Q! the categoreal schemt• Whitehead's detense ot spec-
ulative reason's function by the reduction of the ontological 
prinoiple to the principle ot contradiction is suooesstul only it 
one grants that all particular tacts are intelligible in terms ot 
general principles. 
logical principle. 
Two difficulties were raised against the onto• 
First, 1r every raot is unintelligible, it 
follows that entity can be reduced to non-entity. Whitehead's at-
tempted reduction ot the ontological principle to the principle of 
contradiction is only a restatement in different words of the tune· 
tion of speculative reason. Secondly, the difficulty was raised 
as to how one oan affirm that the ontological principle is true 
without qualification unless one knows that God exists as the basia 
or metaphysical reasons. 
The answer to these difficulties has been shown to lie 
in the relevance of the sense of Deity to the function ot apecula-
U6 
t1ve reason. The ontological principle constitutes the first, 
systematic step in Whitehead's description of the universe as a 
solidarity of many actual entities. The ontological principle 
must be r~oognized as starting to express in a systematic metaphys 
ios the same solidarity of the universe which the sense of Deity 
establishes as an unsystematized, intuited evidence. The sense ot 
Deity is a J2res1stematio evidence which Whitehead will not let any 
theory explain away or deny. It is an evidence which supports the 
basio presupposition of any attempt at metaphysics, namely, that 
all actualities are intelligible. The ontological principle's re-
duction to the principle of contradiction is one way of expressing 
the intelligibility of the sense of Something that matters, the 
sense of Deity. For the sense of Something that matters, the sens 
ot the 1nteroonneoted values of the self, others, and the whole, 
is the sense of existence which is its own justification. The 
formulation of the function of speculative reason in terms of the 
ontological principle is part of Whitehead's attempt to develop 
the systematic principles of his metaphysics. Such principles al-
low him to examine the evidenoe of all of man•s experience and 
thereby to clarify the relationship between Deity and the world in 
a systematic metaphysics. However, the clarification does not 
prove what was previously unknown, namely, that Deity exists. Por 
the basic presupposition of metaphysics, namely, the presupposi-
tion of the function of speculative reason, relies ultimately on 
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the sense of Deity. 
The mutually supplementary defenses of speculative rea-
son •a funotion by the sense or Deity and other evidences need to 
be fulfilled by the best defense: the actual doing of speculative 
philosophy. Whitehead's method of the working hypothesis requires 
that the ideal of speculative reason be treated as tentatively 
accepted until it is suooessfully attained to some degree. The 
ideal of speculative reason is justified in so far as metaphysioa 
enables man to apprehend the rationality of things. However, 
since such a pragmatic justification does not establish the neces-
sary truth of the !deal of speculative reason and since it is al-
ways possible for man to lose hope in this ideal due to the im-
perfection of all metaphysical systems, the preservation of scuh 
faith in reason must depend upon an ultimate moral intuition 
closely allied with religion. The basis of the moral intuition 
that speculative understanding for its own sake is part of the 
good life is fo~nd in Whitehead's description of the religious 
intuition as the sense of Deity. 
B. Problems Suggested .2J: this Studz 
This study is directly related to two further problems 
raised by Thompson and Hartshorne in their interpretations of 
Whitehead. (1) Ohapter two pointed to Thompson's evaluatory re-
lmarks about Whitehead's desoription of religious experience in 
Reli~ion !!! the Making and suggested that the Modes .2! Thought 
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description of the sense of Deity would constitute Whitehead's 
answer. the problem is whether or not Whitehead has answered 
Thompson. (2) The other problem arises from Hartshorne•s claim to 
have worked out an ~ priori method in metaphysios which is consis-
tent with Whitehead's philosophy. The problem is whether or not 
this method is consistent with Whitehead's thought. These two 
problems will be di~ouased in turn. 
l. The Sense .Qf Deity.!.! !n Evidence 
Thompson holds that Whitehead was content simply to for-
mulate a statement of the religious intuition and did not concern 
himself with answering questions about the precise nature and ohar• 
aoter of the data disclosed in the relig16us intuition. Oonse• 
quently, Thompson holds that the religious intuition as described 
by Whitehead is both vague and ambiguous as an evidence in its 
own right. Whitehead himself considers an objection to his use of 
the religious intuition quite similar to Thompson's remarks. An 
intuition merely experienced in exceptional moments is a private 
psyoholog1oal fact and is without general evidential force. White· 
head•a answer is that those intuitions which emerge under exaep~ 
tional circumstances and remain knowable only under such condi-
tions have only personal s1gnif1oance.1 But those intuitions 
which emerge under exceptional circumstances and become knowable 
l ~. pp. 63-64. 
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apart from those oiroumstanoes have more than personal s1gn1£1-
oanoe; such intuitions have gen~ral evidential force. Such gener-
ally evident intuitions may be clearer under exoeptional oiroum-
stances, This answer of Whitehead will constitute the criteria 
by which his own description of the sense of Deity will be evalu-
ated. If Whitehead oan describe the religious intuition in terms 
of the fundamental evidences and prineipl~s of his metaphysics, 
then he has not given a vague and a..~biguous description or the 
religious intuition. 
For the purpose of analyzing the evidence which White-
head proposes for the sense of Deity, the evidence may be divided 
into four aspects: the religious intuition discloses reality (1) 
as Something that matters, and this includes the interoonneoted 
values of (11) Internality, (iii) Externality, and {iv) Totality. 
These tour aspects will be discussed in turn. 
(1) Whitehead holds that the sense of importance la em-
bedded in the very being of human and animal experience. His ex-
planation in Modes ,g! Thought suooesstully exhibits that evidence 
in terms of (a) his analysis of experience and (b) his prinoiplea 
or rationalism. (a) Selective attention which is a necessary as-
pect of consciousness presupposes importance. For sustained ob• 
jeotion means disregard of irrelevances; and this disregard can 
only be sustained by some sense of importance. Consequently, the 
basic expression of man•s primary experience is--Have a oare1 here 
is something that matters. The primary 11mmer1n of 
l8o 
reveals Something that matters. The fundamental basis of this 
description is that a person's experience is a value-experience, 
expressing a vague sense of a power maintaining and realizing its 
own purpose. The essence of power is the drive of the person 
towards aesthetic worth for its own sake. This worth is not a 
feeling which man arbitrarily attributes to his grasp of reality. 
Rather, the drive towards worth is felt as exhibiting the very 
essence ot actualities in the universe. 
(b) Logical consistency of Whitehead's rationalism alao 
upholds his oonoept or importance as embedded in matter ot fact. 
The upholding or objectivity in scientific and reflective thought 
as an ideal is the insistence upon the importance of objectivity 
tor man. Man's zeal for matter-of-tact truth irrespective ot sub-
jective human interests and values presupposes that true descrip-
tions of matter of fact are very important for objective human 
interests and values. Consequently, matter-of-fact as objectively 
known is important for man. 
(11) and (111) Whitehead holds that the sense of Some-
thing that matters differentiates itself into the inter-connected 
values ot Interna.11ty (self) and Externality (others). His des-
cription in Modes .2.f Thought auooesafully exhibits that evidence 
in terms of perception in the mode of causal efficacy. The sense 
ot Something that matters is most clear in Internality, the self-
teeling of its emotional worth now. This is the self feeling the 
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drive of the person towards aesthetic worth for its own sake. How· 
ever, the self does not feel this apart from its causal derivation 
from its past (External1ty) nor apart from its tendency to causal-
ly affect its future (Externality). The self's value-experience 
now embodies in itslef value-experiences from the past. The most 
explicit example of derivation from the valuable past occurs in 
memory, in the self's awareness of its past actuality as fusing 
its self-enjoyment with its immediate present. The self also has 
the feeling that it has something important to express to others 
in the immediate future. This 11 the feeling that the self's im-
portance now should bedome part of the importance or others. Both 
the past and the future of the self disclose evidence for the val-
ue of others (Externality) in the world. 2 Importance, limited to 
the self alone, solus ipse, ceases to be important. The self's 
conviction in and sense or importance, Something that matters, is 
intelligible only if the self's importance continues and develops 
the importance or the past and prepares tor the 1mportanoe of the 
future.3 
2 Ot. Al• pp. 375-376: "Oare for the future of person-
al existence, regret or pride in its past, are alike feelings 
which leap beyond the bounds of the sheer actuality of the present~ 
) Of. !,!1 PP• 371•372: ttthe egoistic desire for.tame • 
• • 1s an inversion of the social impulse, and yet presuppose• it. 
• • • In the widest sense, it _Lthe egoistic desire for tmrel ia 
the craving for sympathy. It involves the feeling that eaob act 
of experience is a central reality, claiming all things as its 
own. The world has then no justification except as a satisfaction 
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(1v) Whitehead holds that the sense of Something that 
matters differentiates itself into the interconnected values of 
Internality, Externality, and T_otalitz. Whitehead claims that 
the self (Internality) feels itself as deriving from the Totality 
of value-experience of the past and as preparing its contribution 
for the Jotality of VRlue-experienoe of the future. This aspect 
of the religious intuition is the most d1ff1oult to give evidence 
for• This aspect of the religious intuition is that there is a 
unity in the universe whioh unifies the many past value-experien-
ces into Totality and which shares this value of the Totality with 
present and future value-experiences. Whitehead 1a intuition is 
that only Deity, immanent in experience as the ultimate preserving 
unification of value-experiences and aa the source of the world's 
unity of ideals, could make intelligible the unity of the trans-
cendent universe for the preservation of values realized and for 
the ideals ot the universe. Immanent in experienoe as the unifi-
cation of value-experiences, Deity is the Totality which 1a direct· 
ly experienced. Immanent in experience as the source of ideals, 
1.e., ot potential values to be realized, Deity is the external 
•tandard to which human experience explicitly relates itself. 
Whitehead hes attempted to establish general evidence for 
of suoh claims. But the ~oint is that the desire for admiring 
lttention beoomes futile except in the presence of an audience 
rit to render it." 
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Deity as the Totality of value-experiences and as the source ot 
ideals. Thia public evidence is the obviousness of the unifica-
tion of value-experiences and the obviousness of the unity of the 
ideals of value-experience. To establish this as generally evi-
dent Whitehead must answer the following objections: how does he 
know that the unitioation of values achieved is a unification in 
taot and not in imagination, and how does he know that there is 
one source or all the ideals in the universe? 
The best answers to these two questions are Whitehead's 
appeals to •modes or experience which in some degree are exception· 
al. It must be remembered that the present level of average wak-
ing human experience was at one time exceptional among the ances-
tors of mankind."4 Oonsequently, Whitehead believes he is justi-
fied "in appealing to those modes of experience which in our di· 
reot Judgment stand above the average level.".$ Whitehead appeals 
to the experience ot Peace to establish that the unification of 
value-experiences is a unification in fact, and he appeals to the 
experience or unselfish love to establish that there 1s a unified 
~inality to the universe. 
"Peace • • • is a broadening of feeling due to the emer-
gence ot some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet mo-
4 £, p. 379. 
5 !!· p. 380. 
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mentous in its coordination .2f values. "6 In the midst of the 
passing away of temporal beauty and heroism, "Peace is ••• the 
intuition of permanence.n7 Peace ia the intuition of the preser-
vation by Deity or values achieved in the universe. If the unifi-
cation were simply a deliberately imagined unification, the re-
sulting feeling would be the "bastard substitute" of Peace, "An-
aestheaia. "8 Anaesthesia is the withdrawal of the self from life 
of the universe, whereas the experience of Peace coordinates the 
value-activity of the self with the value-activity of others and 
of the Totality. Since the unification of values achieved in the 
universe is experienced as !'actual, "Peace is self-control at its 
widest, --at the width wae:re ••• interest has been transferred 
to coordinations wider than personality. 
is • • • the love of mankind as such. ,,9 
• • • One of its fruits 
The experience of unselfish love helps to establish that 
there is a unified finality to the universe. Unselfish love 
should be distinguished from selfish love. In selfish love, "all 
personal desire is transferred to the thing loved, as a desire for 
its perfeotion.nlO Thia love excludes the rest of the universe; 
6 y, p. 367 (my emphasis). 
1 AI. p. 369. 
8 
.!!1 p. 368 • 
9 ,g, p. 368. 
10 AI· P· 372. 
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the self is simply "clinging to a condition for selfish happiness. 
There is no transoendenoe ot personality.nll But unselfish love 
is: 
••• the love of self-devotion where the potentialities 
of the loved object are felt passionately as a claim that it 
find itself in a friendly Universe. Such love is really an 
intense feeling as to how the harmony of the world should be 
realized in particular objects. It is the feeling as to what 
would happen if right could triumph in a beautitul world, 
with discord routed. • • • Suoh love is distracting, nerve-
raoking. But, unless darkened by utter despair, it involves 
deep feeling of an ai~ in the Universe, winning such triumph 
as is possible to 1t.i2 
Unselfish love involves a deep feeling of a unified f1-
nali ty towards value in the Univ.rse because such love hopes that 
the potentialities of the loved object find their actualization in 
a friendly, harmonious universe. Whitehead has appealed to the ex· 
periences of Peaoe and unselfish love to establish the factuality 
ot unification of value experiences and the unified finality of 
the world. 
Whitehead's appeal to such exceptional experiences needs 
to be supplemented by an appeal to more ordinary experiences. Thii 
further appeal is found in Whitehead's indication that the sense 
of Deity, the sense ot the interconnected values of self, others, 
and the whole, is the presupposition of moral and speculative ex-
perience. Although Whitehead recognizes the relativity of moral 
11 Al· p. 373. 
12 _!!, p. 373. 
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codes whioh men have oonstruoted, he argues that ''what these codes 
do witness to, and what their interpretation by seers of various 
races throughout history does witness to, is the aim at social 
perifeotion. nl3 This sooial per.feotion is "an abiding perfection· 
in the nature of things, a treasure for all ages. It is not a ro-
mance or thought, it is a fact of Nature."14 The general princi-
ples underlying all moral codes are "the principles or the gener-
ality of harmony, and of the importance of the individual. The 
first means •order,• and the second means 'love•."15 The apparent 
oontlict between impersonal order and personal love is solved: (a) 
by valuing those orders in the degree in which they succeed in 
promoting worth of individual actualities; and (b) by valuing the 
individual in so far as he achieves ett'.!lf-worth and also promotes 
those valuable orders which themselves promote the worth ot 1nd1-
v1duals.16 "The essence of Peace is that the individual," whose 
seeking or value 1• tounded upon the religious intuition, "thereby 
is extending the 1nfluenoe of the source of all order."17 
Just as moral experience presupposes and points obscure• 
13 AI, P• 375. 
14 .!!. p. 375. 
15 ,!!, p. 376. 
16 !j, pp. 376-377. 
17 !!1 p. 377. 
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ly to the abiding value of the Tmtality, so also speoulat1ve rea-
son's attempt to state objective truth presupposes and points ob-
scurely to the objective structure of the Totality. Whitehead's 
Roycean argument fo~ the primordial and consequent natures ot God 
18 is based on the sense of Deity. Man believes that objective 
truth is possible because man has the sense that there is some 
structure to which all his judgments more or less adequately ap-
proximate. This sense of reality as a whole discloses to man that 
all his judgments are trying to express the realities {achieved 
values) which Totality objectively preserves and unities. Because 
the arguments from moral and speculative experience are interpre-
tations of experienoe and of the interpretations of those inter-
preta tions, these argumentations need to be completed by a system-
atic metaphysics. In fact, the way in which Whitehead has stated 
his Royoean argument and concluded to the actuality of God's pri-
mordial and consequent natures indicates that it cannot be proper-
ly discussed outside or his appeal to a variety or evidences tor 
his systematic metaphysics. Oonsequently, although Thompson did 
not recognize the sense of Deity as Whitehead's attempt to make 
the religious intuition generally evident, Thompson is oorrect to 
nave emphasized Whitehead's metaphysical concept of God as an in-
terpretation of his description of the religious intuition. White-
18 or. oh. 2, pp. 102-105. 
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head explicitly points out that 111t is impossible to tix the sense 
of fundamental terms except by reference to some definite meta-
physical way of conceiving the most penetrating description of the 
universe. Thus rational religion must have recourse to metaphys-
ics !'or a scrutiny of its terms. 1119 
2. Hartshorne•s Interpretation J21: Whitehead 
Hartshorne identifies himself as an interpreter of White 
head who has recognized a problem in Whitehead's claim that the 
method of philosophy by description 2£ experience attains neces-
sary truths. 20 Hartshorne has tried to work out a solution ot 
this problem in g~neral harmony with Whitehead's thought. 21 Harts· 
home's problem can be solved by appealing to the sense of Deity. 
For the difficulty which he raises is the very same difficulty 
raised in chapter tihne about Whitehead's assumption that necessary 
truths oan be had from ~xper1enae since what does not communicate 
with experience is simply unknowable. 22 For Whitehead points out 
that the sense or Deity is that "starting point in philosophy" 
w'hioh "is the determination of that aspect of experience which 
19 fil:l, p. 79. 
20 Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead and Contemporary 
Philosophy, 11 'I1he Relevance of Whitehead, ed. Lealerc, p. 35; o~. 
_!!H, p. 88; l!!, pp. 3-6. 
21 
22 
Hartshorne, loc. o1t. 
--
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most fully exhibits the universal necessities of existenoe. 023 
This starting point in Whitehead's metephysios 1s both desoriptiv~ 
and neoessa!'I. It is descriptive since it is based on immediate 
experience. Also, it is necessary since the sense of Deity dia-
oloses Totality as the ultimate source and end ot all particular 
actualities. As chapter three pointed out, this experience justi-
ties Whitehead's assumption that the universe of experience has an 
essence which forbids relationships beyond itself as a violation 
of its aesthetic harmony, its rationality. Accordingly, specula-
tive philosophy is justified in its method of attempting to reach 
necessary truths in descriptive intuitions of immediate experi-
ence. It oan work no other way since it must criticize abstrac-
tions only by 1ntu1 t1ona of imm.edia te experience. However, as 
chapter one pointed out, speculative philosophy must avoid the 
dogrre.tio fallacy which is the belief that the principles or its 
working hypothesis are clear, obvious, and irreformable. Specula· 
tive philosophy must embody the method of the working hypothesis 
since its first principles are the very elements which speoulative 
reason is trying to grasp. Consequently, tor Whitehead, there is 
always a tentativeness to the claim that a necessary or metaphysi-
cal truth has been disclosed in an intuition of immediate exper1-
ence. 
23 _!!, p. 155. 
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It is primarily in terms of Whitehead's criterion of the 
working hypothesis that Ha~tshorne's solution to the problem will 
be evaluated. In order to solve the problem of how metaphysical 
truths may be both experiential (descriptive) and necessary, Harts~ 
home proposes a notion of metaphysical truth based on logical 
consistency. "Metaphysical truths may be described as such that 
no experience can contradict them, but also such that any experi-
ence must illustrate them."24 He defends logical consistency with 
every experience as the criterion of~ priori metaphysical truth 
by distinguishing three kinds or statements: (1) those partially 
restrictive of existential possibilities; (2) those completely re-
strictive; and (J) those completely non-restrictive. 
(1) Partially restrictive statements are illustrated by 
ordinary factual statements. If they are affirmative, they im-
plicitly deny something, thereby restricting some existential poa-
aibili ty from being realized at the same time and place; and it 
they are negative, they implicitly affirm somAthing. For example, 
to affirm that there are men in the room is to deny 1mpl1o1tly 
that the room is totally filled with air; and to deny that there 
are men in the room is to affirm implicitly that every part or the 
room contains something other than a man_ 25 
24 Hartshorne, "Some Empty Though Important Truths," 
Review .2.! Metaphysics, VIII, no. 4 (June, 1955) p. 557. 
25 Hartshorne, 11Metaphys1cal Statements as Non-Restric-
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(2) A completely restrictive statement is one such as, 
'Nothing exists,' which would exclude anything and everything trom 
existing. This statement restricts any existential possibility 
from being realized. Consequently, such a statement is unverifi-
able, since the verifying experience itself would have to exist. 
Also, such a statement is falsifiable, sinoe the existence of any 
experience at all falsifies the statement. Accordingly, a com-
pletely restrictive statement is impossible to verify and always 
falsifiable sinoe it is not consistent with the existence of any 
experience. Hartshorne suggests that the more plausible view ot 
such statements is that they express 'impossibility• and not 'a 
conceivable but unrealized faot•. 26 
(3) A completely non-restrictive statement is one which 
is consistent with the existence of any experience. Such a state-
ment would be, 'Something exists.' Since this is the contradio-
torr of the completely restrictive statement, 'Nothing exists,• it 
should be necessarily true. For a completely restrictive state-
ment is impossible, and the contradictory of an impossible state-
ment is necessar7. In contrast to the completely restrictive 
statement whioh was unverifiable and alwars falsifiable, the com-
pletely non-restrictive statement is always verifiable and unfal-
tive and Existential,"·Review E.f. Metaphysics, XII, no. 1 (Sept., 
1958) p. 35. 
26 Ibid. 
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s1t1able. The statement, •something exists,• is unfalsifiable and 
always verifiable, since the supposed falsifying experience would 
itself have to exist and would thereby verity it rather than fal-
sity it. Accordingly, Hartshorne proposes that a statement which 
is unfalsifiable and always verifiable by the existence of any 
experience is the criterion of metaphysical truth. A metaphysical 
truth as a completely non-restrictive statement is to be discerned 
through its properties of being unfalsifiable and always verifia-
ble by any experienoe. 27 
Hartshorne views metap<hysios as studying non-restrioti ve 
existential affirmations in contrast to mathematics which studies 
non-restrictive, non-existential affirmations. Mathematical state 
ments, as usually interpreted, affirm, not that something with a 
certain character exists, but that if it did, such and such would 
also be the oase. Mathematics explores relations between possi-
bilities without affirming that possibility exists. 28 In contras~ 
"metaphysics tries to expr~ss what ~ possibilities ot existence 
have in common excluding blank non-existence as an impossibility.~~ 
Metaphysics explores being qua being, namely the strictly univer-
sal features of the ultimate realities, those features which oan-
27 l'E,!g., pn. 35-36. 
28 Ibid. 
-
29 Ibid. 
-
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not be unexemplified, such as the statemtnt, 'Something ex!sts.t30 
Sinoe the prooos1t1on, •something exigts,• is necessary, 
Hartshorne a~gues that the contemporary dogma is wrong which as-
serts that a statement is rendered contingent by the mere faot 
that it asserts existence. For the false dogma, •all existential 
statements are oonting$nt,• the following true principle should 
be substituted, 'all partially restrictive statAments are oontin-
g~nt and all completely non-restrictive statements are neoes-
sary.131 The criterion for a metaphysical truth is whether or not 
positive illustration or the proposition is inconsistent with, 
that is, would exclude, anything positive. This criterion or meta 
physical, ~ Er1or1 truth may ba incapable of clear and certain 
application by man•s cognitive powers. But such a difficulty 
would not make metqphysical truth unknowable in itself. For what 
is oommon to all possible worlds is certainly included in the 
present actual world; it is only a matter of trying to identify 
the metaphysical elements, which again may be qt1ite diffioult.32 
Hartshorne•s proposal for determining metaphysical truth 
in an~ Erior1 way through consistency with every possible experi-
ence is in fundamental agreement with Whitehead's comments on 
30 ~ •• p. 37. 
31 .!219.·· pp. 35-37. 
32 Hartshorne, "Some Empty Though Important Truths," 
.21:?• .2.!S·· pp. 556-551. 
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metaphysios and consistency. For Whitehead does hold that meta-
physical truths are necessary truths which apply to every possible 
and aotual experienoe.33 Further, Whitehead agrees with basing 
logio upon the conoept of oonsistenoy-1noons1atenoy. Inconsisten-
cy introduces Spinoza's concept of tinitude. The finite is neces-
sarily inconsistent with some other state of affairs, since lim-
itedness to a square, for example, prevents the finite reality 
from being at the same time a circle. Inconsistency as the basis 
for logic is a fundamental principle of Whitehead's metaphysical 
understanding or reality in pro~eas. By means of process, the 
universe can escape from the exclusions or finite inoonsistenoy.34 
In other words, Whitehead has stated that the criterion 
of a non-metaphys1oal proposition is that it excludes the simul-
taneous realization or another meaningful proposition. According• 
ly, Hartshorne agrees with Whitehead in proposing that partially 
restrictive propositions, that is, ordinary tactual statements, 
are contingently true, whereas oompletely non-restr1ot1ve proposi• 
33 ]!, pp. 5-6. 
34 ]!!, PP• 72-73, 75: "The oonoept that two proposi-
tions, which we will name J2 a..~d _g, are inconsistent, must mean 
that in the modes of togetherness illustrated in some presupposed 
environment the meaning of the propositions R and ~ cannot both 
occur. Neither meaning may occur or either may occur, but not 
both. Now process is the way by whioh the universe escapes from 
the exclusions of inconsistency.rt 
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tions, that is, metaphysical statements exempl:t!'iable by any pos-
sible exper:tenoe, are necessarily true. 
However, Hartshorne•s ~ priorJ method for discovering 
metaphysical truths appears to violate White.head's method or the 
working hypothesis. Por Hartshorne argues that all metaphysical 
truths are implied by the fundamental, metaphysical truth •some-
thing exists.• He seems to be saying that a simple analysis o!' 
that proposition will disclose "Within its meaning all the meta-
physical trutha."35 However, that procedure is not what Harts-
horne is proposing, but rather exEerimentation with meanings of 
propositions to discover those propositions which are completely 
non-restrictive. He explicitly rejects the fallacious notion 
that insights into the absolute must be absolute insights, that 1~ 
that insights into metaphysical truths must be unqualified in-
sights. Any insight into a metaphysioal truth should be accepted 
not as an absolute, never to be reconsidered, but rather as an 
hypothesis to be considered in light or its deductive 1mplioationa 
and of how well it fits into all man's experience. Accepted as 
hypotheses, such insights should be defended against a vigorous 
devil's advooqte. Such insights should be expanded by deduction 
~s a way of testing the insights by examining the self-evidence 
and testability or their oonsequences.36 Hartshorne's procedure 
35 Hartshorne, "Metaphysical Statements as Non-Restric-
tive and Existential," .22• ,gj!. P• 37. 
36 Hartshorne, Man's Vision or God and the Lo2io of .................... __
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is to experiment with such insights by trying to find those which 
are ~ Rr1or1 consistent in mutually implying each other and in 
being completely non-restrictive and which are exemplified ~ pos-
teriori in all experienoes.37 Therefore, Hartshorne•a procedure 
does embody the Whiteheadian method of the working hypothesis. 
Hartshorne's exemplification of his method should help 
to clarify his procedure. He proposes that the following proposi-
tions are oomfletely non-restrictive (metaphysically true} and mu-
tually imply eaob other: 
Necessarily, something exists. 
Necessarily, experience occurs. 
Necessarily, creative synthesis occurs. 
Necessarily, there are concrete actualities all of 
which are both externally and internally related, both abso-
lute and relative. f!;.J Necessarily, divine or infallible expe~Senoe, having 
fallible experiences among its objects, oocurs.J 
(1) The statement, 'something exists,• has been aonsid· 
ered with regard to its complete non-restrictiveness. It excludes 
nothing except bare nothing itself, and the existence of bare not~ 
ing is no existence. Further, the statement is in principle un-
falsifiable and always verifiable by any existent experience which 
would grasp its meaning, since the experience itself exists. As 
Theism (Hamden: Arohon Books, 1964} pp. 68-70. 
37 Ibid., pp. 71-72. Or. Hartshorne, A Natural 111seolQ-
SI !2.;: Our Time (LaSalle: Open Court, 1967} pp. 29-31. -
38 Hartshorne, "Metaphysical Statements as Non-Restric-
tive and Existential," .21?~ ci~., p. 47. 
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consistent with every possible state of affairs, the statement is 
necessarily true. 
(2) The statement, •experience ooours,• is in principle 
unfalsifiable and always verifiable by any existent experience, 
since the experience itself exists. The statement does not appear 
to exclude any existential possibility. For 'experience' is not 
to be taken in the sense of human or animal experience but in the 
metaphysical sense which Hartshorne and Whitehead propose. The 
existence of human experience would exclude at that same time the 
existential realization of a world without human experience, but 
the existence of experience itself does not exolude any possible 
state of affairs from ooourring.39 For in Whitehead's and Harts-
horne's view, an act of experienoe is an appropriate way ot oon-
oeptualizing actual entities, the ultimately real things which 
constitute the world.40 Accordingly, Hartlshorne concludes that 
this line of thought "strongly suggests, and I think proves that 
it Litatement (217 1s necessarily true, or an~ Rriori valid 
statement. • • • I conclude, that if the statemtnt ••• ls re-
str1ct1ve, there is no way to ascertain this. I think it is non-
restrictive, and so neoessary.n4l 
39 !219.·· pp. 38-39. 
40 .f!!, p. 28. 
4l Hartshorne, "Metaphysical Statements as Non-Restric• 
tive and Existential, ..21?• ~., PP• 38-39. 
198 
Hartshorne has stated his conclusion about the necessary 
truth of statement (2) in a tentative way. 'l'his tentativeness is 
appropriate since the statement presupposes that the oonoept ot 
experience can be generalized from human and animal experience 
to an analogous concept consistent with every possible state of 
affairs. The devil's advocate in the court ot metaphysical in-
quiry should attack such a presupoosition, and Hartshorne would be 
required to defend it at some length. A convincing defense, tor 
example, would have to show how such a generalization would help 
make emergent evolution inteiligible.42 Without suoh a defense, 
the Whiteheadian metaphys1o1an cannot be sure that the generaliza-
tion is VPlid, that is, consistent with any possible state of af-
fairs. Without testing the application ot the generalization to 
reality, Hartshorne runs into the difficulty that his criterion ot 
metaphysical, ~ priori truth may be incapable of olear and certain 
application with regard to the statement, •experience occurs.• 
The mere application of the criterion, the simple non-contradic-
toriness of a oonoept which is completely non-restrictive of any 
possible state of affairs, to the concept, •experience occurs,' 
is not sufficient for judging it to be metaphysically true.43 The 
mind is left with the desire that verification be had in which the 
42 er. !Ji, PP· 3.34. 
43 Hartshorne, "Metaphysical Statements as Non-Restric-
tive and Existential," .2.12• cit., p. 39. 
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oonoept is aotually seen to be applied meaningfully to various 
different states ot affairs. 
The same diffioulty raised with regard to the claim that 
statement (2) is necessarily true can be raised with regard to 
statements (3) and (4), •creative synthesis ooours,• and 'there 
are concrete actualities all of which are both externally and in-
ternally related, both absolute and relative.• The apparently 
successful applicAtion of the criterion or metaphysical, ~ eriori 
truth does not suffice to judge these statements as necessarily 
true.44 The mind is left with the desire that verifications be 
had in which the concepts are meaningfully applied to various dif-
ferent states of affairs. In light of these reflections, Harts-
horne• a procedure for determining metaphysical truth by an~ pri-
..2!:! criterion is a valid Whiteheadian development of the method ot 
the working hypothesis; but Hartshorne•s procedure needs to be 
supplemented by the inductive method Whitehead himselt used. 
It is in this light that Hartshorne•s methodological 
commitment to the redoing of Anselm's ontological argument must be 
judged. Hartshorne•s redoing of the argument is valid according 
to his Whiteheadian criterion of metaphysical truth as completely 
non-restrictive. In fact, it would be a dis-confirmation of White· 
head's theism if it were impossible~ Rriori to form a concept ot 
44 ~., pp. 39-43. 
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Whitehead's God as a non-oontradictory possibility which was com• 
pletely non-restriotive.45 However, as Hartshorne himself points 
out, the whole burden of asserting the existence ot God as a meta 
physical truth should not be placed on the ontological argument, 
since other approaches are available in Whiteheadian metaphysics. 
All such approaches, including the ontological argument, should 
be used as mutually confirming each other.46 
The brief defense outlined in this section is only a 
suggestion of the full defense which Hartshorne recognizes should 
be given for a criterion of ~ priori metaphysical truths. A 
thorough consideration of symbolic logic and the philosophy of 
symbolic logic and of the nature of contingent and necessary 
truths needs to be developed.47 Consequently. Hartshorne•a pro-
posal is a reformable, human attempt to identify the criterion of 
~ priori metaphys1oal truth. Both Christian and Leclerc, on the 
one hand, and Hartshorne, on the other, are correct to emphasize 
45 Ct. Hartshorne, ! Natural !lieolosz, ~p. 33•43. 
46 Of. Hartshorne• Man's Vision 2£ God, pp. 339-340. 
One way in which Hartshorne redoes the ontological argument is hi 
appeal to the Royoean argument which Whitehead himself accepts. 
Any attempt to state an objectively true statement, even the posi 
t1v1st attempt to deny meaning to the concept ot God, necessarily 
establishes the exiatenoe ot God as the orit1oal judge of all judgments. Consequently, tor Hartshorne suoh positivism is 
necessarily false, and theism necessarily true. 
Hartshorne, The Log1o of Perfection, P• 70; "Metaphysi-
cal Statements as Non-Ri'Strictlve-and liistential," .2R• Ji!., 
p. 45. 
47 Hartshorne, The Lo io of Perfection 
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the tentativeness, the contingency, of any claim to metaphysical 
truth, whether the truth be proposed inductively by analogous 
generalization and verifioation in experience ror Christian and 
Leolero, or deductively by analogous generalization and experi-
mentation with such axioms in an~ prior~ way by Hartshorne. For 
the tentativeness ot philosophical insight and argument is the 
basic principle speeulative reason must rollow in attempting to 
£u1r111 its funotion. 
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